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1
INTRODUCTION
It is often remarked that Anarchism is an impractical theory imported into the
United States by a lot of ignorant foreigners. Of course, those who make this
statement are as much mistaken as though they made it while conscious of its
falsity. The doctrine of personal freedom is an American doctrine, in so far as the
attempt to put it into practice is concerned, as Paine, Franklin, Jefferson and
others understood it quite well (Joseph Labadie, Anarchism: What It Is and What
It Is Not).
Anarchy does not mean simply opposed to the archos, or political leader. It means
opposed to archē. Now, archē, in the first instance, means beginning, origin. From
this it comes to mean a first principle, an element; then first place, supreme
power, sovereignty, dominion, command, authority; and finally a sovereignty, an
empire, a realm, a magistracy, a governmental office
(Benjamin Tucker, “Anarchism and the State” 34).
We have no illusions that there are any shortcuts to anarchy. We don’t seek to
lead “the” people, but to establish a nation of sovereigns; we don’t seek to be a
vanguard of theorists, but to empower a readership of authors; we don’t seek to be
the artists of a new avant garde, but to enable an audience of performers—we
don’t so much seek to destroy power as to make it freely available in abundance:
we want to be masters without slaves. (CrimethInc, Fighting for our Lives: An
Anarchist Primer 7).
A casual reader of humanities and social sciences scholarship could be forgiven for
thinking that critical theory has been either dead or dying for nearly three decades. Concomitant
with the budding “big theory” era in American universities, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
Michaels questioned its very foundations in their infamous 1982 article, “Against Theory.” In
1996, Alan Sokal’s famous “hoax” on the venerable critical theory organ Social Text left many
opponents of critical theory as a method (and certainly of its popularity in academic research and
mass media coverage of the same) gleefully celebrating the “vindication” of their beliefs that the
endeavor was intentionally obtuse and, in any case, one conducted with little or no stakes in the
“real world” of contemporary political economy. The year 2004 marked the beginning of another
pang in the supposed “death of theory,” one seen everywhere from the publication of Terry
Eagleton’s After Theory, to the linking of Jacques Derrida’s death to the death of critical theory
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as a whole in his obituary in the New York Times, to what Jeffrey Nealon calls the “high profile
wake” for the enterprise that inadvertently resulted from Critical Inquiry’s roundtable on its
future.1 Yet, unlike any of its previous “deaths,” the 2004 postmortem of critical theory did not
present the enterprise as corrupt from the start, or one that had been recently outdated, but rather
as a victim of its own success. Critical theory, long taken to be, in the works of Max Horkheimer,
the “intellectual side of the historical process of proletarian emancipation,” the resistant
counterpoint to the dominant forces of oppression, had proven itself to be so effective that its
methods had been co-opted by the very institutions of social power that it was once leveraged
against (Horkheimer 215).
The post-Marxist writers Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, perhaps the most vocal
proponents of this conclusion, suggest that from the 1980s onward “the postmodernist and
postcolonial theorists who advocate a politics of difference, fluidity, and hybridity in order to
challenge the binaries and essentialism of modern sovereignty have been outflanked by the
strategies of power” (138). As Negri writes elsewhere, critical theory’s critique of capital and
power relations has in many important ways become the very logic of capitalism, thereby
crippling critique as a political tool of dominant social and economic systems and concomitantly
shifting “any possible critical space towards the outside, to its margins” (“The Italian Difference”
13). Similarly, Bruno Latour has drawn our attention to how critical theory’s focus on the power
of discourse and social constructivist epistemology is now being used by those with retrograde
political objectives, such as the “dangerous extremists” who oppose the science of climate
change and who leverage theories of textual indeterminacy and accusations of ideological bias in
order to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives” (227). Far from celebrating critical
1

See Jeffrey T. Nealon’s “Post-Deconstructive: Negri, Derrida, and the State of Theory,”
Symblokē 14, no. 1 (2006): 68-80. Print.
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theory’s “success” on this score, politically inclined academics are instead tasked with thinking
through the irony of the contemporary situation. In Horkheimer and Adorno’s words, what once
“require[d] us to take up the cause of the remnants of freedom, of tendencies toward real
humanity,” is now used by advertising executives, lobbyists/politicians, and CEOs to accumulate
record profits (xi).
In addition to critical theory’s precarious situation, contemporary American politics has
seen a similar ironic inversion taking place around the same time and gathering significant steam
since the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Specifically, the actions and ideas so long
associated with the Left, particularly the populist tactics associated with the “New Left” of the
1960s, have also become unmoored, and find themselves often equally comfortable on the Right
of the political spectrum. The newly christened Tea Party (an acronym that stands for “Taxed
Enough Already”) and other “patriot groups,” many of which are funded by the billionaire Koch
Brothers, have dominated the political landscape using an arsenal of strategies more commonly
associated with leftist organizing. Writing in the New York Times, conservative commentator
David Brooks offers a succinct summary:
The Tea Partiers have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for street theater,
mass rallies, marches and extreme statements that are designed to shock polite society out
of its stupor. This mimicry is no accident. Dick Armey, one of the spokesmen for the Tea
Party movement, recently praised the methods of Saul Alinsky, the leading tactician of
the New Left. (“The Wal-Mart Hippies”)
Consequently, the American Left, despite Democratic control of both the Presidency and
Congress from 2008-10, as well as the emergence of the ubiquitous yet short-lived Occupy Wall
Street movement in 2010, there has been less cheering than jeering. According to a recent

4
“manifesto” in the Nation Magazine, “American progressives and principled liberals need to face
an essential truth: the Democratic Party, as now constituted, is no longer an agency for realizing
their ideals (“How to Save the Democratic Party”). Unable to counter the Right’s assault on
social programs and responsible regulation, as well as the continual capitulation to the Right’s
demands, the reform-minded and radical Left has been left disappointed on seemingly all fronts.
The early twenty-first century has found critical theory’s critical gaze turned inward, and
those concerned with social, political, and economic justice without a program. Thus, one might
ask: what is or could be considered “radicalism” in the twenty-first century? In addition, what is
the role of critical thought in/for such twenty-first century radicalism?
For some, critical theory’s “death” warrants a gleeful adieu. Stanley Fish, for instance,
suggests “theory is a political non-starter,” and one should “stop asking it to do things it just
can’t do” (“Ideas and Theory: The Political Difference”). Critical theory, in this regard, is not
political; politics alone is political. In short, “theoretical formulations are not answers to
political/empirical questions” (“Ideas and Theory: The Political Difference”). Yet for others, the
goal has been to interrogate and contextualize critical theory’s own existence in order to take
stock of its impact and move beyond the contemporary impasse. This entails, in Terry Eagleton’s
words, “reflect[ing] on the truth and reality of its [critical theory’s] existence, at a time when
postmodern thought has grave doubts about both truth and reality” (73). Indeed, the text
Philosophy in the Present, a dialogue between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek addressing the role
of philosophy in the wake critical theory’s “death” suggests both an audience and an academy
eager to move beyond the current impasse (this text was republished three times in 2010 alone).
In their discussion, Žižek suggests it is time to renounce the “neo-Kantian” and “postmodern
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neosophism” that has marked the academy for over a generation and reconstitute philosophy and
its quest for timeless truths (65-66).
The most common answers to the questions outlined above—the same ones that guide this
study—have included two “(re)turns.” Most prominent has been the return to the study of
ontology by such thinkers as Jean-Luc Nancy, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Michael Hardt
and his collaborator Antonio Negri. Furthermore, in the works of many theorists, particularly
Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, and Terry Eagleton, Marxism remains the dominant political
paradigm. Yet, the (re)turn to such essentialized categories threatens to roll-back the advances
made in politics and critical thought as a result of poststructuralism’s questioning of these very
categories. While the contemporary moment suggests the need to rethink critical theory and its
connection to politics, the response to its latest “death” should not risk dismissing the practices
and connections that once invigorated an entire generation of radicals, artists, and dissidents.
Indeed, Jean-Luc Nancy, for one, points out that the revolts of May 1968, were largely
influenced by the works of France’s most influential theorists—the same “neo-Kantians” and
“postmodern neosophists” Badiou and Žižek are apt to blame for the decline of philosophical
thought: “In the midst of the profound upheavals caused by decolonization—accompanied, on
the one hand, by the multiplication of socialist-revolutionary or socialist-republican models, and,
on the other, be the tectonic mutations of thought and representations—we left the age of
‘History,’ as Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida all diagnosed very early on” (9). On
Nancy’s view, these theorists’ critique of Western metaphysics became a tool for radicals,
dissidents, and students in their attempt to create an egalitarian society. For Rancière, who, one
might argue, is the heir apparent of critical theory, if there is ever to be a similar rupture in the
body politic, one must recognize that “the end of politics” bemoaned by Badiou, Žižek, Hardt
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and Negri, etc, as well as the hope for a “return of politics” by Marxists like Eagleton, Jameson,
and Harvey, belies the possibility that both views are “two complementary ways of cancelling
out politics in the simple relationship between a state of the social and a state of the state
apparatus” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 42). In other words, the returns to metaphysics and
Marxism because of critical theory’s “failure,” enact the same problematic: they limit our ability
to (re)imagine the very concepts of politics and ethics.
For this study, I attempt to join rhetorical theory and anarchist politics as a counterpoint to
the current trends toward metaphysics and Marxism. To be specific, this dissertation argues that
instead of turning away from much of critical theory and returning to originary systems of
totalizing thought—Marxism and metaphysics—we develop more fully many of critique’s most
influential tenets by taking up two constellations of ideas that, while implied in much of critical
theory’s postmodern and poststructuralist expression, have either been overlooked or
disregarded. To phrase it another way, instead of discounting critical theory out of
disappointment and disgust and returning to the originary models of human thought (philosophy)
and radical politics (Marxism), we optimistically take up an alternative set of ideas that stand
directly opposed to such original categories: rhetoric and anarchism. In the chapters following
this one, I develop what I call “anarchic rhetoric,” which, I hope, echoes Wendy Brown’s
observation that “[c]ritical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it
might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor” (16).
The End of Politics?
Before continuing with the argument, however, it is necessary to reiterate and elaborate
on some of the concepts and ideas that have marked critical theory since the mid-twentieth
century and characterize what has broadly been called the “linguistic turn” within critical theory.
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Doing so will allow me to better articulate the various responses to critical theory’s “death,” as
well as frame my project’s relationship to these responses. The following, then, is a brief
description of the ideas of Jacques Derrida, whose work I take to be emblematic of the sort of
poststructuralist and critical thought that has been both venerated and valorized since the midtwentieth century and, as such, informs much of my own approach in the following chapters. To
be clear, while I recognize that Derrida’s ideas are well-worn territory, I begin here because the
project of “deconstruction,” with its emphasis on the contingency of language and its ability to
undermine dialectical/philosophical thought, as well as its influence on later critical theorists,
provides the proper contextualization for my turn to rhetoric and anarchism. To be specific,
deconstruction, insofar as it is “political,” represents both the best and worst of critical theory’s
uptake in French poststructuralist and postmodern thought.
Being well-worn territory, I will reserve a long explication of Derrida’s thought and
instead offer a brief summary in order to move into a discussion of Derrida’s reception among
Marxist-oriented critical theorists. Derrida’s project takes up the whole of Western metaphysics
through a reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, as well as the way in which a certain desire for absolute
“presence” characterizes the work of, among others, Rousseau and Levi-Strauss. Most famously,
though, Derrida targets the relationship between speech (dialectical/philosophical examination)
and writing (rhetoric) in the Phaedrus, and, through a philological investigation into the meaning
of the word “pharmakon” undermines Plato’s condemnation of writing/rhetoric and valorization
of dialectical exchange.
As Derrida notes in his book Dissemination, when Plato criticizes writing (qua sophistic
rhetoric), Plato uses the term “pharmakon,” which means both remedy and poison. Thus, when
Plato’s Socrates makes the case against writing, which is a criticism directed “above all against
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sophistics” that “mark[ed] out the battle lines between sophistics and philosophy” for over two
millennia (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 1855-1856), Plato attempts to efface “the fact that the pharmakon
properly consists in a certain inconsistency, a certain impropriety, this nonidentity-with-itself
always allowing it to be turned against itself” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 1865). To phrase it another
way, Plato pits dialectic (philosophy) against rhetoric, which he labels a poison (“pharmakon”).
However, as Derrida points out, because “pharmakon” also suggests remedy or healing, the
distinction between rhetoric and philosophy lacks the substantive grounding Plato thought he
was providing. By making this distinction, Derrida calls into question the Platonic hope for
metaphysical knowledge via dialectical exchange, which, as he suggests, marks the history of
Western philosophy and its claim to absolute correspondence between signifiers and signified.
The result is that all “Truth” claims, in being cast against some opposing or competing concept,
have a priori assumptions that “deconstruct” the binary. Such a situation reveals that the Platonic
desire for an idealized communicative process that brings one into contact with the everlasting
and divine is an impossibility. Echoing Horkheimer’s characterization of “traditional theory,”
philosophy, on Derrida’s view, is characterized by the desire to efface contingency and
undecidability by developing totalizing systems of thought and action. 2
The result of Derrida’s view is that the desire for Platonic truth is undermined by
language’s slipperiness. For Derrida, because language lacks a transcendental referent, meaning
is constructed at certain times, among certain groups, and in particular places. Such a view, then,
seems to suggest a rhetorical view of truth and meaning that evokes Plato’s archenemies, the
Sophists and their interest in kairos—the recognition that persuasion is dependent on arguing the

2 Horkheimer writes, “The general goal of all theory is a universal systematic science,
not limited to any particular subject, but embracing all possible objects” (“Traditional and
Critical Theory” 188).
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“right” thing at the “right” time in front of particular audience. The sophist Gorgias, for instance,
writes, “[O]n most subjects most men take opinion as counselor to their soul, but since opinion is
slippery and insecure it casts those employing it into slippery and insecure successes” (41). Thus,
the works of both Derrida and Gorgias continually point to the idea that “truth” and “meaning”
are contingent and open to construction and revision at anytime.
However, despite bearing such a strong resemblance to sophistic thought, Derrida is
unwilling to assign rhetoric the same all-encompassing definition as Gorgias. Whereas Gorgias
calls rhetoric “a powerful lord” (41), Derrida argues, “I am in favor of the most rigorous and
most generous attention given to rhetoric. What I'm suspicious of under the name 'rhetoricism’ is
the authority of language” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16). In fact, when
faced with the opposition between the Plato and the sophists, Derrida says he “would be on the
side of philosophy” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16), and any privileging of
“rhetoricism…is synonymous with logocentrism or phonocentrism” (“Jacques Derrida on
Rhetoric and Composition” 19). To summarize, Derrida’s project might be characterized as a
rhetorically inclined philosophy that, in being “interested in the way concepts or arguments
depend intrinsically on metaphors, tropes, and are in themselves to some extent metaphors or
tropes,” is somewhere in between philosophy and rhetoric. Alternatively, to use Derrida’s
description, “To the extent that I am caught up within this couple, I'm a philosopher, but I try not
to remain within this opposition” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16). The
point I am trying to make here is that although his critique of Western philosophy shares much in
common with philosophy’s Other—rhetoric—Derrida is unwilling to place himself in that
tradition. He makes clear that one must “be fully cognizant that this reading of Plato is at no time
spurred on by some slogan or password of a ‘back-to-the sophists-nature” (“Plato’s Pharmacy”
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1857). While his work has done much for (re)invigorating rhetorical studies, his project’s own
undecidability and his refusal to take hard stances leaves much to be desired, particularly, as I
hope to show, when it comes to questions of politics and ethics.
Derrida would come to take up variety of controversial and politically oriented themes
late in his career, which included penning perhaps his most (in)famous work, Specters of Marx.
In this text, Derrida develops the concept of the “new international,” one who is “an untimely
link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine,
without contract, ‘out of joint,’ without coordination, without party, without country, without
national community” (Specters of Marx 107). The “new international” “refers to a profound
transformation, projected over the long term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of
intervention” (Specters of Marx 105). Yet, this collective existence, this striving for a more
egalitarian existence is a future-to-come. The “new international,” and Derrida’s entire project, is
“even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of a promise
that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious
determination, from any messianism” (Specters of Marx 111). Such a goal—to be messianic
without the messianism—means recognizing the “undeconstructibility of a certain form of
justice” (Specters of Marx 112). Derrida suggests that such a project begins by acknowledging
that “no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so
many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth”
(Specters of Marx 106). Yet this knowledge is only a beginning. For as he puts forth in his essay
“On Cosmopolitanism,” to create such a messianic project with the messianism is a task of
“invention” (4).
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Paradoxically, this future-to-come, which is to remedy these concrete political injustices,
is dependent on the constant questioning of any possible future. That is, endless critique must
orient any possible politics stemming from deconstruction:
A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the
irreducibility or affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the
undeconstructability of a certain idea of justice (disassociated here from law). Such a
thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable,
infinite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. (Specters of Marx
112)
The formation of a “new international,” a messianic project, must endlessly critique its own
possible futures so as to avoid becoming a “messianism.” Thus, we are left with an aporia
whereby the invention of the “new international” means constantly striving for and critiquing an
(un)known future.
Regarding Derrida’s decision to enter into radical political discourse in 1994 with his
Specters of Marx, the moment when the future of Marxism was being debated most vigorously,
Terry Eagleton wryly remarks, “He has…been an unconscionably long time coming” (“Marxism
Without the Marxism” 83). Eagleton continues by asking, “[W]here was Jacques Derrida when
we needed him, in the long dark night of Reagan-Thatcher” (“Marxism Without the Marxism”
83)? The implicit answer in Eagleton’s question is that Derrida would not have risked making
and taking a stand, as it would have then ran the risk of transforming into dogmatic ideology
(“logocentrism”), and would have performed the same act that Derrida targets in his works.
Derrida’s method seeks, instead, to question these dogmas, the binary oppositions that favor and
oppress, but are forever intertwined with one another. Thus, in an effort to avoid committing the
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same act he criticizes, Derrida refuses to move beyond his analyses and critique to posit a
concrete and more egalitarian alternative. However, at the time of Marxism’s collapse, Derrida
also makes the claim that deconstruction is a but a “radicalization” of Marxism, and “[e]ven
where it [Marxism] is not acknowledged, even where it remains unconscious or disavowed, this
debt remains at work, in particular in political philosophy which structures implicitly all
philosophy or all thought on the subject of philosophy” (114-115). All we are left with,
according to Eagleton, is a “preoccupation with slippage, failure, aporia, incoherence, notquiteness, its suspicion of the achieved” (“Marxism Without Marxism” 86). Like Derrida’s
refusal to go “back-to-the sophists” despite his works’ affinity to Sophistic thought, Derrida’s
(re)turn to Marx results in what Eagleton characterizes as “Marxism without Marxism”—a
radical critique without a politics (“Marxism Without Marxism” 87).
Whither Radical Politics?
For many thinkers, the connection between deconstruction and radical Marxist politics
fails on all accounts: it gives no concrete political recommendation, nor does it provide any
substantiated grounding from which to think about the political. Indeed, as was spelled out in the
opening pages, critique’s unmooring from leftist politics has left critical theorists and radicals
alike searching for some place to hang their hats. Perhaps Antonio Negri’s commentary on
Specters of Marx best lays bare the alleged impotence, and, indeed the danger, of a politics of an
(anti)metaphysical (anti)Marxist deconstruction:
When the analysis passes from the hermeneutic and ontological viewpoint to the
experience of the political, the picture given is terrible. The conspiracy against Marxism
and the world evangelization of the free market, the construction of a global power
“without place” and “without time,” the structuring of the “end of history,” the media’s
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colonization of consciousness and the impoverishment in the quality of work, the
emptying out of meaning from the word “democracy—within individual countries and in
international relations—these represent only a few of the hegemonic orders of capitalism
in one phase of the spectral construction of the real. (“The Specter’s Smile” 9)
Those who echo Negri’s observations include Fredric Jameson and Eagleton, who argue that the
separation of critique from political leftism warrants a return to the originary radical politics of
Karl Marx. In 2010, Jameson published Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One and
Eagleton released Why Marx Was Right. Within philosophy, Alain Badiou points to the need for
the “reconstruction or re-emergence of the category of truth” as a corrective to
poststructuralism’s lack of genuine philosophical thought (“Philosophy and Desire” 36). He
suggests, “Our epoch can be said to have been stamped and signed, in philosophy, by the return
of the question of Being” (Deleuze: The Clamor of Being 19). Thus, as mentioned in the opening
pages and developed in the discussion of Derrida’s work, the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries have been marked by the following situation: poststructuralist critique, with its
“deconstruction” of binary thought, refusal of monolithic structures of meaning, and challenge to
“grand narratives,” has been both unmoored from political leftism and co-opted by contemporary
capitalism, as have the leftist political tactics been appropriated by the political right. As a result,
many—particularly Badiou and Žižek—have sought to replace the outdated, outmoded, and
outflanked critical theory with a resurrecting of and return to metaphysics and Marxism.
Rhetoric and Anarchism
Bearing the above in mind, my aim here is to provide an alternative to the return to
metaphysics and Marxism by pursuing many of the ideas handed down by critical theory’s
“linguistic turn.” As I hope will become clear, a turn to rhetoric can be seen as extending many
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tenets of critical theory’s poststructuralist expression, and, as such, provides a salient (and
persuasive) set of ideas through which to interrogate the death of critical theory and radical
politics. Instead of returning to those concepts that critical theory has sought to overcome,
rhetoric provides a new and generative perspective on today’s political and critical impasse.
What’s more, by turning to rhetoric to address the above questions, one might deduce a curious
situation whereby instead of setting Western metaphysics on its head, poststructuralist critical
thought might be seen as an opening act to the main event: a whole hog embrace of philosophy’s
Other—rhetoric. Indeed, in what comes next, I claim that turning to rhetoric implies another
Other: anarchism.
In his book, Saving Persuasion, Bryan Garsten writes, “In both theory and practice today,
the reigning view of rhetorical speech is that it is a disruptive force in politics and a threat to
deliberation” (3). In place of the State, the practice of rhetoric holds the possibility of a polity
“being subjected to the rule of persuasive speakers.” Garsten argues this anxiety begins with
Plato and can be traced through philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. Indeed,
Plato’s suggestion that “self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as
cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice” largely set the stage for subsequent dismissals of
rhetoric from progressive social theory; rhetoric, more often than not, is simply positioned as the
probable or contingent masquerading as the transcendental or just (Gorgias 72). As a result of
this vilification, argues Garsten, the dominant practice has been to eliminate rhetoric from the
political arena, which, in turn, has alienated citizens from democratic participation. In other
words, rhetoric holds the potential to violate notions of the sovereign State and its embodiment
of reason and the capacity for judgment. Therefore, one might reasonably say that because
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rhetoric is void of any meaningful content, the rhetoricians who practice this craft pose a
potential threat to the State.
So, is the insinuation here that rhetoricians are anarchists? While I in no way claim that
all who engage in rhetoric are anti-Statists, there is a striking resemblance between anarchist
politics and certain strands of rhetorical theory. To elaborate, because of its very nature,
anarchism, as both a politics and philosophy, is notoriously difficult to define. As Peter Marshall
writes, “It would be misleading to offer a neat definition of anarchism, since by its very nature it
is anti-dogmatic. It does not offer a fixed body of doctrine based on one particular world-view”
(3). Despite this, every study of anarchism begins with an obligatory explanation that attempts to
explain the major tenets and aims of anarchism. While this essay is no different, I want to
emphasize anarchism’s inherent skepticism and contingency.
Anarchism can be characterized as “[t]he philosophy of a new social order based on
liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence,
and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary” (Goldman 50). Its goal is “to
establish the condition of anarchy, that is to say, a decentralized and self-regulating society
consisting of a federation of voluntary associations of free and equal individuals,” which allows
for humans to “realize their full potential” (Marshall 3). To realize this goal, anarchism adopts a
dynamic and experimental approach to fostering social change. Paul Goodman’s short
“Reflections on the Anarchist Principle” captures the pragmatic, contingent, and kairotic nature
of anarchism:
[T]his relativity of the anarchist principle to the actual situation is of the essence of
anarchism. There cannot be a history of anarchism in the sense of establishing a
permanent state of things called “anarchist.” It is always a continual coping with the next
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situation, and a vigilance to make sure that past freedoms are not lost and do not turn into
the opposite, as free enterprise turned into wage-slavery and monopoly capitalism, or the
independent judiciary turned into a monopoly of courts, cops, and lawyers, or free
education turned into school systems. (56)
Anarchism’s skepticism and kairotic nature has resulted in several varying trends. Depending on
the emphasis of the practitioner, anarchism is often categorized as either “social” or
“individualist,” each of which has a unique set of practices and aims. Marshall notes, “The
individualists see the danger of obligatory cooperation and are worried that a collectivist society
will lead to the tyranny of the group. On the other hand, the social anarchists are concerned that a
society of individualists might become atomistic and that the spirit of competition could destroy
mutual aid and general solidarity” (6). While this division has given birth to several schools of
thought and practice—mutualist, collectivist, communist, syndicalist, anarcho-capitalist—all
anarchists reject the institutionalized concentration of power. Consequently, the only way to
check this concentration is through a flexible approach that rejects any “incontrovertible
blueprint for future generations” (Marshall 6).
Standard histories of political anarchism, while acknowledging the work of William
Godwin’s “philosophical anarchism,” begin with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and his disciple
Mikhail Bakunin. While these two laid the foundation for the views described above, what is
also of note here is their relationship to Karl Marx. Indeed, the conflict between the anarchists
and Marx largely laid the foundation for radical politics for well over a century. In fact, Marx’s
philosophy was largely developed in response to the anarchist movement over a nearly thirtyyear period. Proudhon’s well-known 1846 letter to Karl Marx best illustrates the debate between
the two. Responding to Marx’s invitation to engage in a series of letters, Proudhon writes:
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I applaud with all my heart your thought of bringing all opinions to light; let us carry on a
good and loyal polemic; let us give the world an example of learned and far-sighted
tolerance, but let us not, merely because we are at the head of a movement, make
ourselves the leaders of a new intolerance, let us not pose as the apostles of a new
religion, even if it be the religion of logic, the religion of reason. Let us gather together
and encourage all protests, let us brand all exclusiveness, all mysticism; let us never
regard a question as exhausted, and when we have used our last argument, let us begin
again, if need be, with eloquence and irony. (“Proudhon to Marx”)
Against Proudhon, Marx would develop his own philosophy, a dialectical view of historical
progress that poked a finger in the eye of Proudhon’s anarchism. In fact, a year after Proudhon’s
letter, Marx would publish The Poverty of Philosophy as a direct refutation of Proudhon’s The
Philosophy of Poverty. This trend would continue throughout Marx’s work and eventually boil
over during the 1872 Hague Conference of the First International. During the conference, Marx
and the Congress voted to expel the anarchist wing of the International thereby laying the
foundation for the reign of Marxism as the paradigmatic radical political program.
The role of the State constituted the primary point of contention among Marx and the
anarchists. While the Marxist and anarchist programs have always shared the desire for a
Stateless society, they differed on the means for realizing this goal. Whereas Marx’s historical
materialism retained an important role for the State in ushering communism, the anarchists
argued that a “dictatorship of the proletariat” would simply be replacing one oppressive force
with another. Indeed, Bakunin, Marx’s rival in the First International, polemically writes, “In a
word, we reject all legislation, all authority, and all privileged, licensed, official, and legal
influence…This is the sense in which we are really anarchists” (35). For the anarchists, the State,
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no matter the form, was an obstacle to emancipation. In positioning themselves against the State,
the anarchists, then, were left to seek modes of rhetorical engagement that did not rely on
appealing to the State for social or political reforms or participating in the State via the electoral
or legislative processes. In light, then, of the seemingly anti-Statist Occupy Wall Street and Tea
Party movements, a reconsideration of anarchism and its strategies of persuasion and coalition
building seem timely.
Marx vs. the Sophists?
The connection between anarchist politics and certain strands of rhetorical thought is not
an uncanny one. As the epigraph by Benjamin Tucker points up, anarchist politics, in its refusal
of “first principles,” seemingly does what Plato and a long line of dialecticians saw as the danger
of rhetoric and those sophists who practiced it; rhetoric and rhetoricians are a threat to reason and
its codification in institutions and processes. Such a connection becomes apparent when
examining Marx’s quarrel with the anarchists. As Marx—possibly the archetypal dialectician—
was developing his system of thought against the anarchists, he forwarded a critique that echoes
Plato’s dismissal of Sophistic rhetoric that reveals, despite his own ambivalence towards the
Greek philosopher, a veiled Platonism. For example, in stark contrast to Proudhon’s above letter,
Marx’s 1871 letter concerning Bakunin’s writings sounds rather Platonic:
This infant's [Bakunin] spelling-book found favour (and still has a certain hold) in Italy
and Spain, where the real conditions of the workers' movement are as yet little developed,
and among a few vain, ambitious and empty doctrinaires in French Switzerland and
Belgium. For Mr. Bakunin the theory (the assembled rubbish he has scraped together
from Proudhon, St. Simon, etc.) is a secondary affair – merely a means to his personal
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self-assertion. If he is a nonentity as a theoretician he is in his element as an intriguer.
(“Marx to Friedrich Bolte”)
In this light, anarchism, like rhetoric, lacks a metaphysical or intellectual grounding, and,
because of this, is empty, void of any meaningful content. That is, we hear in Marx’s critique of
Bakunin’s anarchism Plato’s assertion that rhetoric is simply an “experience” void of content and
unable to bring one into contact with metaphysical conceptions of the “good” or “just.”
Furthermore, in enacting the sort of Platonism that he always sought to avoid, Marx’s criticism
and expunging of anarchism during the First International established the modus operandi for all
successive critiques of anarchism. Namely, as E.J. Hobsbwam writes, “the main appeal of
anarchism was emotional and not intellectual;” and, as a result, “it has almost been designed for
failure.” Thus, tracing this homology out, one might say that as anarchism is to Marxism (and
politics in general), rhetoric is to metaphysics and philosophy.
In suggesting this homology, one is left not only with two competing views of
epistemology and metaphysics, but also with two competing political ends: taking power or
challenging power. Extending this line of thought, theories of political engagement founded on
dialectics lead to “taking power.” As Richard McKeon notes:
The dialectical invocation of truth as guide in action and in use of power is easily
transformed into the assumption that those in power possess wisdom and defend truth
(totalitarianism) or into the use of power (as in the dictatorship of the proletariat) to
establish conditions of "freedom" which have no clear connection with the common
good. (24)
Certainly, Plato’s “guardians of the republic” (those with an understanding of dialectical logos
that allows them to see past reality to the eternal realm of metaphysics) are mirrored in Marx’s
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class-conscious vanguard (those with an understanding of how the “real conditions” of capitalist
production obscure “species-being”). The result, according to Bakunin, is that the “[t]he highly
inspired must be listened to and obeyed by the less inspired, and the less inspired by the
uninspired, and with it the fundamental institutions of slavery: Church and State” (53). Figured
in this way, both Platonism and Marxism give way to a first and guiding principle that is to direct
and determine action and engagement, which in Plato’s case, is discovered via
dialectical/philosophical exchange and is to be embodied in the Republic, or, in Marx’s case,
discovered via historical materialism and is to be enforced by the “dictatorship of the
proletariat.” In short, both politics rely on the power of a metaphysical arkhê and its
manifestation in the State form. The result is a strict limiting, restricting, and determining of the
acceptable forms of rhetorical engagement.
In stark contrast to dialectical/metaphysical philosophies that seek to consolidate and
concentrate thoughts and actions in the State form, rhetoric serves to democratize power. In his
reading of the Phaedrus, Jacques Rancière argues that Plato’s concern with writing (rhetoric) is
not that it is unable to defend itself against the dialectician, but that it is “too loquacious”;
rhetoric can “transmit anything, anywhere.” Further, Rancière suggests that “[m]ute in the face
of the philosophers’ questions, it [rhetoric] cannot restrain itself from speaking to the uninitiated”
(Philosopher 40). As such, rhetoric “put the logos at the disposal of men whose work had
damaged their bodies and mutilated their souls” (Philosopher 40). By resisting dialectic and
speaking to the “uninitiated” and unqualified, rhetoric undermines the arkhê determining
political action and organization. Unrestrained by dialectics/metaphysics and the State, rhetoric
becomes democratically grounded in the lives of individuals who have the ability to question the
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principles that are meant to guide action and present counter-arguments so as to shape and create
the lives they deem fit for living.
Following this line of argument, one might say, then, that the State, with its foundational
arkhê, is by and large an institution formed to protect against rhetoric’s an-arkhê-istic function—
its democratic loquaciousness. By keeping rhetoric within acceptable bounds and in the proper
hands, the State protects the powerful. Bearing this distinction in mind, the following chapters
aim to connect the rhetorical tradition and the anarchist tradition to develop an “anarchic
rhetoric.” Or, in other words, the rest of this essay seeks to show what James Arnt Aune suggests
Marxism with its veiled Platonism has failed to answer: “[W]hat sorts of communicative
processes enable historical actors to see liberatory possibilities” (13)?
Anarchism and the Academy
I see the argument I am making here as contributing to much contemporary thinking on
anarchism, while also advocating for a new theoretical and methodological frame. To be specific,
while I see this study as participating in a recent “anarchist turn” in cultural studies that was
largely inaugurated by Todd May’s The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, I
contend that much of the work within this “turn” does not escape the pitfalls outlined above
concerning poststructuralism’s connection to politics. In connecting poststructuralist thought to
anarchism, May begins by noting that although many thinkers, particularly French thinkers,
including Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, and Badiou, have made politics explicit in their writings,
their engagements have been with Marxist thought. May suggests that because of the tenuous
connections between these thinkers and the Marxist tradition, it may be time to move beyond
Marxism (if one can call today’s radical politics Marxist in the first place). He writes:
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There has been much dialogue between these thinkers and the Marxist tradition. Often,
this dialogue involves various kinds of modification of Marxist thought. However, given
the contortions made in order to bring Marx into alignment with current thinking, one
might wonder whether it would be better to seek a new tradition in which to embed their
thought. (11)
Indeed, May’s own work has sought to connect the “classical” anarchism of Bakunin, Proudhon,
and Stirner with the poststructuralist thought of Deleuze and Foucault ushered in a small “turn to
anarchism.”3 Since the publication of May’s text, there have been many other attempts to
synthesize anarchism and poststrucuralism. These connections have resulted in various theories
of “postmodern anarchism” (Lewis Call) and “postanarchism” (Saul Newman).4 These studies
are joined by those other scholars, who, along with May, have pointed to anarchism as an
alternative to the Marxism that permeates discourses on radical politics, most notably Jacques
Rancière, David Graeber, and Simon Critchley. The works of Rancière, Graeber, and Critchley
have enjoyed a widespread readership, thus they serve as frequent reference points throughout
this dissertation.
While I agree with the general aims of these studies, I find their desire to connect
philosophy, even the sort of poststructuralist philosophy we described above, and anarchism
somewhat ironic. As Benjamin Tucker, who called himself a “philosophical anarchist,” reminds
us, anarchism is opposed not just to government or the State, but all “archē,” all fundamental and
guiding principles, those very things that philosophy seeks to provide. I address this issue
explicitly in chapter two and suggest that Tucker’s response to the alleged bombing of police by
3

See the newly-minted journal Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies.
See Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation of
Power. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001, and Call’s Postmodern Anarchism. Lexington:
Lexington Books. 2002.
4

23
Chicago anarchists reveals a rhetorically-inflected anarchism that stands in opposition to the
search of and appeal to immutable truths. To put it bluntly, in opposition to any sort of
philosophical anarchism, my figuration of “anarchic rhetoric,” I hope, provides a model of
communicative interaction that allows for a particularly timely and persuasive political
intervention that takes the form of a collective “declaration of independence” from the body
politic.
Perhaps because of its uncanniness, anarchism has been relatively absent within rhetorical
studies. Any studies that have investigated anarchist rhetoric have, in large part, focused on
individual rhetors such as Emma Goldman or Mikhail Bakunin. A study such as Martha
Solomon’s “Ideology as Rhetorical Constraint: The Anarchist Agitation of ‘Red Emma’
Goldman,” reveals the sort of rhetorical scholarship surrounding anarchism. Soloman writes,
“close study of her [Goldman’s] work suggests, in the final analysis, the self-contradictions of
anarchist rhetoric” (185). This “final analysis” is one that is too narrow in scope. Though it does
offer an interesting read on Goldman’s rhetoric, Solomon’s dismissal of anarchist rhetoric
illustrates a naïve understanding of anarchist philosophy, one that fails to account for the
historical situation surrounding Goldman and the movement at large. Further, if one considers
the fact that Emma Goldman was imprisoned and deported by the American government, as well
as the resulting legislation that sought to limit anarchist activity, one might reasonably say that
Goldman’s rhetoric was in fact successful.5 In short, Solomon is unable to locate Goldman’s
rhetorical practice within larger historical and political frameworks.
Other studies dismiss anarchism altogether. In Persuasion and Social Movements, a
seminal text in social movement rhetoric, authors Stewart, Smith and Denton Jr. write,
5
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“[p]erhaps the most prominent advocate of revolutionary argument was the anarchist Johann
Most. While others simply blew buildings to pieces, Most delighted in using language to
describe violent acts” (198). Described as such, the authors reduce anarchism to a disturbing and
oversimplified dichotomy, whereby one either willingly commits violence or takes a sadistic
pleasure in describing it. In either case, the authors pay little attention to the larger rhetorical
situation, thereby castigating anarchist rhetoric to the periphery, where it has remained, deemed
unworthy of attention. This dissertation aims to remedy the neglect of this tradition within
rhetorical scholarship by analyzing the specific tropes and strategies of persuasion used within
anarchist rhetoric and how those reference points might allow us to rethink the possibilities for
radical political rhetoric, persuasion, and critical thought in the present.
Methodology
To develop what I call “anarchic rhetoric,” I employ a genealogical method indebted to
Michel Foucault. The genealogical method, according to Foucault, examines the formations and
uses of knowledges and concepts in the service of power. Foucault suggests that genealogy is “a
form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of
objects, etc., without having to make reference to the field of events or runs in its empty
sameness throughout the course of history” (“Truth and Power” 59). In other words, genealogy
demands the isolation and documentation of the points when a particular interpretation of a
concept “emerges,” as well as “the use it serves” (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 86). Such a
method, then, allows me take up a set of individuals and groups, who, at first blush, seem wholly
unconnected. In fact, only chapter two takes up the work of a self-identified anarchist. This does
not mean, though, that the title of this project is a misnomer. As the epigraph by the Detroit
anarchist Joseph Labadie underscores, America has been home to an often neglected and
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maligned radical anti-Statist tradition since its founding. A genealogy focusing on the strategies
of persuasion that these “anarchists” employed reveals a rhetoric without a partisan home or
metaphysical underpinnings that has often been used in advocating paradoxical and conflicting
ends. Specifically, what becomes clear throughout this dissertation is that whereas anarchist
rhetoric was once used to challenge the English Empire and its colonial practices and the
concentration of power in the Federal Government following the American Revolution, it is now
being used to justify the unrestricted and unfettered growth of Empire.
Because of the recent resurgence in the use of Revolutionary symbols and rhetoric by the
conservative Tea Party, the “Founding Fathers” serve as bookends for the entire project. More
specifically, the first chapter takes up Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. In
doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why do anarchists, whether on the Left or the Right,
look back fondly on the American Revolution and its Declaration of Independence? In other
words, what tropes and figures did Jefferson, in his penning of the Declaration, employ that
resonate so strongly with anarchists?
To clarify the question, the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker, who I take up in
chapter two, suggests that anarchists are “unterrified Jeffersonian Democrats” (“State Socialism:
How Far they Agree and Wherein the Differ” 13). In fact, the pages of Tucker’s radical anarchist
periodical Liberty are filled with references and allusions to Jefferson and Jeffersonian
democracy. Moreover, the anarchism of the New Left thinker Paul Goodman’s is also heavily
influenced by Jefferson’s vision of government and citizen engagement. Thus, this chapter
examines the intersection of Jefferson’s writings and anarchism in order to explain both his
appeal to anarchists and lay the foundation for my figuration of “anarchic rhetoric.” By
contextualizing Jefferson’s view of rhetoric and politics and analyzing the Declaration of
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Independence, I argue that Jefferson lays the foundation for anarchic rhetoric. In opposition to
those scholars who place Jefferson in the liberal or republican camps, I suggest Jefferson, in his
complicating of these two traditions, points to the following figuration of an anarchist society: a
society can be considered anarchistic in proportion to the rhetorical engagement of its
inhabitants. The more rhetoric there is, the less concentrated power there will be.
Chapter Two takes us from the macro to the micro level. Whereas Jefferson provides us
with a view of an anarchist society, the response of Benjamin Tucker and his compatriots, who
are often called the “Boston Anarchists,” to the Chicago Haymarket Affair offers a look at the
rhetorical exchange between individuals and groups of people within an anarchist arrangement.
The bombing of a column of police officers, which was allegedly committed by a group of
European immigrants and anarchists, led to anarchism’s vilification among politicians, citizens,
and other leftist radicals. However, in the face of widespread condemnation, repression, and
intimidation, Tucker proudly donned the anarchist label. Thus, at a time when anarchism
becomes synonymous with terror, violence, and infiltration, Tucker still sought to attract others
to the cause. So, what tropes, figures, and strategies did Tucker employ to navigate this problem?
I argue that Tucker draws on Adam Smith’s figuration of “sympathy,” the rhetorical construction
of moral sentiments. In foregrounding the sympathetic process, Tucker provides a foil to the
Platonic dialectic, which seeks persuasion through reason, empathy, and consensus, and begins
to draw our attention to the affective dimension of anarchic rhetoric and the ways in which the
rhetorical construction of moral sentiments (sympathy) can take the place of the State while
avoiding absolute moral relativism.
While chapter three is largely a demonstration of anarchic rhetoric from a leftist position,
it also draws our attention to the aesthetic dimension of such a rhetoric. Specifically, this chapter
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examines the Marxist C.L.R. James’ intervention into what was called the “negro question”
among radical leftist groups. Contextualizing James’s work within the leftist movements of the
early twentieth-century reveals his dissatisfaction with both American liberalism and the
dominant Stalinism in addressing the needs of African Americans, whom he identified as the
most radicalized population in the United States. Although he began his venture into American
radical politics as a Trotskyist, he would eventually forge his own path and advocate for a
decentralized and autonomous African American politics. In doing so, he would seek to build a
coalition by seeking “sympathy” around the particular affect of anger. What is more, in rejecting
both the liberal and Stalinist attempts to represent African Americans, James would ironically
appropriate the Roosevelt’s “fireside chat” in order to advocate for Bigger Thomas, a character
from Richard Wright’s novel Native Son, occupying the White House. James’ turn away from
Trotskyism, and call for an autonomous African American political movement violates what
Rancière calls the “police order,” and works “the interval between identities” in order to
“reconfigure the distributions of the public and private” and the “universal and particular”
(Hatred of Democracy 62-63). By taking us into the realm of the aesthetic, James underscores
the role of rhetoric in determining politics, instead of the common assumption that politics
determines the rhetoric.
In the concluding chapter, I take up the rewriting of social studies curriculum by the Tea
Party-influenced Texas State Board of Education in order to suggest that the latest iteration of
anarchic rhetoric is a conservative one. The revamped curriculum foregrounded America’s
Christian tradition, while downplaying and/or eliminating its progressive strains. In fact, it all but
removed Thomas Jefferson from its textbooks. However, whereas most on the Left have
chastised the Board’s actions and its version of American “history,” I argue that its rhetoric
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enacts many of critical theory’s central tenets, particularly its emphasis on social constructivist
epistemology. It is also in this chapter where I make the case for anarchic rhetoric within critical
theory and rhetorical studies. In doing so, I make the argument that anarchic rhetoric performs
much of the same tasks of the critical tradition, yet evacuates its tenuous connection to Marxist
dialectics. That is, I claim that critical theory cannot be wed to a particular politics because it is
thoroughly anarchistic, democratic, and egalitarian, and only a rhetorical view of politics and the
critical tradition, as opposed to a philosophical one, lays bare this notion.
To be clear, part of the argument over the next few chapters is that “anarchic rhetoric” is a
rhetorical formalism that is “without content.” As such, this rhetoric has been available to a
whole host of seemingly disparate American political figures to achieve often-conflicting
political goals: the pre-partisan Thomas Jefferson (chapter one), the anarchist Benjamin Tucker
(chapter two), the Marxist C.L.R. James (chapter three), and the far-right Tea Party (chapter
four). While many might make the claim that such a situation reenacts the contemporary “death
of theory/radical politics” discourse, I argue that “anarchic rhetoric,” in its non-allegiance to any
particular person, groups, or politics, is inherently democratic and egalitarian, which are
characteristics to be celebrated and further developed. Instead of developing rhetorics that reflect
certain partisan politics and using them to conquer—persuade—other partisans, which, in
essence, circumscribes politics to a Platonic dialectic, we develop politics that reflect certain
rhetorics. Doing so endlessly challenges the codification of politics in the State form and opens
rhetoric to the non-dialectical, the affective, and the aesthetic. To phrase it another way, a
rhetoric that emphasizes those concepts that are said to have contributed to the death of critique
and radical politics—the non-dialectical, the affective, and the aesthetic—points to new futures
and new “ends” of both radicalism and critical thought. In short, it allows for six billion

29
Declarations of Independence from the ubiquitous Platonism that seemingly determines all of our
politics and thought.
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CHAPTER ONE
THOMAS JEFFERSON, RHETORIC, AND THE (ANTI-)FOUNDATIONS OF
ANARCHY
“I hold that it a little rebellion now and then is a good thing” (Thomas Jefferson,
“To James Madison” 27).
“Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would probably be an anarchist. His
philosophy pointed straight in the direction of absolute liberty” (Benjamin
Tucker, “On Picket Duty” 1).
In the prologue to his seminal biography of Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Ellis details
Jefferson’s “ideological promiscuity” and the paradoxes of his legacy. He writes, “Soon after his
death in 1826, Jefferson became a touchstone for wildly divergent political movements that
continued to compete for his name and the claim on his legacy” (7). These competing claims—
which are in no short supply—have created some conflicting portraits:
Southern secessionists cited him on behalf of states’ rights; northern abolitionists quoted
his words in the Declaration of Independence against slavery. The so-called Robber
Barons of the Gilded Age echoed his warnings against the encroaching powers of the
federal government; liberal reformers and radical Populists referred to his strictures
against corrupt businessmen and trumpeted his tributes to the superiority of agrarian
values. (Ellis 7)
However, the ironies of Jefferson’s legacy are not confined to the past. In his book To Save
America: Stopping Obama's Secular-Socialist Machine, Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the
House and architect of the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” as well as former Republican
presidential candidate, suggests that Thomas Jefferson would stand in opposition to President
Obama’s “progressive” and “secular” government (14). In contrast, Michael Hardt’s recent
commentary on the Declaration of Independence sets out to “reclaim” Jefferson by placing the
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Declaration of Independence in line with the revolutionary writings of Marx and Lenin. Hardt
explains that Jefferson, despite being so intimately connected to the “anti-revolutionary
vocation” of the United States, can “help us move beyond some of the obstacles to thinking
about revolution today” (vii). Consequently, Jefferson’s lack of a partisan home, Ellis suggests,
has resulted in Jefferson being “America’s Everyman,” a “free-floating icon” whose words and
ideas provide a rhetorical topos that transcends political categories (7).
While the use of Jefferson and his ideas in political discourse is an interesting question,
what is of interest here is how Jefferson seems so easily to violate our categories of liberal and
republican, right and left, or conservative and progressive. In the age of the Tea Party and
Occupy Wall Street, two movements that themselves have questioned both our thinking about
and practice of partisan politics, it might serve us well, as an alternative, to (re)examine
Jefferson’s connection to a politics that actively seeks to transgress these categories: anarchism.
As strange as this might seem, the connection between anarchism and Jefferson is an old
one. Indeed, looking through anarchist literature reveals a common affinity between Jefferson
and anarchism. For example, the 19th century American radical—and first to embrace anarchism
as a political category and project in the United States—Benjamin Tucker argued that an
anarchist is simply an “unterrified Jeffersonian democrat” (“The Anarchist View of the
Expansion Question” 14). Moreover, Mortimer Adler described Jefferson as a “philosophical
anarchist” (378). Paul Goodman’s own anarchism was greatly indebted to Jefferson; he called
the American Revolution the “only achieved liberation movement” (59). On the whole, Noam
Chomsky suggests, “Anarchist thinkers have constantly referred to the American experience and
to the ideal of Jeffersonian democracy very favorably” (135). After all, it was Jefferson who
penned the Declaration of Independence, a document that makes it the right and duty of citizens
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to “throw off” any government that prevents “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (1617).
However, Ellis suggests that the idea that a government would ever be able to not
infringe upon these self-evident and inalienable rights “is a wildly idealistic message, the kind of
good news simply too good to be true” (8-9). According to Ellis, Jefferson’s words in the
Declaration are “a recipe for anarchy” (9). So, the question becomes: how can a document be
both a foundational text for a nation-state, as well as an anarchist tract? Ellis answers, rather selfassuredly, “But, of course, the words were not intended to serve as an operational political
blueprint. Jefferson was not a profound political thinker. He was, however, an utterly brilliant
political rhetorician and visionary” (9).
The insinuation here is that the paradox of the Declaration of Independence just
described—and maybe Thomas Jefferson’s “ideological promiscuity” as a whole—is thanks to
his being a brilliant rhetorician. In particular, Ellis argues that “[t]he genius of his vision is to
propose that our deepest yearnings for personal freedom are in fact attainable. The genius of his
rhetoric is to articulate irreconcilable human urges at a sufficiently abstract level to mask their
mutual exclusiveness” (9). For Ellis, in other words, Jefferson’s rhetoric, replete with
abstraction, pointed to an egalitarian vision of human existence, and, as such, suggests that
government is unnecessary. To put it another way, Jefferson’s rhetoric was anarchic, and thus
unfit for the work of creating and maintaining a new nation. That is, on the one hand Jefferson is
a Founding Father, the patriarch who laid the foundation for a new nation, while on the other
hand, he is an obstinate son, an heir to Continental radical thought who sought to overthrow the
rule of the British fatherland. Starting with this idea, I want to examine Jefferson’s rhetoric in
order to figure out what exactly makes Jefferson’s rhetoric anarchic. In short, why has Jefferson
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become a rhetorical topos for American anarchists and radicals? This will entail pointing to the
Declaration of Independence as an example of “anarchy in action” before connecting the
resultant rhetoric to the tradition of political anarchism. To make this connection, I will turn to
Hugh Blair’s rhetorical theory and the writings of the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker.
Finally, this essay will situate an anarchist Jefferson within the larger scholarly debates
surrounding Jefferson’s rhetorical and political legacy.
A Recipe for Anarchy
This essay began by discussing Joseph Ellis’ take on the Jeffersonian legacy, which
included the allegation that Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and his entire rhetorical
program were, and are, a recipe for anarchy. While Jefferson’s connection to anarchism has been
made explicit, what remains to be answered is “how” this recipe works, and “why” it has created
a conflicting, ironic, and anarchic legacy. The answer to this question can be found in
Jefferson’s view of rhetoric and its role in creating and maintaining a Stateless society. In what
follows, I make the argument that Jefferson’s view of self-government presupposes the ability an
individual to act rhetorically. To be specific, analogous to Jefferson’s view of republicanism, a
society can be anarchistic only when individuals are free to make arguments that challenge the
tendencies of the State to circumscribe rhetorical action within acceptable channels of political
action and engagement. To that end, I will first discuss Jefferson’s view of rhetoric, before
making the case for the Declaration of Independence as the anarchist document par excellance.
While Jefferson was not known for being a particularly engaging or effective orator,
Jefferson’s view of rhetoric reflected his beliefs in self-government; self-governance depends on
the ability to act rhetorically. Stephen Browne makes a similar argument in his reading of
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address. Browne locates within the speech a theory of rhetoric that
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exemplifies Jefferson’s republican virtue. Brown suggests Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address “is
a rhetorical expression of the republican creed, and the republican expression of a rhetorical
creed” (411). Although my argument will by and large concur with Browne’s, mine will posit an
alternative definition that points to a rereading of Jefferson’s republicanism as the first
expression of anarchism in America. To be specific, I suggest, rhetoric functioned in two ways
within Jefferson’s republicanism: 1) it prevented the intrusion of the State on the individual by
challenging the public/private dichotomy, which, in turn, 2) allowed for the unhindered and nonteleological exchange of ideas. Characterized in this way, one might be able to revise Jefferson’s
definition of republicanism to reflect his “anarchic rhetoric.” To be clear, Jefferson’s definition
of republicanism is as follows: “government is more or less republican, in proportion as it has in
its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of its citizens.” The role of
rhetoric in Jefferson’s thought might provide the following alternative: society is more or less
anarchistic, in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct
rhetorical engagement of its citizens.
In a well-known letter to Edward Carrington, one can see Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric is
both the basis of self-government, and the check on the State’s expansion and intrusion on selfgovernment. Jefferson suggests that “[t]he basis of our governments being the opinion of the
people, the very first object should be to keep that right” (24). The way to “keep that right” and
foster anarchy is to uphold the unhindered exchange of arguments. Jefferson specifically
identifies the newspaper as the organ that fosters this two-pronged process. He writes, “were it
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (24). This freeexchange of arguments provides the defense against the concentration of power in the State and
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encourages self-governance. “I am persuaded myself,” Jefferson writes, “that the good sense of
the people will always be found to be the best army” (24). Therefore, a Stateless society suggests
a rhetorical society; anarchy is a State of rhetoric.
In the same letter, Jefferson famously points to the Native Americans as exemplars of
rhetoric and anarchy. He writes:
I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government enjoy
in the general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under
the European governments. Among the former, public opinion is in the place of law, &
restrains morals as powerfully as laws ever did anywhere. Among the latter, under
pretence of governing they have divided their nations into two classes, wolves and
sheeps. I do not exaggerate. (24).
Jefferson’s embrace of rhetoric and a State-less society is not limited to his private
correspondences. Jefferson also makes the connection between rhetoric and a Stateless society in
his Notes on the State of Virginia, the only book Jefferson published during his lifetime. The
Native Americans “astonish you with the most sublime oratory; such as prove their reason and
sentiment strong, their imagination glowing and elevated” (135). In fact, for Jefferson, the
speech made against Lord Dunmore, the colonial Governor of the State of Virginia, by Logan, a
Native American Chief, surpasses the greatness of the ancients. He writes, “I may challenge the
whole orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, and of any more eminent orator, if Europe has
furnished more eminent, to produce a single passage, superior to the speech of Logan, a Mingo
chief, to Lord Dunmore, the governor of this State [Virginia]” (Notes 60). Jefferson’s favor,
though, is not isolated to the Native Americans. In a letter to Abraham Small, he writes that the
“unanswerable speech of Carnot” against Napoleon Bonaparte is another exemplary rhetorical
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performance. Describing Carnot’s speech, Jefferson asserts, “This creed of republicanism should
be well translated, and placed in the hands and heart of every friend to the rights of selfgovernment” (“To Abraham Small” 347). It is no coincidence that Jefferson commends these
two speeches. They are both made against State powers, and, as such, also exhibit the ability to
self-govern. They can be said to reflect Jefferson’s “republican ethos, which according to
Browne in his discussion of the First Inaugural Address, aims to “reveal the delusion of others,
correct their errors, [and] remind them of the republican way” (426). It is clear, then, that for
Jefferson, anarchy depends on rhetoric, and rhetoric depends on anarchy.
Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric also echoes against the work of Hugh Blair, a theorist whose
work was widely read in America during the eighteenth-century, and who along with the works
of Richard Whately and George Campbell, according to James Berlin, best reflected America’s
belief in “individualism, equality, and self-government” (33). Jefferson read Blair’s work and
recommended it to those interested in oratory and rhetoric. In fact, when Jefferson sold his
library to the U.S. Government in 1815 to form the Library of Congress, Blair’s Lectures was
included. In one of the few pieces to deal directly with Jefferson’s contribution to rhetorical
theory, Berman and McClintock posit that one of Jefferson’s contributions to rhetorical theory is
his insistence on the importance of Blair’s work (7). Jefferson, one might reasonably presume,
would agree with Blair’s evaluation of “eloquence” in Ancient Greece and Rome. Blair defined
“eloquence” as “the art persuasion,” and “[i]t is not till the rise of the Grecian republics that we
find any remarkable appearances of eloquence as the art of persuasion” (238). Athens became
the birthplace of eloquence because, according to Blair, “The genius of their government was
entirely democratical; their legislature consisted of the whole body of the people” (239). To no
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surprise, then, the downfall of oratory and eloquence among the Romans was due to the
expansion of State power. Blair writes:
Under their government, it was naturally to be expected that taste would be corrupted,
and genius discouraged. Some of the ornamental arts, less intimately connected with
liberty, continued, for a while to prevail; but for that masculine eloquence, which had
exercised itself in the senate, and in the public affairs, there was no longer any place.
(249)
Thus, we find in both Jefferson and Blair the notion that rhetorical engagement—the free
exchange of arguments by and among self-governing individuals, which also serves as the
foundation of a Stateless society—decreases in proportion to the rise of government.
In what follows, I further the connection between rhetoric and political anarchism via a
reading of the Declaration of Independence. Doing so will begin to lay the foundation for the
concept I aim to develop throughout the proceeding chapters: “anarchic rhetoric.”
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Rhetoric
To trace the influence of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence would require volumes.
In the history of modern politics, its mark has been indelible. David Armitage notes that “more
than two centuries since 1776, over half the countries of the world have their own declarations of
independence” (3). More to the point, during the composition of these other Declarations, “many
of these documents drew directly on American Declaration for inspiration. They adopted and
sometimes adapted specific phrases from the Declaration. More often, they took its structure as a
model for their own” (3). However, as was suggested in the opening pages of this essay, there is
a certain irony in this situation. In his hostile “review” of the Declaration, Jeremy Bentham,
foreshadowing the views of later American anarchists and highlighting the ironic function of the
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document, argues that if one were to follow the Declaration to its logical conclusion “[t]here
never was, never can be, established, any government on earth” (180). Despite, Bentham’s
allegation, the Declaration of Independence has repeatedly operated as a founding document for
hundreds of governments. Thus, the Declaration is a liminal document. It simultaneously calls
into question the State, but also operates as a foundational document for many Nation-States. It
is both arkhê-istic and an-arkhê-istic. The following analysis suggests that this indeterminate
space reveals Jefferson’s anarchism. This anarchic rhetoric reflects a “self-evident” overstepping
of the State that has prohibited individual rhetorical action, or what Fliegelman calls the “public
revelation of a private self” (24), and a non-teleological development of self-government. While
these many of these ideas have already been discussed, the following section examines how the
Declaration—the document that has come to be synonymous with Jefferson—embodies and
plays out Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric. For it is these facets that give Jefferson and his
Declaration their continuing influence and anarchic function.
The syllogistic structure of the text lays bare its appeal. The structure of the Declaration,
by and large, is a list of “facts” that seek to prove “the establishment of an absolute tyranny over
these States” in order to “dissolve the political bands” between the Colonies and England (“The
Declaration of Independence” 16-17). These “facts,” however, take the form of wrongs when
judged against the major premise of the Declaration: “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (17). Moreover,
governments derive their powers from people and are formed “among men” in order to “secure
these rights.” The minor premise is a list of “injuries,” “usurpations,” and “invasions” made by
the British on these “self-evident” rights. The logical conclusion of these two premises is that the
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British government, because they have violated the “unalienable Rights” of mankind, must be
thrown-off.
The “self-evident” truths contained in the major premise of the syllogism reveal the
Declaration’s profound anti-metaphysics, a dominant theme of the Enlightenment era. That is,
recognizing government intrusion on “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” does not
presuppose an appeal to a Platonic figuration of right or wrong. As Willis and Fliegelman argue,
the Declaration reflects the epoch’s reliance on the tropes of “common sense” or “self-evident”
truths provided by the Scottish Moral Sense Philosophers of Hutchinson, Kames, and Reid, as
well as John Locke. Regarding the effectiveness of the “self-evident” truths in the Declaration’s
syllogistic structure, Fliegelman argues that “syllogisms grounded on self-evident truths
furnished their own eloquence, required no argumentation, and freed the Declaration from the
charge of innovation or individualistic utterances” (51). Similarly, Alain Badiou’s recent works
point to the power of politics founded on axioms or self-evident truths. A political decision
stemming from an axiom, Badiou writes, “tears itself away from any dialectic of the subjective
and the objective…The beginning, under its evental injunction, is pure declaration” (qtd in
Hallward 772). A self-evident declaration is disruptive and resists any metaphysical or dialectical
logos. In other words, such a view evokes Aristotle’s characterization of “contentious reasoning”
or “sophistical refutations,” which, unlike dialectical exchange that reasons from “opinions that
are generally accepted” in order to arrive at the “true” and “primary,” are disruptive/contentious
to the search for the “true” and “primary” because they reason from opinions that are not
generally accepted or “merely [seem] to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally
accepted” (Aristotle 188).
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Fliegelman also suggests that the form and content of the Declaration enact Jefferson’s
desire to “believe in Bacon’s inductive dream” (53). By endowing the deductive syllogism with
seemingly inductive content, the Declaration reframes the “Aristotelian commonplaces to a basis
in self-evident truth [that] paralleled the simultaneous sanctioning and containing of nonrational
appeals effected by the concept of a natural language” (51-52). In other words, Jefferson adopted
a rhetorical approach based on the Enlightenment ideals, which, according to Wilbur Samuel
Howell, “delivered its ideas by the method of science to a generation which greatly respected
scientific standards of thought and expression” (214). The result of Jefferson’s approach is a
document that exists between, as Fliegelman notes, “transcendent representativeness and
personal revelation…between rational persuasion and affective appeals; between logic and
rhetoric…between argument and self-evidence” (190). The result is a liminal document that
reflects the eighteenth century epistemology wherein “[t]he old distinction between dialectic as
the discipline of learned discourse and rhetoric as the discipline of popular discourse is destroyed
(Berlin 769); it is both profoundly rhetorical in that it makes a deductive argument about the role
of government, as well as anti-rhetorical because of its reliance on seemingly unarguable
axiomatic, “self-evident” truths.
A close examination of the minor premise—the list of wrongs committed by the British
Government against the colonists—reveals that the majority of the wrongs concern the
prohibition of self-government qua rhetorical action. Like those scholars such as Maier and
Willis who find distinct categories within the list of allegations, I find three groups pertaining to
the prohibition of rhetoric by the King. They can be classified as 1) Platonic preclusions of
rhetoric, 2) spatial and temporal restrictions on rhetorical engagement, and 3) acts of violence.
For example, the Declaration reads: “He [King George] has refused to pass other Laws for the
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accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only”
(17). The Colonists are prevented from self-governance because of the will of King George,
which acts as an immutable and transcendent form that bars any rhetorical/political alternative.
The ability of the Colonists to construct political arguments in opposition to the King is
forbidden. To further prevent this process, King George “has dissolved Representative Houses
repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people” (17).
This dissolving of “Representative Houses,” places where individuals engage in deliberation and
debate, was, in effect, an effort to prevent the gathering of individuals in order to stifle and
prevent rhetorical engagement. Lastly, the Declaration lists several incidents of violence. For
instance, “He [King George] has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and
destroyed the lives of our people” (18). Taken together, these three categories underscore the
extent to which the Declaration—and the American Revolution itself—represent a conflict over
the ability to pose arguments that question the legitimacy of the State. Furthermore, the
Declaration also acknowledges the King’s recognition of the anarchic function of rhetorical
engagement and his desire to keep argument within certain bounds. Judged against the major
premise of the Declaration, the list of wrongs clearly demonstrates two motivations for declaring
independence: 1) King George has violated the right to “life” by physically attacking the
Colonists, and 2) limited “liberty” (rhetorical action) through the invocation of immutable
conceptions of the “good” or “just,” as well as the placing of spatial and temporal strictures on
the colonists’ ability to self-govern and question the State.
What, then, is left of the third term? For Jefferson, simply having the rights of life and
liberty do not promote happiness. Reflecting the republican ideal of participatory governance,
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Jefferson recognizes that it is the exercising of these rights through self-governance that leads to
happiness. Recalling Jefferson’s valorization of the Native Americans and their anarchistic
communities, it is clear that when it comes to the “pursuit of happiness,” Jefferson believes that
rhetorical engagement among individuals is its sine qua non. According to Jefferson, “I am
convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government enjoy in the
general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European
governments (“Letter to Edward Carrington” 24). If decentralization and permanent revolution—
two tenants of anarchistic politics—is created and maintained through rhetorical action and just
government is that which is “most likely to effect…Safety and Happiness,” then the pursuit of
rhetoric within the anarchy is the basis for happiness. Such a sentiment is echoed by Paul
Goodman:
[A]s Thomas Jefferson pointed out, only such an organization of society is selfimproving; we learn by doing, and the only way to educate co-operative citizens is to
give power to people as they are. Except in unusual circumstances, there is not much
need for dictators, deans, police, pre-arranged curricula, imposed schedules, conscription,
coercive laws. Free people easily agree among themselves on plausible working rules;
they listen to expert direction when necessary; they wisely choose pro tem leaders.
Remove authority, and there will be self-regulation, not chaos. (94)
For one to retain his/her liberty by resisting the growth and reach of the State, one must exercise
that same liberty by engaging in the anarchic rhetorical process.
In short, a rhetoric grounded in self-evident truths is what gives the Declaration its lasting
appeal. Self-evident truths are unarguable, yet their abstractness leaves them empty. As a result,
the Declaration is a seemingly “empty” document with its content left to be supplied by a rhetor.
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Moreover, because the Declaration reflects what Darren Staloff calls the Enlightenment’s
“metaphysical disenchantment,” it creates an egalitarian vision of politics. To put it another way,
Howell argues that the Declaration “employed the forms of philosophical address at a time when
such forms were believed equal to the tasks of persuasion and appropriate as means of
expressing the doctrine of human rights” (214). As such, the Declaration permits anyone and
everyone to make arguments about the justness of government. The text, then, because of its call
for rhetorical action, models its own ideal. If individuals have the ability to act rhetorically, and
rhetoric plays an an-arkhê-istic function by unmasking and calling into question the metaphysical
and political arkhê that unjustly determine and limit the actions of individuals, while also serving
as the grounding for anarchist communities, the Declaration, when put into rhetorical action, is
the anarchistic and an-arkhê-istic document par excellance.
“The earth belongs always to the living”
Although I have been making the case for an anarchist Jefferson, even a cursory look at
Jefferson’s writings suggest that he saw a role for government, albeit a very particular role.
While this may seem to put Jefferson at odds with anarchism—or at least its common
connotation as the complete lack of government and organization—in what follows, I hope to
suggest that Jefferson’s vision of government, which includes concrete proposals for the
organizing of a society and its institutions, does not put him at odds with anarchism. On the
contrary, Jefferson’s vision of government, which reflects his resistance to institutionalized
government—the State—actually lays the foundation for the politics of the first American
anarchist Benjamin Tucker and consequently allows us to rethink Jefferson and anarchism’s
contribution to radical thought.
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Jefferson suggests that government can be—and should be—dynamic, voluntary, and
subject to change depending on the will of those people who will be directly affected by it. In the
most pointed lines of the Declaration, Jefferson makes clear his view of government. He asserts:
Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness], it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, & institute new
government, laying it’s [sic] foundation on such principles & organizing it’s [sic] power
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. (The
Declaration of Independence 10)
Reflecting this notion, Jefferson advocated for republican arrangements that would minimize the
concentration of power and allow for democratic self-government. In a letter to Joseph C. Cabell,
Jefferson proposes that “the way to have a good and safe government, is not to trust it all to one,
but to divide it among the many” (62). This means continuously dividing and subdividing the
nation into states, counties, and wards with each division having certain responsibilities that were
appropriate to it. Important to Jefferson’s idea of government was the notion that the higher up
an institution was on the republican ladder, the less power and influence it had over the
multitude. The aim, according to Jefferson, was to trust “fewer and fewer powers in proportion
as the trustees became more and more oligarchical” (“To Joseph C. Cabell” 62).
Of all these divisions, however, the power rests in the hands of individuals, who, through
their direct participation in their local wards, would have the opportunity to exercise his/her
liberty and self-govern. Jefferson’s ward system would create an environment where “the voice
of the whole people would be thus fairly, fully, and peaceably discussed, and decided by the
common reason of the society” (“To Samuel Kercheval” 75). Reflecting (rather gleefully) on his
idea, Jefferson suggests, “These wards, called townships in New England, are the vital principle
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of their governments, and have proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of
man for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its preservation” (“To Samuel
Kercheval” 71). Jefferson’s very definition of republicanism reflects his beliefs in liberty and
self-government. Acknowledging that definitions have been “very vague,” Jefferson offers a
rather succinct account of his own republicanism:
Were I to assign this term a precise and definite idea, I would, purely and simply, it
means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to
rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less
republican, in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the
direct action of its citizens. (“To John Taylor” 65)
What is called Jefferson’s republicanism, then, is a radically democratic program that seeks to
prevent the rise of an inherently unjust State by democratically allowing everyday citizens to
exercise their liberty by participating in the debates that would directly impact them and their
locale. The direct participation of citizens in the governing process would ensure that there exists
a plurality of opinions, ideas, and debates, which would also prevent the stagnation of the same.
Michael Hardt suggests that “Jefferson’s insistence, in particular, on the direct action of the
population in government—not through representatives determined by election or otherwise—is
one element that make this a radically democratic conception” (xv). In other words, a republican
arrangement of society would give individuals the opportunity to participate in the free-market of
argument and debate and represent their own concerns and interests.
Yet, republican arrangements in and of themselves will not preserve liberty and promote
self-governance. Implicit in Jefferson’s republican-ward system is what has often been said to be
Jefferson’s contribution to radical thought. To be specific, several scholars, particularly Richard
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Matthews and Michael Hardt, have argued that the nexus of Jefferson’s radicalism rests in his
notion that only the living can decide their politics. Jefferson argues that the dead have no rights,
thus cannot dictate and/or influence the politics of the living. As a result, individuals must
continually rebel and revolt in order to determine their own “living” politics. He writes, “The
earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from
it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are master too of their own persons, and
consequently may govern them as they please” (“To James Madison” 56). As a result of such a
belief, it follows that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law”
(“To James Madison” 56). Jefferson’s view stands in sharp contrast to those such as John
Adams’, who argued that a just republic is an “empire of laws, not of men” (Adams 236). In
other words, apart from the impracticality of representative government, the notion that there can
be created a document or institution that acts as a transcendent and everlasting arbiter between
individuals and/or individuals and the State is unjust. To prevent this injustice, Jefferson suggests
that “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally, expires at the end of 19 years. If it be
enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right” (“To James Madison” 57). Such a
principle—what Hardt calls the “eternal return” of rebellion (xiii)—prevents the concentration of
governmental power in the form of the State, as well as its negative effects on individuals,
which, in turn, allows for self-governance. Hardt notes that for Jefferson, “rebellion has an
intrinsic value, regardless of the justness of its specific grievances and goals. Periodic rebellion is
necessary to guarantee the health of a society and preserve public freedom” (xiii). Thus,
Jefferson’s ward-republics undergirded by a philosophy of constant and continual revolution
would be the best arrangement to both foster self-government and prevent the rise of a despotic
State.
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Jefferson’s views—unjust government as an intrusion on liberty, continual rebellion as a
duty of the populace, decentralized political power—allow the opportunity for the full exercise
of one’s liberty and ability to self-govern, while also staving off State power. Summarizing this
idea, Jefferson writes:
Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic, or of some of the
higher ones, and feels that he is a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at
an election one day in the year, but every day; when there shall not be a man in the State
who will not be a member of some one of its councils, great or small, will he let the heart
be torn out of his body sooner that his be wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.
(“To Joseph C. Cabell” 63)
Jefferson’s ideal political arrangement—anarchy—sought to allow for individuals to willingly
and directly participate in the managing of the public’s affairs, which, because it was also
localized, was bound to matter and affect him/her directly. It would also stave off the
establishment of static and coercive political, social, and/or economic arraignments. In short, the
anarchist Paul Goodman seems to capture the spirit of Jefferson’s anarchism when he posits that
anarchism “is always a continual coping with the next situation, and vigilance to make sure that
past freedoms are not lost and do not turn into the opposite, as free-enterprise turned into-wage
slavery and monopoly capitalism, or the independent judiciary turned into a monopoly of courts,
cops, and lawyers, or free education turned into School Systems” (56).
Jefferson’s republicanism, which includes concrete proposals for the arranging of a
society, foreshadows the anarchism of Benjamin Tucker. Throughout his lifetime, Tucker would
attack the “monopoly,” which he defined as:
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any person corporation, or institution whose right to engage in any given pursuit of life is
secured, either wholly or partially, by any agency whatsoever—whether the nature of
things or the force of events or the decree of arbitrary power,—against the influence of
competition (qtd. in Martin 210).
As a remedy, Tucker would advocate government by “non-compulsive organization” and
“associative combination” (qtd. in Martin 218): self-government. Like Jefferson, Tucker
recognized that liberty could only be exercised and maintained by voluntarily and directly
engaging with other individuals who, being non-coerced and willing themselves, also recognized
some benefit in the interaction. In short, people were free to establish groups and institutions as
long as they served particular purposes, were dissolved after those purposes were met, and did
not intrude on the liberty of others.
It is clear that Jefferson’s political philosophy and the republican arrangements that
reflected it seem at home within the anarchist tradition. Although the anarchist Rudolf Rocker
places Jefferson in the liberal tradition, he argues that, along with Thomas Paine, Jefferson laid
the foundation for American anarchism: “The anarchism which developed on American soil has
its starting point in the philosophic ideas of the Eighteenth Century which circulated in England
and were brought here by the Fathers of this country and were modified under the influence of a
new environment” (155). As an alternative to the State, Jefferson posited a non-teleological
process of continual rebellion and rebuilding: permanent revolution. Moreover, as has been
shown, Tucker recognized the anarchist strands of Jefferson’s thought. It was also Tucker who
argued that “[t]he Anarchists are simply unterrified Jeffersonian democrats” (“State Socialism:
How Far they Agree and Wherein the Differ” 13).
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“Unterrified Jeffersonian Democrat”
While Jefferson himself would not have been aware of anything called the anarchist
movement (anarchism was first embraced in America as a political program by Benjamin Tucker
in the 19th century), his politics has distinct shades of anarchism. Jefferson was a seminal figure
among the American anarchists of the nineteenth-century. The anarchist Benjamin Tucker,
whose quote serves as the epigraph of this essay, made the anarchism-Jefferson connection in no
uncertain terms in Liberty, the journal he both edited and published for nearly thirty years. In
fact, included in the journal’s promotional material was a quote from Samuel Cooper, a
Philadelphia lawyer, which read: “Liberty is a journal that Thomas Jefferson would have loved”
(qtd in. Tucker, “Advertisement 3” 7). Thus, to make solid the connection between anarchism
and Jefferson explicit we can look to Liberty and the work of Benjamin Tucker.
On December 9th, 1882, Tucker published a brief piece titled “Anarchism and Consent”
that links Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence with an anarchist rejection of government by
tacit consent. The piece begins by pointing to the strange acceptance of the Declaration among
“law and order” aristocrats in the U.S. and Europe. Tucker suggests that among such circles, the
Declaration represents “a chimera of generalities imbibed by Jefferson through familiar contact
with French atheists” (2). This reputation is ironic, Tucker suggests, as the Declaration has
“numerous internal evidences to show that, were Thomas Jefferson living to-day [sic], he would
be a pronounced anarchist” (“Anarchism and Consent” 2). To make this connection Tucker
draws out Jefferson’s claim in the Declaration that “governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed.” According to Tucker, the logical conclusion of this claim suggests
that government is an unjust intrusion on the individual because consent to be governed was
never rendered. He points to the Constitution’s limiting of voting rights, protection of slavery,
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and “other constitutional bars” as instances that drastically limit those who can consent to being
governed. The restrictions have resulted in “less than one-tenth of the whole people” having the
opportunity to actively consent (or dissent) to being governed by the State. Therefore, according
to Tucker, it “follows that when any individual is governed by a government without his or her
consent, that government is exercising unjust power and is a usurpation” (2). By extending
Jefferson’s argument in the Declaration, Tucker reaches anarchist conclusions. In short, “Under
any conceivable interpretation of Jefferson’s talk about the consent of the governed, every
existing government is outlawed beyond recovery, and the ‘just powers’ vanish into thin air” (2).
Tucker’s assertion is not without warrant. Throughout Jefferson’s writings, one finds a
profound skepticism of both the practical and ethical facets of institutionalized government. In a
letter to James Madison, Jefferson made known his aversion to institutionalized government and
its desire to embody the interests of a people. According to Jefferson, there is no form of
government that is able to obtain and/or embody the will of the majority because any claim of
complete representation is forever undercut by the inability to bring individuals together to voice
their opinions, as well as the damning effects of personal interests when codified in laws,
practices, and institutions:
The people cannot assemble themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious.
Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of
the public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them astray from the
general interests of the constituents. (“To James Madison” 57)
The result of Jefferson’s claim is that a just government based on the consent and will of the
majority is an impossibility. Peoples are too spread apart, their differences too great, and humans
too self-interested to be fully and justly represented in a static institution.
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Moreover, apart from being impractical, institutionalized government violates Jefferson’s
view of individual liberty, a view that resembles and precedes the anarchist one. In outlining his
complaints against statist governance, Jefferson also reveals his vision of just governance. That
is, one can detect in his admonishments above, the ideals of direct participation and individual
liberty. Liberty, according to Jefferson, is the “natural condition of human life” (Yarbrough 9).
Moreover, synonymous with liberty is self-government. Jefferson writes, “Every man, and every
body of men on earth, possesses the right of self-government: they receive it with their being
from the hand of nature” (“Jefferson’s Opinion” 195). Describing this idea, Matthews observes
that for Jefferson “[s]elf-governance is essential, vital, natural” (87). Indeed, in the draft of the
Declaration of Independence that Jefferson included in his autobiography, he asserts that
government is an intrusion on self-government. In reference to King George and the British
government, he argues, “He [King George] has waged cruel war against human nature itself,
violating it’s [sic] most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who
never offended him” (“Draft” 13). While these exact words were omitted from the final draft of
the Declaration, this idea—institutionalized government as an intrusion on liberty—would
remain in the final draft and his writings as a whole. Jefferson concludes that because humans
are naturally endowed with liberty (the ability to self-govern), government as a static institution
that attempts to speak for or represent an individual, robs individuals of their natural ability, and
is thus an artifice that promotes subjugation.
This conceptualization echoes against Tucker’s anarchism. Tucker defined liberty as
“simply and solely the freedom and power to choose,” and government as “invasion, nothing
more or less,” (qtd. Martin 215). The freedom and power to choose what to do with one’s
liberty—self-govern—can only be exercised in the absence of government. More pointedly, one
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can detect the similarity between Jefferson and Tucker in the description of the journal Liberty.
The journal was described as “[a]n anarchistic journal, expounding the doctrine that in Equal
Liberty is to be found the most satisfactory solution of social questions, and that majority rule, or
democracy, equally with monarchical rule, is a denial of liberty” (“On Picket Duty” 1). Putting
these two together, it is evident that both Tucker and Jefferson share the belief that government,
no matter the form, is an intrusion on liberty qua the ability to self-govern. For one to be able to
fully exercise his/her personal liberty and ability to self-govern, the State as a codified system of
governmental institutions, must be abolished or at least severely limited.
Jefferson suggests that a strong centralized government, based on what Gordon S. Wood
calls “virtual representation6,” fundamentally excludes the majority of the people from
determining their politics. This idea creates a distinction between those who can participate and
determine the public’s affairs, and those who are excluded and left to the inferior private realm.
One, then, finds Jefferson sounding rather like Jacques Rancière. For Rancière, as with Jefferson,
such a politics is “an oligarchic form, a representation of minorities who are entitled to take
charge of public affairs” (Hatred of Democracy 53). Challenging this movement means creating
and fostering a democratic “movement that ceaselessly displaces the limits of the public and the
private, of the political and the social” (Hatred of Democracy 62). While we have already
outlined Jefferson’s own democratic challenge, we have yet to situate the resulting anarchist
Jefferson within the larger scholarly debates surrounding his political and rhetorical legacies.

6

Wood describes “virtual representation” as the dominant political ideology of the
eighteenth-century, which suggested that the populace could be represented in governmental and
public institutions by individuals who—because of their “disinterestedness”—would embody
and carry-out the will of the public good. “Virtual representation” was placed against “actual
representation,” a profound “mistrust” of elected officials to represent individual interests. Wood
claims that “American democracy grew out of this pervasive mistrust” (30)
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Liberal, Republican, Anarchist
The divergent use of Thomas Jefferson in political discourse has only been
paralleled by the scholarly interpretations of Jefferson and the other Founding Fathers. While the
conventional wisdom has always suggested that Jefferson was a model Lockean, the twentieth
century saw the proliferation of a variety of competing interpretations. Describing the many
alternatives to a Lockean Jefferson, Forest McDonald points to:
a Bolingbrokean and English Oppositionist Jefferson (Lance Banning), a Scottish
Enlightenment moral-sense Jefferson a la Frances Hutcheson (Garry Wills), a Scottish
Enlightenment rationalist Jefferson a la Thomas Reid (Morton White), an antimodern
agrarian expansionist Jefferson (Drew McCoy), and a champion of commercialism and
capitalism Jefferson (Joyce Appleby). (396-397)
Despite all of the ink that has been spilled trying to place Jefferson in this or that paradigm, it has
done little to explain his status as a “free-floating icon.” In fact, it more or less has contributed to
Jefferson’s indeterminacy. That is, it would be hard to imagine the Populists evoking the
“champion of commercialism and capitalism” Jefferson. Moreover, the scholarly debates
surrounding Jefferson’s politics do little to explain Jefferson’s anarchist appeal.
Richard Matthews, however, provides a counterpoint to the Jefferson debates, while also
providing a substantive grounding to the anarchist claim. Matthews argues in his 1984 book that
Jefferson’s political philosophy provides an alternative to both the liberal and republican
interpretation of Jefferson in the form of a radically democratic and communitarian anarchism
(16-18). Against those such as Joyce Appleby, Carl Becker, and Louis Hartz who argue that
Jefferson’s Declaration is a rehashing of Locke’s Second Treatise, which, in turn, also laid the
groundwork for America’s “unique brand of market liberalism,” Matthews suggests that
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Jefferson’s “vehement arguments against economic exploitation and in favor of substantive
economic and political freedom” points to Jefferson’s inherent humanism. Jefferson’s reverence
of the Native Americans, Matthews also argues, reveals Jefferson’s “communitarian anarchism,”
while his figuration of “permanent revolution” suggests a radically democratic vision of selfgovernance. Although Matthews targets most explicitly the liberal interpretation of Jefferson, he
is not willing to align himself with those who advocate a republican Jefferson. Pointing to the
work of J.G.A. Pocock, Matthews notes that while “the language of the civic-humanist paradigm
is indeed helpful for understanding Jefferson,” “his ideal human would balance the public and
the private, for a life totally devoted to either would be less than fully human” (17).
Likewise, Jay Fliegelman, in his situating of Jefferson among the “world of eighteenthcentury theories and practices of rhetoric,” concurs with Matthews’s assertion regarding the
balance between public and private. He points to Jefferson and the Declaration as being
emblematic of an “oratorical revolution” that is of “greater significance than his [Jefferson’s]
indebtedness to Locke or Hutchinson” (4). Fliegelman locates a shift in rhetorical theory and
practice that “sought to replace artificial language with natural language and to make writing
over in the image of speaking” (24). The result was the collapsing of the public/private binary:
Once a decorous, rule-governed, and class specific behavior that articulated the public
virtues of civic-humanism—the honor of the office and the public good—public speaking
became reconceptualized in the mid eighteenth century as an occasion for the public
revelation of a private self. (24)
In doing so, the “oratorical revolution” largely leveled the playing for rhetorical and political
action. By questioning the public/private binary, the “oratorical revolution,” Fliegelman argues,
allowed for the “declaring of independence” (24-25). These shifts in rhetoric sanctioned the
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ability of anyone and everyone to make political arguments that question the legitimacy of
government while also expressing their own personal wants and beliefs.
Formulated in this light, eighteenth-century rhetoric existed as something of an aporia.
Fliegelman posits:
The oratorical revolution was rife with internal conflicts—between self-control and
passionate

expression…between

transcendent

representativeness

and

personal

revelation…between rational persuasion and affective appeals; between logic and
rhetoric…between argument and self-evidence. (190)
As such, rhetoric possessed a certain deconstructive force that undid the epistemological and
metaphysical assumptions of the eighteenth-century. Fliegelman claims, “The oratorical ideal
that loomed so large in the America of 1776 presumed to contain or mediate these conflicts”
(190). He continues by suggesting that the ways in which rhetoric served as a site for these
conflicts has been “historically neglected” despite being a “crucial battleground of American
Revolutionary culture” (190).
In his reading of Jefferson’s famous letter to Maria Cosway, Jeremy Engels locates in the
tension between the calls political rationality and irrational romanticism that characterized the
later eighteenth century a rhetoric that leads to political anarchism. He writes, “Jefferson did not
fear anarchy per se but its consequences: that anarchy would yield powerful rhetorical
justifications for despotism” (429). Against the conclusions of Matthews and Fliegelman, Engels
suggests that although Jefferson clearly demonstrates anarchist tendencies, Jefferson is also
quick to temper those tendencies by calling for a rational and enlightened educational program
that would enable the polis to operate within a republican society and avoid the pitfalls of a
pejorative anarchism characterized by relativism and irrationality.
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Conclusion
Jefferson’s distrust of the State and his embrace of rhetoric in challenging that power,
sustaining individual liberty, and producing happiness hold sway for contemporary rhetorical and
political theory. The continual appropriation of Jefferson’s image and writings among various
radical groups, today’s Tea Party being the most obvious, as well as the recent expunging of
Jefferson from social studies text books by the Texas legislature, suggests that Jefferson’s
political thought represents a challenge to State and institutionalized power while also acting as
the animus for anarchy in America.
The following chapters will sharpen our understanding of this rhetoric “without content”
and underscore its shifting allegiances. That is, like Jefferson, anarchic rhetoric has no partisan
home, and, as such, has been used by those on the right and left of the political spectrum. Before
elaborating on this claim, though, chapter two will trace Jefferson’s influence on the nineteenth
century anarchists by grounding anarchic rhetoric within the debates and polemics following the
Chicago Haymarket bombing in order to more fully develop our understanding of this concept.
Specifically, chapter two will examine the anarchist Benjamin Tucker’s response to the events at
Haymarket in order to connect anarchic rhetoric with Adam Smith and his figuration of
“sympathy.” Chapter two will be followed up by a discussion of the Marxist C.L.R. James’s
appropriation of anarchic rhetoric during the middle of the twentieth century. The final chapter
will take up the recent resurgence of anarchic rhetoric by today’s Tea Party. The second half of
chapter four will discuss the implications of anarchic rhetoric for contemporary critical,
rhetorical, and political theory.
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CHAPTER TWO
IMAGINING COLLECTIVITY: TASTE, SYMPATHY, AND THE “ENDS” OF
ANARCHIC RHETORIC
“As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what ourselves
should feel in the like situation” (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
9).
“‘Mind your own business’” is its [anarchism’s] only moral law (Benjamin
Tucker, “State Socialism” 15).
We established in chapter one that Thomas Jefferson’s republicanism points to a societal
arrangement with a rhetorical grounding. In order to best foster liberty and stave off intrusions on
that liberty, Jefferson suggests that a free and happy society must take as its rasion d’etre the
dynamic exchange of ideas among its members. Specifically, by revising Jefferson’s own
definition of republicanism, we established that a society is considered anarchistic in proportion
to the engagement of its members in determining their own politics. The opposite of this
figuration—the attempt to circumscribe rhetorical action within the State—is an intrusion on and
usurpation of liberty.
And while in the last chapter we began to spell out the differences between these two
competing figurations of rhetorical action—one which is dependent on the State form and the
other which seeks to undermine it—we by and large focused on rhetoric’s general (and ideal)
role within an anarchist society. Regarding anarchic rhetoric and its role in creating and
maintaining a Stateless society much remains to be parsed. Expanding on this issue, though,
means tackling the most common critique of anarchism, which, according to our logic here,
echoes the Platonic critique of rhetoric: how can anarchism (rhetoric) be theorized as a positive
societal arrangement instead of pure chaos and moral relativism? That is, if the critique of
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anarchism (and rhetoric) is that it lacks all transcendent arbiters—the State, Truth, God—and
these arbiters serve to prevent anarchy (in both its positive and pejorative senses), how can one
expect equitable interaction within such a society? In short, what can be said about the “ends” of
these competing rhetorics when it comes to questions of persuasion and ethics?
This essay will argue that “sympathy” represents the rhetorical and political “end” of
anarchism, which might be contrasted against what I will refer to as the “dialectical empathy”
that is prominent in much liberal and Marxist thought. My conceptualization of “dialectical
empathy” will allow me to connect two views, which, at first blush, seem rather dissimilar:
Plato’s view of dialectical rhetoric and Marx’s view of historical materialism. In turning to this
binary, I hope to add to the discourse(s) known as the “affective turn” in critical and rhetorical
studies, which has sought to theorize non-representational logics of solidarity, community, and
politics in the wake of poststructuralist thought. Indeed, as Brian Massumi has suggested, “There
seems to be a growing feeling…that affect is central for an understanding of our informationand image- based late capitalist culture, in which so-called master narratives have been perceived
to have foundered” (18). Yet, in contradistinction to Deleuze and Guttari or Hardt and Negri, all
of whom turn to Spinoza to connect the affective and political, I turn to Adam Smith and his
concept of “sympathy,” which may prove more useful in thinking about affect’s role in ushering
in political and social change. To be specific, I hope to show that anarchic rhetoric, with its
seeming rejection of all forms of representation, reliance on axiomatic truths, and dynamic
exchange of ideas, takes Adam Smith’s figuration of “sympathy” as its goal.
I will make this argument by examining the response of the individualist anarchists
located in and around Boston to the Chicago Haymarket Affair. The Haymarket Affair produced
a unique rhetorical situation whereby the followers of anarchism were left to combat the public’s
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outrage against anarchism, as well as continue to propound the anarchist agenda. Examining the
responses found in the pages of Benjamin Tucker’s Liberty will reveal anarchic rhetoric’s
“sympathetic” ends. More pointedly, through my analysis, I hope to argue that in tackling the
question outlined above—how can individuals interact equitably without the mediation of the
State?—the anarchists offered a figuration of affect that has much to offer our thinking about the
role of affect in human interaction today. Indeed, while many have argued for the centrality of
affect in theorizing ethics, politics, and ontology, little has been said about the process through
which affect might be able to constitute more equitable human relationships and/or interactions.
To take one example, while Hardt and Negri suggest that the valorization of affective labor has
become part and parcel to contemporary capitalism, as well as the idea that “[v]alue-affect opens
the way to a revolutionary political economy in which insurrection is a necessary ingredient and
which poses the theme of the reappropriation of the biopolitical context by the productive
subjects” (Hardt and Negri 88), we are, according to someone like Timothy Brennan, left without
an understanding of how the latter might actually take place. 1 Further, Ruth Leys makes explicit
the idea that today’s theories of affect “imply such a radical separation between affect and reason
as to make disagreement about meaning, or ideological dispute, irrelevant to cultural analysis”
(40). Smith, I argue, provides what today’s thinkers have not: an account of how affect can
constitute equitable relationships and community. Finally, the essay will end by situating my
argument against Plato’s description of dialectical rhetoric in the Phaedrus, which will allow me
to draw out what I call “empathetic Marxism,” anarchic rhetoric’s affective and political
opposite.
1

Brennan suggests that the role of affect in Hardt and Negri’s Empire points to “a
gathering of subjectivities (the multitude) who never actually meet or converse and who
therefore can never be guilty of repressing their political foes or, for that matter, of exercising
their political wills” (350).
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Tucker’s Liberty
Published in Boston from 1881 to 1908, Liberty, Not the Daughter But the Mother of
Order has the distinction of being the longest-lasting anarchist periodical, and, as such, may be
the best record of anarchism in America. In fact, as Peter Marshall notes, its editor, Benjamin
Tucker, was the “first American thinker to call himself an anarchist with pride” (389). However,
despite being a prolific writer, Tucker and his unique brand of anarchism have received little
notice. Indeed, Tucker, his compatriots, and his journal have all but been forgotten. Thus, an
explanation of his work is in order.
In the first full-length study of American anarchism, James J. Martin, pits “individualist
anarchism” against “syndicalist anarchism” and suggests that the growth of what came to be
known as “anarcho-syndicalism,” which developed in Europe in opposition to the work of Karl
Marx, was paralleled by a “kindred but nearly unconnected phenomenon in America, seeking the
same ends through individualistic rather than collective dynamics” (ix). Specifically, Martin
suggests that the forerunners of “individualist anarchism,” American radicals such as Josiah
Warren, Lysander Spooner, Stephen Pearl Andrews, William B. Greene, and Ezra Heywood,
reacted to “the crystallization of the means of political expression into a conventional series of
ritual-like gestures,” and that such a tendency violated their “Jeffersonian” beliefs (1). However,
“individualist anarchism” as a distinct political category began to take shape when Benjamin
Tucker introduced to other American radicals via Liberty the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, Max
Stirner, and Herbert Spencer (Martin 203). Benjamin Tucker’s work, then, “is the cultural
synthesis of the earlier exponents and innovators of the various elements of which this variety of
American radicalism was composed” (xii). Frank H. Brooks supports this claim when he writes
that “the anarchism expressed in Liberty owed only a general debt to individualist thinkers in
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America such as Thoreau or Jefferson and a substantial debt only to one American thinker,
Josiah Warren. The major intellectual influences were British, French, and German” (2).
Specifically, Brooks points to Herbert Spencer’s “law of equal freedom,” Proudhon’s “mutual
banking,” and Max Stirner’s egoist ethics (Brooks 2). One might say, then, that “individualist
anarchism,” which came to “maturity” in the late nineteenth century within the pages of Liberty
(Martin 208), represents the joining of the native radicalism(s) of Jefferson, Paine, Thoreau,
Emerson, and others, with the European anti-statism(s) of Pierre Joseph-Proudhon, Mikhail
Bakunin, Max Stirner, and Herbert Spencer.
The result of such a synthesis has born competing interpretations, especially when
compared to the European anarchism imported to America by such figures as Emma Goldman
and Alexander Berkman. For instance, David DeLeon argues that “individualist anarchism”
represents a “right libertarianism” when placed against the “communist anarchism,” or “left
libertarianism” of Goldman and Berkman (85). Specifically, DeLeon argues that “right
libertarianism” is a “capitalist” view that overlaps with “militant Liberalism” and stands in
opposition to the anti-capitalist views of “left libertarianism” (61-85). Peter Marshall posits that
Tucker grafts “Left Hegelianism onto the American Individual tradition of natural rights” (390).
That is, while locating certain “rightist” positions in Tucker’s thought, Marshall argues that
Tucker ultimately falls on the side of “left-wing libertarianism” (391). For Brooks, such an
anarchism might be “a meeting point of right and left” (xii). However, Martin is quick to suggest
that the differences between these anarchisms were thrown into relief only after the Chicago
Haymarket affair when anarchism was put under the political microscope (x). Indeed, prior to
Haymarket, little attention was paid to the differences between the American and European antistatist programs. Partisan labels aside, one might paint the following picture: “The individualists
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see the danger of obligatory cooperation and are worried that a collectivist society will lead to
the tyranny of the group. On the other hand, the social [communist] anarchists are concerned that
a society of individualists might become atomistic and that the spirit of competition could
destroy mutual aid and general solidarity” (Marshall 6). In short, the difference between the
communist and individualist programs is one of means not ends. While they both share the desire
for a Stateless society, they differ on the methods for realizing that goal.2
However, because the focus of this essay is on the American or “individualist” anarchist
tradition, a more detailed discussion of its particular aims and methods is in order. David
DeLeon isolates three beliefs of the individualist anarchist. First, the powers of the State “were
not based upon valid contracts” (76). Following Jefferson’s maxim “the earth belongs to the
living,” the anarchists argued that “since all of those who had signed the Constitution were now
dead, this moldy old document should be null and void. It violated the supremacy of the present”
(DeLeon 76). Secondly, the anarchists argued that “the state was a bastion of privilege, such as
monopolies in patents, copyrights, legal benefits, limited banking, land restrictions and tariffs”
(DeLeon 76). Indeed, throughout the pages of Liberty, Tucker identified and railed against the
government’s four monopolies: money, land, tariff, and patent (“State Socialism” 9). Lastly, the
anarchists argued “the state was unjust because people were never given the choice of accepting
or rejecting its power” (DeLeon 76). Taken as a whole, then, the anarchist program in America
amounted to the abolition and replacement of all “unnatural,” non-consensual monopolies with
new forms of organization based on voluntary association. DeLeon calls this notion
“Jeffersonianism” (79).

2 For a summary of anarcho-communism see Alexander Berkman’s What is Anarchism?.
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How was such a transformation to take place? DeLeon argues that “the anarchists relied
more on education than on nitroglycerine to demolish government” (76). The American
anarchists argued that the use of violence, as opposed to peaceful boycotts and education, would
simply result in the more rapid and aggressive concentration of power in the State. To be
specific, the anarchists relied on an agenda that sought to educate and inform the masses about
anarchism in general, but also about what the anarchist alternative might look like. Apart from
dispelling the myths surrounding anarchism, the rhetorical agenda would include illustrating how
“alternatives to state functions should be built through schools, labor and community exchanges,
cooperative banks, businesses, and labor unions” (DeLeon 76). The results would be that
“[a]narchism would be irresistibly attractive if it were properly understood” (DeLeon 76).
Yet, what is of note here is not this seemingly pedestrian rhetorical goal, but rather how
Tucker seems to reach that goal. Indeed, one can detect in the description of Liberty that Tucker
included in the first issue a rhetoric that violates conceptualizations of dialectical and rational
persuasion. Tucker emblazoned the first page of the periodical with a forceful description of his
editorial aims:
It may be well to state at the outset that this journal will be edited to suit its editor, not its
readers. He hopes that what suits him will suit them; but if not, it will make no difference.
No subscriber, or body of subscribers, will be allowed to govern his course, dictate his
policy, or prescribe his methods. Liberty is published for the very definite purpose of
spreading certain ideas, and no claim will be admitted on any pretext of freedom of
speech, to waste its limited space in hindering the attainment of that object. (“Declaration
of Purpose” 1)
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Liberty certainly reflects Tucker’s view; Tucker spent pages responding to critics, often to a
detriment. Martin suggests that much of Tucker’s writing was “wrangling and hair-splitting of
little or no value which in the alter days gave the paper the tenor of a debating society” (208).
With this characterization in mind, it appears that Tucker seems to neglect one of rhetoric’s most
tried and true tenets: the construction of arguments that accord with audience expectations. In
essence, when Tucker writes, “He hopes that what suits him will suit them,” he flips the script on
rhetorical invention. Instead of composing arguments that appeal to his audience, he asks his
audience to appeal to his argument. To phrase it another way, Tucker expects to “spread” the
gospel of anarchism not by dialectical persuasion, but by the evoking of affective judgments that
reflect Adam Smith’s concept of “sympathy.” Even more pointedly, in response to the
question—how can such a non-dialectical rhetoric persuade individuals to join the anarchist
cause?—Tucker answers “sympathy,” which, as will be discussed below, asks interlocutors to
judge an orator’s argument not on how well the rhetor speaks to his/her particular beliefs and
assumptions, but by imagining his/her own response to the same exigency. Before explicating
my claim here, it is necessary to outline the Chicago Haymarket Affair: one of the most
important events in American radical politics, the nadir of anarchism in America, and the event
that precipitates Tucker’s “sympathy.”
The Haymarket Affair
According to the labor historian James Green, Post-Civil War Chicago epitomized the
“Gilded Aged—an age of excess when businessmen accumulated huge fortunes, constructed
lavish mansions, exploited the public domain and corrupted public officials” (38). In addition to
the prevalent social and economic inequities that characterized Chicago, the Great Chicago Fire
of 1871, a growing immigrant population, the failure of socialist electoral politics, and a series of
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labor battles resulting in overt police brutality would result in the bombing of a battalion of
police officers and the arrest and execution of several prominent anarchist labor agitators.
Indeed, the trials and tribulations of Chicago radicalism and politics were by and large shaped by
the prominent labor agitator and orator Albert Parsons, his wife Lucy, and his comrades August
Spies, and George Engel in their drift from reform-minded socialists to militant anarchists.
The late-1870s saw an explosion of radical clubs and trade unions in response to the
failures of the Socialistic Labor Party, a newly formed Marxist-influenced party that had enjoyed
a rapid period of growth among Chicago’s immigrant population. After a defeat at the polls in
1879, the absorption of many socialist candidates and supporters into the Democratic and
Republican ranks in 1880, and a voting scandal in 1881 that nullified the election of a socialist
city council member, many German radicals who once comprised the Socialistic Labor Party
were left searching out alternative routes for social and political change (Green 90). That is, the
debates surrounding the relationship between of electoral politics, trade unionism, and radical
politics “hardened hearts and closed minds, leading passionate young socialists like [Albert]
Parsons and [August Spies] to reject electoral politics completely” (91). As a result, many of the
SLP’s former members, led by Spies and Albert and Lucy Parsons, became dispersed among the
anarchist International Working People’s Association (IWPA) and/or the militant Knights of
Labor.
The Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor (KL) was founded in 1869, and,
because of its embrace of a mystical Catholicism, appeared to be a sort of off-shoot of the Free
Masons (Green 96). Like many other radical groups of the time, the Order believed that
capitalism should be replaced by a “cooperative economy that would allow dependent wage
workers to become independent producers” (Green 97). The group’s aim attracted Albert
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Parsons, who would join the Order on July 4th, 1876 and found the Knight’s first Chicago
branch. The Order operated as a point that “amalgamated the fractured trade unions into one
solidified organization,” which, consequently, attracted thousands of American to join the KL.
Indeed, the cause of the KL’s ascendency was the organization of a mass strike in 1885 against
the railroad magnate Jay Gould, which saw its membership swell to over 700,000 (Dubofsky and
Dulles 131). Despite its prominence on the national stage, in Chicago it was a different story; in
1883, just as quickly as the KL rose to eminence among Chicago’s working-class, its
membership dropped by 49,000 in less than a year after being defeated by Western Union in
their attempt to secure better working conditions (Green 98-99). The KL in Chicago, however,
after a series of successful strikes and organizing by the Chicago anarchists, would experience
another sustained period of growth in 1886, which would pave the way for the dramatic events of
May.
In the wake of the KL’s dramatic fall from grace in 1883, Chicago presented fertile
conditions for the IWPA, a European anarchist organization formed in London in response to the
ousting of anarchists from the First International by Karl Marx in 1872. In 1881, the followers of
Mikhail Bakunin convened in London to found the International Working People’s Association
(IWPA). Against the Marxist International Workingmen’s Association, the anarchists who
formed the IWPA in London “acted on their belief that socialist propaganda could not effectively
read workers through trade unions and political parties; nor would revolutionary change result
from strikes, mass demonstrations and election campaigns” (Green 93). The result was a
program that stressed “propaganda by deed,” “a violent act planned by a secret conspiracy and
committed by a dedicated militant, [which] could impress the world with the evil of the despotic
state and with the fearless determination of those who intended to destroy it” (Green 93). Albert
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Parsons and August Spies attended the 1883 meeting in Pittsburgh that established the American
branch of the IWPA. In fact, Parsons, along with the newly-minted Chicagoan Johann Most,
wrote The Pittsburgh Manifesto—the IWPA’s statement of principles in America, which opened
with a quote from the Declaration of Independence. Soon thereafter, the “militant socialists of
Chicago began identifying themselves as anarchists” (Green 129).
Near the end of 1893, the Chicago economy was growing at a rapid clip. Indeed, “the net
value of goods produced by the city’s leading manufacturers leapt from $28 million to a
staggering total of $760 million” (Green 102). Unsurprisingly, the dramatic increase was the
result of increased downward pressure on worker’s wages and the expanded use of technology in
the production process (Green 105). In addition to the changes in mass production and the effects
they had on Chicago’s wage workers, a depression soon befell the city and country.
Consequently, Chicago’s major trade unions and radical groups, led largely by the speeches and
publications of Albert Parsons and his comrades, would engage in a massive organizing effort,
which would result in an unprecedented expansion of membership roles, including the
reemergence of the Knights of Labor after a series of successful strikes against Jay Gould’s
Southwest Railroad System and the organization of workers in the vehemently anti-union
McCormick Reaper Works in Chicago in early 1886 (Green 145-159). Indeed, what has come to
be known as the “Great Upheaval,” the coordinated efforts and sympathy strikes that appeared
across the United States, had Chicago as it “epicenter” (Green 146).
To be specific, Chicago’s anarchists, radical socialists, and trade unionists, notably the
IWPA and its trade union the Central Labor Union (CLU), galvanized around the surging
Knights of Labor and the reinvigorated calls for an eight-hour workday (Green 154). This
coordination would result in unprecedented action that surprised anarchists, unionists, and
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capitalists alike. In a warm-up to a planned May 1st rally and strike, 15,000 members of the
anarchist-led CLU marched through downtown Chicago on April 25th, 1886 in front of an
estimated 50,000 onlookers to argue for a shortened working-day. After giving rousing speeches
full of allusions to dynamite, Albert Parsons and August Spies were singled-out in the press as
dangerous agitators who were plotting to use violence during the May 1st rally (Green 158-159).
Much to the police’s surprise, the May 1st rally came and went without incident; thousands of
workers went on strike and paraded through the streets of Chicago. Dances were held and
speeches were given, and the festivities continued well-into the weekend (Green 164-167).
However, the mood began to change on May 3rd. A fatal clash between workers and
police in front of the McCormick Reaper Works, the open drilling of Chicago police officers, the
firing of KL workers from the Gould railway system, and the summoning of National
Guardsmen ripened the discord among the striking workers (Green 168-169). The strikes
resumed on May 4th and were to culminate in a protest at Haymarket Square against the rampant
police violence. Among others, Albert Parsons and August Spies gave fiery speeches denouncing
the police’s actions against striking workers at McCormick’s. Then, at 10:20pm, despite most of
the crowd having left, six columns of Chicago police marched into the square to disperse the
remaining protestors. As the police marched forward, a bomb was thrown into the center of the
columns. The police then opened fire on the protestors. Over the ensuing days the exchange
would result in the death of seven police officers and an unknown number of anarchist protestors
and civilians, as well as the arrest of dozens of anarchist agitators (Green 180-189). After a
sensational trial where eight anarchists were tried for murder, the Haymarket Affair would result
in the hangings of four, the suicide of one, and the life-imprisonment of two.
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In sum, the political and economic conditions of late-nineteenth century America
provided fodder for a growing radicalism and labor movement, which pitted not only radicals
against capitalists but radicals against radicals. In other words, concomitant with the fight against
the injustices caused by capitalism and the State was a fight about how best to wage that war. As
we will see in the following sections, it was the latter battle that occupied the writings of the
Boston anarchists in the weeks and months following the Haymarket blast.
Liberty’s Sympathies
From 1886 to 1887, like most of America’s other newspapers and periodicals, the events
at Haymarket occupied the pages of Liberty. Because the bombing had attracted so much
attention to anarchism, Tucker and his compatriots had to tip-toe between two competing
motivations: separating themselves from the anarchism associated with the Haymarket bombing
while still arguing for the relevance of their program. From 1886 to 1888, Brooks notes that
“Tucker and writers tried to differentiate individualist anarchism theoretically, economically, and
strategically from the ‘Chicago anarchism’ represented by the defendants in the Haymarket case”
(7). In a response called “The Boston Anarchists,” which Tucker published on May 22nd, he
writes, “the Boston anarchists are ready to denounce the savage Communists of Chicago, who,
falsely sailing under Anarchistic colors, commit murder, arson, and mob violence” (5). However,
despite the scrutiny of anarchism as a result of the actions of the Chicago anarchists, Tucker
argues, “I see no reason why we should take in our shingle and so give the appearance of running
away from our philosophy. We propose to let the old sign-board stand” (5). What is more, in
another piece published in the same issue, Tucker also suggests, “The outbreak at Chicago,
whether the actors in it were good or bad, is a very small one, compared to those that proceed
from ‘bad laws’ in this and other parts of the world” (“Coming to Its Senses” 5). Tucker’s
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exigency, then, consisted of negotiating the paradox of denouncing the Chicago anarchists while
simultaneously raising the anarchistic banner higher on the mast.
To meet such a challenge, Tucker aimed to pique his readers’ “sympathies.” In response
to the impending execution of the Chicago anarchists, Tucker included a piece written by
“A.H.S.”3 titled “A Fellow-Feeling” on November 5th, 1887.4 Specifically, this short piece
(about 250 words) is aimed at “those Anarchistic members of the Order” (“A Fellow-Feeling”).
A.H.S. here refers to the Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor, who, because they had
became so closely tied to Haymarket bombing, supported the execution of the Chicago anarchists
in an effort to salvage their reputation in the face of public anger. As Dubofsky and Dulles note,
“The Knights of Labor were as violent in condemning them [the anarchists] as the most
conservative newspapers” (112). The Knights’ decrying of the action at Haymarket was all the
more offensive to the anarchists because among those to be executed was the anarchist and
founding member of the Knights of Labor in Chicago, Albert Parsons. As the two groups were
closely aligned in the struggle for worker’s rights, the anarchists reacted negatively. To be
specific, the piece begins with a portrait of a speech by the Order’s leadership to its members; the
author writes, “‘While we as individuals have sympathy for the men about to be executed, as an
order we believe in the majesty of the law, and that the anarchists, having been condemned,
should be punished,’ said General Treasurer of the K. of L. Frederick Turner. And ‘me too’
echoed Secretary Charles H. Litchman” (A.H.S 1). According to A.H.S., the motivation for
asking the Knights of Labor to suppress their sympathy for the condemned anarchists is that
“perhaps the secession of some of the ‘brothers’ was anticipated by some of the Grand and Petty
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On November 11th, 1887, the anarchists Albert Parsons, George Engel, August Spies,
and Adolph Fischer were executed by hanging.
4
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Masters, and that is why they have used the funds of the Order to get into the law-making
business” (1).5 In short, A.H.S. argues that the leaders of the Knights of Labor commanded its
members to disregard their identification with the condemned anarchists in order “to maintain
discipline” because sympathy poses a threat to order—to the Order (1). Reflecting the anarchists’
dismay with the Knights’ actions, “A Fellow-Feeling” culminates in the following question:
“How does this [the Knights’ support of the execution of the anarchists] strike the Anarchistic
members of the Order who believe in discipline and red-letter tyranny—when it is used to
preserve the majesty of the Order” (1)? By ending this piece with such a question, the author
asks the anarchist members of the Knights of Labor to resist the Order’s call to suppress their
sympathy with the soon-to-be-executed anarchists and obey the rule of law.
As a counter, then, to the Knights of Labor’s appeals to “law and order,” wherein they
ask/command their members to resist their own identification with the anarchists bound for the
gallows, A.H.S.’s rhetorical tack foregrounds the concept of sympathy. Apart from explicitly
evoking Adam Smith’s definition of sympathy as “fellow-feeling,” A.H.S. seems to borrow
directly from the pages of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. That is, like Smith, A.H.S. relies
on a scene of a “brother’s” torture and execution to exemplify the sympathetic function. Noting
the explicit evocation of Adam Smith’s “sympathy,” what follows is an examination of the
sympathetic process and its connection to anarchist politics.
Adam Smith begins his treatise on ethics with the following claim, which also serves as
the epigraph of this essay: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what ourselves should

5

In response to the events at Haymarket, the Knights of Labor would throw themselves
headlong into reformist and electoral politics in the fall of 1886. See Dubofsky and Dulles 132133.
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feel in the like situation” (9). He continues, “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we
ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us what he suffers” (9). Against a vulgar
empiricism, Smith grounds his ethical system in a seemingly anti-representational logic that
suggests that humans cannot know or experience the sentiments of others, even those of kin.
Because “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” our cognitive
representation of the Other’s subjective experience cannot bring us into knowledge of the Other
and his/her subjective position. “True knowledge” of an Other is impossible. Instead, “By the
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same
torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with
him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them” (9). For Smith, we come to know the
experiences of others by imaginatively placing ourselves in the Other’s position. However, this
imagining of oneself in the position of the Other does not mean taking on the Other’s
subjectivity. Although one’s subjectivity may, in fact, change as a result of such an exercise, the
sympathetic process relies on the two participants retaining their own subjectivities so as to
remain distinct. According to Smith, sympathy, while possibly being synonymous with pity or
compassion, “denote[s] our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever” that results from
imagining ourselves in the position of the Other (10).
Stephen McKenna has argued that sympathy, the process by which affects are
engendered as shared moral sentiments, is an inherently rhetorical project (117). In fact, against
the view of most Smith scholars who find his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres derivative
of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, McKenna argues the opposite—Smith provides us a “Theory
of Persuasible Sentiments” (114). To be specific, sympathy is a natural human tendency that
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grounds Smith’s ethics, yet its expression can only be realized through communicative
interaction. McKenna argues that Smith’s rhetorical ethics “rejects the either/or fallacy of a
choice between foundational knowledge (or transcendent criteria) on the one hand or pure
contingency of value on the other as a basis for morality” (139). Thus, one might say that the
anarchist response to the question posed at the beginning of this essay—how can anarchism (or
rhetoric), with its rejection of transcendent arbiters, be theorized as a positive societal
arrangement instead of pure chaos?—would be sympathy. In other words, in place of a
transcendental criteria that is used to ground ethical action, such as the Knights of Labor’s appeal
to “law and order,” and the seemingly chaotic, “anything goes” view that anarchism is so often
accused of fostering, Tucker and the Boston anarchists promote “sympathy”—the rhetorical
construction of ethical norms and moral sentiments.
However, the process through which sympathy occurs, its connection to anarchism, and
the implications for connecting the two still deserves explanation. According to Smith, in order
to sympathize, the hearer must understand the causes of the speaker’s joy or grief and evaluate
the response to such a situation. He writes, “The first question we ask is, What has befallen
you?” (11). That is, for sympathy to take place, the hearer must know the exigence motivating
the speaker. Smith continues, “Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the
passion, as from the situation which excites it. We sometime feel for another, a passion which he
himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that
passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his form the reality” (12).
For sympathy to occur, the speaker must formulate a response to an event that demonstrates
“propriety.” According to Smith, “In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or
disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists
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the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action” (18). To
achieve the rhetorical propriety that will lead to sympathy between rhetor and interlocutor means
constructing an argument that is aimed not at a particular audience, but an imagined “impartial
spectator.” Because Smith begins his ethics with the premise that one cannot experience the
feelings of another, this means that a rhetor cannot appeal to the beliefs and feelings of an
audience. Instead, an imagined “impartial spectator,” or what Smith calls “reason, principle,
conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our
conduct” guides our affective response to a given situation (Smith 139). According to McKenna,
the “impartial spectator” that “grounds rhetorical and ethical propriety” is the archive of
experience comprised of previously formed sympathies (McKenna 67, 131). That is, the
“impartial spectator” is the internalization of social norms and practices that determines propriety
in the rhetorical/ethical. Responses, then, are constructed with an eye to this storehouse of
experience and social norms (“impartial spectator”), which, because the interlocutor has also had
sympathy with others, functions as the bridge between the communicants.
In effect, then, Smith’s figuration of sympathy might be characterized as the following: A
rhetor who finds him/herself in a particular situation that warrants a response must call upon
his/her past experiences and social interactions (the “impartial spectator”) so as to craft an
appropriate response. The hearer, then, must judge the speaker’s response to that situation
appropriate by understanding the rhetorical exigence and placing him/herself in the same
situation. In essence, the hearer must answer the following: “Judging from the speaker’s
expression of the situation, which is also an appeal to the synecdoche of our cultural practices
and norms called the ‘impartial spectator,’ would I feel and act the same way in that same
situation?” If the hearer answers “yes,” the result is sympathy, a shared moral sentiment that
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induces the hearer to action and guides political action without any sort of institutionalized
meditation, be it the State or transcendent criteria, while also avoiding absolute ethical relativity.
As McKenna points out, such an evaluation may at first blush appear to simply be a
matter of taste or personal preference. In this light, the hearer’s judgment that results in
sympathy, in “fellow-feeling,” often overlaps with Smith’s figuration of aesthetic judgment
(McKenna 118). However, McKenna points out that the difference between the two has to do
with the interlocutor’s interestedness. That is, aesthetic judgment for Smith involves a
disinterested individual’s evaluation of a how well an object expresses its subject. However,
Smith admits that sympathy is not the end of aesthetic judgment as aesthetic judgment is often
one of personal taste. In short, while two people may share an affective response to an object,
there is no need to actively seek sympathy. On the contrary, when an individual is (self-)
interested in an orator’s subject, the response to some sort of joy or grief-inducing situation, the
evaluation moves from the aesthetic realm into the rhetorical/ethical and thus serves as the
material that will ground the judgment.
Framed in such a way, the role the sympathetic process has distinct Kantian overtones,
particularly Kant’s description of taste and its ability to foster community through
communication. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests:
Now taste is at bottom a faculty for judging of the sensible illustration of moral ideas (by
means of a certain analogy involved in our reflection upon both these); and it is from this
faculty also and from the greater susceptibility grounded thereon for the feeling arising
from the latter (called moral feeling), that the pleasure is derived which taste regards as
valid for mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each. Hence it
appears plain that the true propaedeutic for the foundation of taste is the development of
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moral Ideas and the culture of the moral feeling; because it is only when sensibility is
brought into agreement with this that genuine taste can assume a definite invariable form.
(152)
Kant’s make clear in no uncertain terms that collectivity and community can be built through
taste: the evaluation of a “sensible illustration of moral ideas.” To be specific, the judgment of
such sensuous “pleasure” moves from the subjective and “disinterested evaluation” of an
individual to questions of “interestedness” and the “good” (i.e. ethics) through communicative
interaction with others. Indeed, Kant’s description of humanity explicitly points the importance
of the sympathetic process and its manifestation through rhetorical exchange. He suggests that
humanity “on the one side indicates the universal feeling of sympathy, and on the other the
faculty of being able to communicate universally our inmost [feelings]” (151). Taste, in other
words, “makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charms of Sense to
habitual moral interest” (Kant 150). Like Smith and the anarchists, aesthetic judgment for Kant
has the ability to foster relationships between individuals without the need for a common
epistemological or metaphysical grounding.
The sympathetic process, as suggested earlier, seems to function not through the
construction of arguments to accord with audience beliefs and assumptions (“You should feel the
same way as I do because it is in your interest to do so.”), but by inviting the interlocutor to
evaluate the argument as though it were his/her own (“I feel this way because of this situation.
Judge for yourself whether or not you would too”). In short, a rhetor creates a message that is to
appeal to an “impartial spectator” (an imagined audience constructed from past experiences),
which is then evaluated by an interlocutor, who, by imagining him/herself in the rhetor’s
position, draws upon their own potential affective response to guide his/her judgment of the
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rhetor’s original message. Cast in this way, one might say that throughout the sympathetic
process, both rhetor and interlocutor overcome their inherent egoism—their inability to feel that
which others feel—by focusing on their own self-interestedness. Indeed, it is at this juncture that
the connection between sympathy and anarchism becomes clear. That is, the focus on one’s own
self-interest that characterizes the sympathetic process might be detected in Benjamin Tucker’s
assertion that the only moral law is “Mind your own business,” or his claim that “[t]he most
perfect socialism is possible only on the condition of the most perfect individualism” (qtd. in
Marshall 390). In other words, the most perfect socialism—anarchism—is possible only when
one rejects both chaos and the transcendental and evaluates rhetorical/ethical propriety by
imagining oneself (replete with “interestedness”) in the position of others. According to
Benjamin Tucker and the other Boston Anarchists, sympathy, then, can serve as the basis for
self-government in the absence of a State.
Apart from publishing the piece by A.H.S. in the days prior to the Chicago anarchists’
execution, Tucker also makes this view explicit in a piece titled “Ralph Waldo Emerson on Law”
published a month after the hanging. In this particular piece, Tucker excerpts selections from
Emerson’s essay “Politics.” The longest selection Tucker includes is a section wherein Emerson
describes the process through which individuals can make their own laws. This process is none
other than that of sympathy:
For, any laws but those which men make for themselves, are laughable. If I put myself in
the place of my child, and we stand in one thought, and see that things are thus or thus,
that perception is law for him and me. We are both there, both act. But if, without
carrying him into the thought, I look over into his plot, and guessing how it is with him,
ordain this or that, he will never obey me. This is the history of governments,—one man
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does something which is to bind another. A man who cannot be acquainted with me,
taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall go to this or that
whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy. Behold the consequence. Of all debts,
men are least willing to pay the taxes. What a satire is this on government! Everywhere
they think they get their money’s worth, except for these. (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on
Law”)
In this long passage, we see the sympathetic process and its implications for a Stateless society.
To be specific, like Smith’s sympathy, Emerson/Tucker suggest that just laws are not constructed
by imagining how the Other might feel if and when he/she is subjected to a particular law, but by
using the Other’s response to gauge one’s own reaction to the law. In other words, there is no
“guessing how it is with him.” A law can be just only “[i]f I put myself in the place of” the
Other, which is to say, if I imagine myself being subjected to a particular law. The result of “both
being there, both acting” is a “shared perception” that can serve as law. Sympathy, the rhetorical
construction of a shared affective response, allows the participants to remain unique in their
subjectivity and can serve as the ethical motivation to engage in collaborative action without the
mediation of the State with its alleged embodiment of transcendent criteria. For Emerson/Tucker,
just laws are those that individuals construct for themselves through the rhetorical construction
of a shared moral sentiment (“sympathy”), which, in an anarchist society, takes the place of the
transcendental laws that are said to be embodied in the State and also avoids falling into disputes
of personal preference and taste. Moreover, because laws that are developed through sympathy
are constructed in a particular moment to meet a certain aim, they themselves resist the
institutionalization and codification of law that, on the anarchist view, results in elevating that
law to the metaphysical and transcendent.
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Empathy or Dialectic?
In the passage of Emerson’s that Tucker excerpts, one also sees the opposing process
through which laws can be made and enacted. That process I mention is the one whereby an
individual “look[s] over into [an Other’s] plot, and guess[es] how it is with him, [and] ordain[s]
this or that” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on Law”). Emerson further suggests, “This [process] is the
history of governments,—one man does something which is to bind another. A man who cannot
be acquainted with me, taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall
go to this or that whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on
Law” 7). That is, whereas Adam Smith’s sympathy, or anarchism’s rhetorical ethic, presupposes
that individuals cannot “know” the thoughts and feelings of an Other, its opposite, what I call
“empathetic identification,” is founded on the idea that one can, thanks to a dialectical
knowledge, “know” the thoughts and feelings of an Other. Before elaborating on this claim, it is
necessary to note what I mean by empathy. According to University of Cambridge
Developmental Psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, empathy “is our ability to identify what
someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an
appropriate emotion” (16). It is my argument in the following pages that the ability to identify
and respond to what someone else is thinking and feeling—to empathize—is the “end” of the
dialectical method theorized in Plato’s Phaedrus (and, by extension, Marx’s theory of
revolution). As such, we might think of the dialectic/rhetoric binary that has characterized much
of Western thinking for over two millennia in terms of a binary framed in affective terms:
empathy/sympathy.
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In Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates’ explanation of dialectic can be said to mirror
what Baron-Cohen calls empathy. To unpack my claim, I turn to the succinct summary of
dialectical persuasion Socrates offers Phaedrus in opposition to the sophistry of Lysias:
Serious discourse…is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and
sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who
planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other
minds other words capable of continuing the process forever, and which make their
possessor happy, to the farthest limit of human happiness. (141)
While Socrates clearly suggests that the goal of dialectic is to bring one closer to the
immutable/transcendent, what deserves some explanation here is Socrates’ mentioning of
“fitness.” It is important to note that to deem one appropriate or “fit” presupposes that one
individual possesses the knowledge that allows him/her to deem another appropriate or “fitting.”
That knowledge that sanctions such an evaluation and selection is dialectical knowledge of one’s
own “character,” or the relationship between self and God. That is to say, because I have
dialectical knowledge, I can deem someone appropriate for such knowledge. Summarizing this
view, Socrates tells Phaedrus, “Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful
according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were
his god, to honor and worship him” (127). The Other is deemed fit, then, if one is able to
recognize one’s own self in the Other. As a result, the Other becomes remade in the image of the
dialectician. One, in essence, places him/herself in the position of the Other in order to select
oneself. The Socratic dialectic of the Phaedrus amounts to the following: I have knowledge that
brings me close to God, the all-powerful. You do not have dialectical knowledge, yet I see
myself in you. Because I know me, and I see myself in you, I know that you are wont of
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dialectical knowledge. Therefore, I will give you the dialectical knowledge that will make you
me. All of which is to say, one bases his/her knowledge of the Other on self-knowledge.
In the case of Socrates’ dialectic, the interlocutor must labor to ensure that the
dialectician remains in power. In other words, the interlocutor must give up him/herself to the
dialectician. That is, because the dialectician convinces the interlocutor that his/she is in need of
dialectical knowledge about a particular topic (virtue, rhetoric, government) and the acquisition
of that specific dialectical knowledge brings one closer to the divine, the interlocutor sees in the
dialectician the path to power. To put the situation in simpler terms, I accept that I lack the
dialectical knowledge that brings me closer to God, the all-powerful. You have dialectical
knowledge, which I need in order to become closer to God, the all-powerful. I see myself in you.
Therefore, I will receive the dialectical knowledge because it will make me you. The form of
identification for both the dialectician and the interlocutor is the same: Because I am you, I know
what you are thinking and feeling.
The result of such a dialectical process is empathy, which, for the anarchists, is the path
to unjust laws. That is, the dialectician is marked by his/her “ability to identify what someone
else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate
emotion” (Baron-Cohen 16). To satiate the point, the dialectician “identif[ies] with what
someone else is thinking or feeling” because he/she is that “someone else.” So, the dialectician
can always “respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.” The conclusion
is always, already known. The discourse then is made to retroactively fit the conclusion.
On the anarchist view, empathy elides what sympathy makes explicit: that one has “no
immediate experience of what other men feel” (9). The dialectician, in placing him/herself in the
position of the other, in essence, “guesses how it is with him,” which, according to our logic
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here, is nothing other more than empathizing with the Other. It is the process that Tucker,
Emerson, and the anarchists suggest leads to the construction of laws that serve to keep power in
the hands of the few, its “rightful” place. Or, as Emerson himself puts it, “A man who cannot be
acquainted with me, taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall go to
this or that whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on
Law”). In sum, to the dialectician the interlocutor must pay the ultimate tax: his/her liberty.
Marxism and Rhetoric
In his Rhetoric of Marxism, James Aune suggests that Marx failed to fully consider the
role of rhetoric in ushering in capitalism’s demise. First, Aune picks up on Alvin Gouldner’s
work, which suggests that the dialectical conflict between labor and capital is “inevitable” and
will result in the concentration of the means of production in the State controlled by the
proletarian vanguard before the eventual “withering away of the State.” Such a situation boils
down to the notion that there is no need to persuade individuals to join in the work of
overthrowing capitalism because the revolution is “inevitable.” Gouldner calls this situation
Marxism’s “nuclear contradiction” (13). Refuting this notion, Aune writes, “contrary to
Gouldner, Marx’s argument that change will accelerate and be more positive if one chooses to be
a revolutionary seems to work somewhat effectively as a response” to the “inevitability thesis”
(13). Instead, Aune finds a more significant rhetorical problem within Marx’s thought. That is,
Aune suggests that Marx failed to consider “What sorts of communicative processes enable
historical actors to see liberatory possibilities” (14).
Aune points to Marx’s work on ideology as Marx’s most concrete statement on rhetoric
and the function of language in ushering in social and political change (27). While I recognize
that the vast amount of work and debate surrounding the term “ideology,” I take Marx’s
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definition of ideology as the “camera obscura” as my starting point. Or, in other words, I’ll begin
my reading of Marxist rhetoric with an understanding of “ideology” as, what both James Aune
(among many others) suggests is “false or deluded speech about the world and the human being
who inhabit it” (28). What is more, because the concept of ideology represents well-worn
territory, I want to focus less on what makes ideology “false speech,” and more on what might be
“correct” or “right” speech in Marx’s thought. Indeed, it is my claim that despite his allergy to
Plato, Marx’s project, or more specifically his rhetorical project, is more Platonic than first
appears. Drawing this comparison will then allow me to put forward my conceptualization of
Marxist rhetoric as being “empathetic.”
In 1848, Karl Marx, along with Friedrich Engels, published The Communist Manifesto,
the most well-known call for the “forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions” (Marx and
Engels 48). This singular document “deals in turn with the relations between the bourgeoisie and
the proletariat, between the communists and the proletariat, and between communism and
existing socialist doctrines” (Kołakowski 187). For our purposes here, section two of the
Manifesto will serve to exemplify Marx’s “empathetic” ends. That is, focusing on the
relationship between “the communists and the proletariat” will allow one to detect Marx’s
Platonism, which, following our logic here takes the form of an “empathetic dialectic.”
In this section, Marx and Engels describe “communists” in a way that immediately evokes
Socrates’ description of those with dialectical knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus. They are
described as:
on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class
parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand,
theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly
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understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the
proletarian movement. (27)
Furthermore, the communists desire the “formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of
the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat” (27). To form the
proletariat into a class—the driving force behind historical materialism—the communists “point
out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of
nationality,” which means “[i]n the various stages of development which the struggle of the
working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they [the communists] always and
everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole” (27). Marx and Engels portray
the communists, like Socrates himself, as possessing a unique knowledge that allows them to see
through ideology/“false speech”, and, as a result, able to lead those without such knowledge to
“class-consciousness” or the “immutable.” To phrase it another way, the communists possess the
requisite knowledge that allows them to see and express the ways in which capitalist production,
in its exploitation of workers, “supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and
progress” (Marx and Engels 24).
To elaborate, the class-conscious communist draws on two knowledges to bring
individuals into contact with the “good” or “just” much like Socrates’ dialectician. First, Marx
and Engels note that the communists “have no interests separate and apart from those of the
proletariat as a whole” (26). The communist and the proletarian, then, are one and the same.
However, though the communist and proletariat are, according to Marx and Engels,
indistinguishable, the communists’ understanding and expression of the dialectical progression
of history and class conflict separates them from their proletarian comrades. The class-conscious
communist “express[es], in general terms, actual relations spring from an existing class struggle,
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from a historical movement going on under our every eyes” (Marx and Engels 27). Thus, like the
dialectician who uses knowledge of his/her own “character” to choose a “fitting” Other, the
communist uses knowledge of his/her relation to capitalist production to choose and form the
proletariat. In other words, because both the dialectician and communist possess knowledge of
the dialectic that engenders a certain understanding of their own relationship to the “good” (the
divine or communism), they have ability to choose and remake others in their own image.
Therefore, the communist, like the dialectician, is characterized by “empathy,” or his/her “ability
to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings
with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen 16). That is, the communist puts to work his/her
knowledge of the proletarian and historical materialism in order to “know” what other workers
think or feel and respond in a way that brings them into the revolutionary class. As a result, the
communist’s knowledge of the conditions of capitalism and class formation gives way to a
rhetorical program whereby the communist employs:
the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able
to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed
from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process
forever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest limit of human happiness.
(141)
In conclusion, Marx’s rhetoric takes us back to the beginning of this section, as well as Western
thought. That is, for Marx, rhetoric operates in the same way that Socrates dialectic in Plato’s
Phaedrus, which, as I have argued, takes the form of empathetic identification.
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“the ultimate and bitterer conflict will be still to come”
Sixty-four years after the death of Thomas Jefferson, eighteen years after Marx’s ousting
of the anarchists from the First International, and three years after the execution of four Chicago
anarchists, Benjamin Tucker, in his seminal 1890 essay, “State Socialism and Anarchism: How
Far they Agree, and Wherein they Differ,” describes the evolution of 19th century radical
socialist thought and offers a bleak assessment of the relationship between Marxism and
anarchism. Originally written for the North American Review, one of the most widely read
periodicals of the time, Tucker first lays out the commonalities between Marxist/State and
anarchist socialism.6 He posits that “the economic principles of Modern Socialism are a logical
deduction from the principle laid down by Adam Smith in the early chapters of his “Wealth of
Nations”—namely, that labor is the true measure of price” (“State Socialism” 3). Tucker then
delineates between the responses to the labor theory of value, which are represented by the
positions of Josiah Warren in America and Joseph-Pierre Proudhon in France with that of Karl
Marx in Germany. The philosophies of Warren and Proudhon, which Tucker suggests both point
to “the road of Liberty” despite developing independently of each other and on different
continents, stand in opposition to Karl Marx’s authoritarian “state socialism.”
In concluding his essay, Tucker borrows from the French journalist and anarchist Ernest
Lesigne’s characterization of these two socialisms and presents over forty “crisp antitheses” that
spell out the differences between these two political programs. Tucker specifically points to the
role of the State as emblematic of their respective philosophies:
The first [Marxism] regards the State as a society sui generis, of an especial essence, the
product of a sort of divine right outside of and above all society, with special rights and
6

Despite being called one the “ablest” pieces the magazine’s editor had ever read, it was
never published.
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able to exact special obedience; the second [anarchism] considers the State as an
association like any other, generally managed worse than others. (“State Socialism” 16)
According to Tucker, Marxist politics would rely on the implementation of “a régime of Archism
fully as despotic as that of the State Socialists themselves” (“State Socialism” 15). These
positions, Tucker alleges, “are more diametrically opposed to each other in the fundamental
principles of social action and their methods of reaching the ends aimed at than either is to their
common enemy, existing society” (“State Socialism” 2). More pointedly, even if these two
programs were able to jointly combat and overthrow the existing order, “the ultimate and bitterer
conflict will be still to come” (“State Socialism” 3). In short, Tucker locates in the conflict
between anarchism and Marxism a conflict more consequential than that between labor and
capital.
Tucker’s remarks make apparent that the battle between radical socialisms is a battle
between two politics with two very different rhetorical “ends.” When characterizing the telos of
each program, Tucker notes, “Both are in pursuit of the great possible welfare for all,” yet “One
[Marxism] aims to establish happiness for all, the other [anarchism] to enable each to be happy
in his own way” (“State Socialism” 16). That is, on one hand, Marxism seeks dialectical
empathy, the result of which will be “a State religion, to the expense of which all must contribute
and at the altar of which all must kneel” (“State Socialism” 7). Anarchism, on the other hand,
advocates rhetorical sympathy, or “liberty both as end and means” (“State Socialism” 15). To
phrase it another way, in place of the State and its supposed embodiment of certain immutable or
metaphysical concepts (reason, justice, etc), anarchism proposes a rhetorical ethic called
sympathy that allows for individual liberty by to flourish while also staving off the concentration
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of power in institutionalized government, as well as the bad sort of anarchy: chaos, violence, and
relativism.
Because of its association with political violence resulting from the Haymarket bombing,
anarchism as a distinct political category would soon become unrecognizable. That is, by the
beginning of the twentieth century, the heirs to the individualist anarchist tradition would
“gradually decline into the obscurity of the depression of 1929-1939” (Martin 274). However, as
the next two chapters aim to show, the empathetic/sympathetic (dialectic/rhetoric) divide and its
persistent entanglement with questions of the State would reappear and find competing partisan
homes. Specifically, in opposition to what we might call Jefferson and Tucker’s nonpartisan or
pre-partisan anarchism, the next chapters will trace the use of anarchic rhetoric for both leftist
and rightist politics. Specifically, the next chapter will show how in his drift away from orthodox
Marxism and Trotskyism, the political theorist C.L.R. James enacts anarchic rhetoric, while the
last chapter will examine reemergence of anarchic rhetoric in the twenty first century under the
Tea Party moniker.
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CHAPTER THREE
“BRING[ING] THE UNIVERSAL INTO PLAY IN A POLEMICAL WAY”: ETHOS,
AESTHETICS, AND ANARCHISM IN C.L.R. JAMES’ “FIRESIDE CHAT”
“The critical mind must free itself from a Marxism which says that all will be well
if only you become a socialist” (Max Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto 21).
“Politics occurs wherever a community with the capacity to argue and to make
metaphors is likely, at any time and through anyone’s intervention, to crop up”
(Jacques Rancière, Disagreement 60).
In chapter two, we continued our work of explicating anarchic rhetoric by taking up the
work and ideas of Benjamin Tucker and his compatriots in order to argue for anarchism’s
“sympathetic” end(s). Analyzing the response of the Boston Anarchists to the bombing of police
officers at Haymarket Square and the resulting condemnation of anarchism allowed us to connect
Adam Smith’s conceptualization of “sympathy” and anarchist politics. The result suggested that
anarchic rhetoric seeks the rhetorical alignment of affective responses—the rhetorical
construction of “moral sentiments”— can serve as the basis for self-government in place of the
State. Extending the argument, we were also able to locate certain strands of Platonic thought in
Marx’s historical materialism despite his own ambivalence towards the Greek philosopher. This
connection allowed us to construct a foil to “rhetorical sympathy” in the form of “dialectical
empathy.” This chapter continues to elaborate on this notion by examining the Marxist C.L.R.
James’ response to and remedy for the problems associated with Stalinist-Marxism and the
failures of American liberalism in regards to African American politics. In particular, this
chapter aims to show that Marxism and liberalism’s desire to represent African Americans and
have them identify with the State (Marxist or liberal) was, like our figuration of “dialectical
empathy,” simply a ruse to obtain power and opened the door for James’ employment of
anarchic rhetoric.
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Both the writings and shifting political affiliations of C.L.R. James suggest an oftentimes
conflicted relationship with Marxism, which, for our purposes here, hold much import for
thinking about the relationship between rhetoric and radical politics. In particular, James came to
America as a member of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), before joining another
dissident Trotyskist group called the Workers Party (WP) in 1940, only to rejoin the SWP in
1947. However, in 1951, James would eventually reject Trotskyism all together and go on to
form an original “Marxist tendency” with Grace Lee Bogg and Raya Dunayevskaya called
Correspondence Publishing Committee. James biographer Paul Buhle suggests that these shifts
represent a “philosophical journey,” and that James’ novel approach “told the Old Left what it
did not want to hear, and spoke to the rising New Left in a voice that it could not clearly
understand” (Introduction xxi). That is, one can see that throughout his writings, James’
recognition that because of its perversion under Stalin, twentieth-century Marxism cannot—and
should not—serve as an alternative to liberal capitalism: “The philosophy of Stalinism is the
philosophy of the elite, the bureaucracy, the organizers, the leaders, clothed in Marxists
terminology. It is the extreme, the historical limit of the rationalism of the bourgeoisie, carefully
organized to look like a new revolutionary doctrine” (James, State Capitalism and World
Revolution 121). On James’ view, the various responses to Stalinism, which included a focus on
existentialism and psychoanalysis, were impotent in solving the problems posed by liberal
capitalism and Stalinism. The problem facing James and his compatriots was the idea that “There
is no longer any purely philosophical answer to all this. These philosophical questions, and very
profound they are, Marxism says can be solved only by the revolutionary action of the proletariat
and the masses. There is and can be no other answer” (State Capitalism and World Revolution
129).
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Consequently, there has been much difficulty in trying to pin down James’ politics
among leftist-oriented academics and activists. For example, James biographer Kent Worcester
notes, “James was able to forge a space for his idiosyncratic brand of radical and democratic
politics with the context of Pan-African and black nationalist movements” (xiii), while E.P.
Thompson suggests that James’ work is an “instinctive, unarticulated anarchism” (qtd. in
Rosengarten 26). While many are willing to acknowledge his flexible approach to radical
politics, his most well-known interpreters have insisted on placing him within the Marxist
tradition. Worcester is quick to argue that “James’ politics were forged in the crucible of
classical Marxism, and in many respects his life and work can only be understood with reference
to his lifelong attachment to Marxist principles” (xiii). Regarding the anarchist claim, Paul Buhle
posits that “[t]he misapprehension of James’ position” as “‘syndicalist’ or ‘anarchist’ in its
treatment of party and state” is “sincere but mistaken” (“Marxism in the USA” 56). What, then,
to make of James’ politics? James’ political indeterminacy, I argue, can best be understood as a
rejection of dialectical/metaphysical Marxism/liberalism in favor of a rhetorical anarchism.
However, as was mentioned in the last chapter, in being labeled a dangerous European
phenomenon that espouses violence and dynamite, anarchism’s future in America was all but cut
off at the legs. Indeed, James Martin notes that after the Haymarket Bombing and the death of
Benjamin Tucker, anarchism in American and Europe would seemingly disappear within “avant
garde…literature, philosophy and art,” smaller syndicalist movements, and “small libertarian
groups ranging from experimental educators to exponents of social decentralization” (277).
Thus, despite nearly disappearing as a distinct political category, as I hope to show in this
chapter and the next, anarchism and its strategies of persuasion become appropriated for dueling
political purposes. That is, in contradistinction to Jefferson’s pre-partisan anarchism and
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Tucker’s non-partisan anarchism, there is a reemergence of anarchist thought and strategies in
leftist American radicalism of the twentieth century, as well as far-right conservatism in the
twenty first century. Regarding the former, this chapter argues that CLR James, who, in his drift
away from dogmatic Marxism and Trotyskyism and distrust of liberal politics, would begin to
advocate for a localized, decentralized, and autonomous (i.e. anarchist) African American
politics. After all, James observed in the 1956 preface to the second edition of State Capitalism
and World Revolution, “The great fact of the present organizations is that they suppress and
crush what is always required for the building of a new society, the powers and energies of those
have to build it” (xxxiii). Whether it is the Marxist or liberal State, or the labor unions working
for political reforms on behalf of its members, “the bigger the traditional organizations grow and
the more power they wield, the more they act as a brake upon these creative energies” (“Preface”
xxxiii). In response to the failure of liberal and Communist statism and to foster the
“construction of a new society from the bottom up (“Preface” xxxiv), James enacted an anarchic
rhetoric that, like in our previous chapters, demonstrates the anarchistic/an-arkhê-istic qualities
of decentralized, localized, and affective rhetorical acts. It is important to note, however, that
while James confirms much of the work done in preceding chapters, he also extends our
figuration by emphasizing anarchic rhetoric’s presupposition of absolute equality, demonstrating
the power of anger within the sympathetic process, challenging traditional conceptualizations of
ethos, as well as privileging the role of aesthetics in creating/judging anarchistic/an-arkhê-istic
arguments.
To that end, I first trace a brief history of James’ engagement with American politics,
before moving into a discussion of his “‘My Friends’: A Fireside Chat on the War by Native
Son.”
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C.L.R. James Comes to America
In 1932, upon moving to Britain from his native Trinidad, James made a name for
himself as a sports reporter, creative writer, and political thinker. After the success of his
political writings, notably his World Revolution 1917-1936 and The Black Jacobins, James found
himself in high demand. In late 1938, at the request of Leon Trotsky, James left Britain for the
US “to contribute to the work of the newly formed Socialist Workers Party” (LeBlanc 4), the
organization representing Trotsky’s views in America. According to his friend and collaborator
Grace Lee Boggs, James arrived in the US eager to engage in political activism, which included
taking up the “negro question” with Trotsky, an issue that had increasingly come to the fore
within American radical politics. She notes that upon landing in the US, James “had already
studied and internalized the most important achievements of European civilization. But as a
black man, a colonial, and a Marxist, he also knew that European barbarism had not just begun
with Hitler” (Boggs 165).
With this knowledge, and soon after landing in the US, James began meeting with
workers, writers, and activists to discuss revolutionary politics. James first took up residence in
Harlem where he socialized with many radical New York writers and activists. During his stay in
Harlem, James met Richard Wright, and, despite their initial disagreements—James was a
Trotskyist and Wright a Stalinist—they would go on to become friends. In fact, as will be
discussed below, James located in Wright’s novel Native Son a figure through which he would
develop his vision of radical socialism. James then embarked on a speaking tour in early 1939,
which included a public debate concerning “pacifism” and “socialist revolution” with Bertrand
Russell; according to McLemee, “[B]y a vote of audience, James won the debate” (xiii). These
experiences began to solidify James’ role within American radical politics, as well as offer him a
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glimpse into the American political, economic, and social scene that would greatly shape his own
unique brand of revolutionary socialism.
As suggested above, James’ American sojourn also solidified his reputation as an
effective orator and polemicist with an uncanny ability to synthesize a variety of authors in his
critiques of capitalism, racism, and dogmatic Marxism. In his first encounter with James, Martin
Glaberman describes being “entranced by this tall (six foot, four inch) dark man who kept an
audience in his grasp for three hours speaking about the British Empire, striding back and forth
across the stage without a podium, without a note. I thought then, and I think now, that he was of
the great orators of the twentieth century” (“C.L.R. James: A Recollection” 47). Charles Van
Gelderen seconds Glaberman’s observation when he writes:
James was probably the finest orator our movement has produced, at least in the Englishspeaking world, and the movement made full use of his talents. In Britain he was the one
person feared by the Stalinists as being more than a match for people such as Communist
party leaders Harry Pollitt and R. Palme Dutt. Only once did the Communist party pluck
up enough courage to engage him debate. In the Islington Library on Holloway Road he
devastated the CP spokesperson Pat Sloan, himself no orator. (43)
Apart from being a highly renowned lecturer and orator, James’ rhetorical talents found him to
be a leading propagandist for revolutionary socialism in America. McLemee notes James’
“abundant journalistic output included a fair quantity of what might be called ‘revolutionary
boilerplate’: newspaper columns denouncing racism, capitalist hypocrisy, and the misleaders of
the African American community” (xxxi).
Although James’ work has been taken-up within cultural and literary studies and political
science, his work remains neglected within rhetorical studies despite his rhetorical prowess and
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importance as a radical political thinker. However, as I hope will become clear, his
“revolutionary boilerplate” offers a rich body of texts for rhetoricians interested in the
intersections of race, rhetoric, and radical politics, and, more specifically, strategies of
persuasion that run counter to liberal and Marxist thought.
Marxism and African American Autonomy
The impetus behind James’ tackling of the “negro question” was the position of African
Americans in regards to liberal and Marxist politics. That is, while Jim Crow prevented full
political and economic participation by African Americans, the Stalinist Communist Party, the
most prominent alternative to liberalism, did no better. According to James, the Communist
Party (CP) had:
passed through three stages in its Negro work: (a) up to 1928 when the Negro work was
neglected, (b) 1929-1935 when it made a drive, the period which coincided with the
period of [denouncing all other left currents as] social fascism, and (c) 1935-1939, the
open abandonment of the revolutionary line by the C.P. and the catastrophic loss of
nearly all its Negro membership. (“The Communist Party’s Zigzags” 116)
In other words, before promoting the idea of a Popular Front against the rise of fascism, a move
that largely stifled any revolutionary tendencies outside of the CP and resulted in left-leaning
coalition governments in France and Spain, the CP called for “self-determination” and the
establishment of a “Negro Soviet Republic” within the “Black Belt” South. According to Cedric
Robinson, the policy of “self-determination” advocated by the CP at the behest of Stalin was
“political opportunism searching for theoretical justifications” (226). In other words, the CP’s
call for “self-determination,” which was undergirded by historical materialism, was simply a
tactic to strengthen the CP’s influence in America in order to seize power. Thus, when it did take
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up the “negro question,” the CP in America, under the direction of Stalin and the Third
International and in accordance with Marxist theory, presented two answers, both of which
involved adhering to the State form.
However, from 1928 to 1938, the Trotskyites, with whom James had aligned himself,
“took even less interest in the Negro question than did the Communist Party” (James, “Historical
Development” 74). In fact, in 1933, Trotsky himself did not agree with the stance his own
organization had taken (McLemee xix). Whereas the SWP was advocating for the “liberal” idea
of equal rights, Trotsky thought self-determination the more radical idea, although he refused to
take a hard stance. What he did do was call for “a serious discussion of this question, perhaps in
an internal bulletin” (“The Negro Question”).
Trotsky and the SWP would soon be brought in-line thanks to James. In April of 1939,
James traveled to Mexico to meet Trotsky and discuss the relationship between African
Americans and Marxism. As McLemee notes, James wrote two resolutions concerning African
Americans and the radical socialist movement that were accepted by the national convention of
the Socialist Workers Party. The resolutions were not a call for a “separate black state,” but
“affirm[ed] the right of the African American people to national self-determination, if they so
chose, in the course of the revolutionary process” (xxii). Thus, the Trotskyist position on the
“negro question” was the result of James’ work and discussions with Trotsky.
In choosing to “affirm” and support rather than dictate and “lead” the actions of African
Americans, James had developed a position, which despite its mundane appearance, stood in
direct opposition to the CP’s stance. The CP had turned the “negro question” into a “national
question,” and therefore stressed the necessity of forming an African American state in the
South. Perhaps Jay Lovestone, leader of the Communist Party in the USA, best captured the
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party’s stance: “The especially intense exploitation and heavy oppression to which millions of
Negroes in America are subject make it imperative for the Party to devote its best energies and
its maximum resources toward becoming the recognized leaders and champions of the Negroes
as an oppressed people” (674-675). This view, according to James was “(1) economically
reactionary and (2) politically false because no Negroes (except C.P. stooges) want it. For
Negroes it is merely an inverted segregation” (“Preliminary Notes” 8). The idea that an
organization would work to establish a State without having the assent or involvement of those
who would occupy the State amounts simply to “they want to get rid of us” (“Note Following the
Discussions” 15-16). Because the formation of a State was unwanted among the African
American population, the idea represented a Communist Party dictate designed to seize power at
the expense of the wants of African Americans.
According to James, there was a certain irony in the way African Americans had been
treated by radical socialist groups; their action suggested they were the most revolutionary of all
populations. Citing the influences of both Black churches and Marcus Garvey, James argues:
The success of the Garvey movement, the Divine Movement, and the millions of dollars
poor Negroes pour annually into the churches out of their almost empty purses, all these
are evidence of their fanatical devotion and capacity for self-sacrifice. And the
revolutionary energy, the readiness to give all which distinguished the Garvey movement
in particular, in return for nothing tangible but the promise of a new society, show that
here, in contradistinction to the great movements of organized workers for wages, closed
shops, etc., we have perhaps the most important manifestation in American capitalist
society of one most powerful current in the coming socialist revolution. (“Notes
Following the Discussions with Leon Trotsky” 16)
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James recognized that the difficulty lay in reaching and organizing the African American
populations. Recognizing the CP’s mistakes, as well as the revolutionary potential of African
Americans, James would begin to advocate for a rhetorical agenda that emphasized local,
decentralized, and anti-vanguardist politics. Moreover, if, as Joel Olson suggests, anarchism has
by and large paid little attention to issues of race and politics, and James’ program is “clearly
consistent with anarchist politics” (41), James might be thought of as the first anarchist thinker to
seriously tackle this question.
“My Friends” and “Anarchic Rhetoric”
As one of the most prominent and active members within the Trotskyist movement and
the Left Opposition, James took up the “negro question” in his writings for such publications as
Socialist Appeal, Labor Action, and The Militant, which included tackling the question in a
variety of genres. Although James often found himself writing for an “audience of Marxist party
cadre,” James’ journalistic writings were aimed at a wider audience and often provided detailed
accounts of the conditions of African American workers, reviews of popular books and films,
and analyses of African American figures and historical events. Regarding his journalistic
writing, James’ output was remarkable: “There are scores, possibly hundreds, of these pieces”
(McLemee xxxi). Yet, James’ use of pseudonyms prevents us from knowing exactly which
pieces James composed. However, in addition to his theoretical and journalistic writings, James
often penned revolutionary socialist propaganda not restricted to “Marxist party cadre” or
periodical subscribers. James’ 1940 text “‘My Friends’: A Fireside Chat on the War by Native
Son” falls into this latter category. Indeed, McLemee suggests “My Friends” is “a very different
sort of text altogether. Printed by the thousands and distributed as widely as possible, the
pamphlet is an example of James as revolutionary propagandist” (xxxi). Kent Worcester’s
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description of “My Friends” also points to its enigmatic character. Worcester suggests the piece
is a “bibliophile’s prize.” Yet, he also characterizes it as a “fierce polemic” and “passionate but
odd and strangely disingenuous” (68). While Worcester does not elaborate on his claim, his
claim suggests that “My Friends” stands apart from the numerous other writings aimed at
activists and intellectuals familiar with Marxist theory. James’ “My Friends: A Fireside Chat on
the War by Native Son,” allows one to see how James writes, not as a Marxist theorist, but as a
propagandist aimed at fostering a decentralized, autonomous, and self-determined African
American (i.e. anarchist) political movement.
Recalling the name of Richard Wright’s novel of the same name, which was published
months before “My Friends,” James writes under the pseudonym “Native Son,” while also
ironically (re)employing the rhetorical strategies taken by President Roosevelt and the Allies
during the run-up to WWII, to argue that Roosevelt “should stop being so active in his defense of
democracy abroad and pay attention to the crimes against democracy at home” (“Fireside Chat”
20). For instance, James begins the text with Claude McKay’s poem “If We Must Die,” which
Winston Churchill had recited in front of the American Congress to garner support for the fight
against the Nazis. Furthermore, James parodies both the form and content of Roosevelt’s
“fireside chat” throughout the text. James opens the piece by sarcastically pointing-up
Roosevelt’s reliance on rational deliberation: “But in order to make you feel like you will be
getting the real inside dope in a confidential manner, I shall begin by saying: ‘My friends, let us
sit down, you and I, and talk this thing over together.’ That piece of baloney being out of the
way, we can now get down to business” (18). The “business” James is alluding to is the
“business” of achieving political and social change in spite of the State. By explicitly
foregrounding his ironic appropriation of the “fireside chat,” writing as opponent to Stalin, and
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arguing against Roosevelt’s liberalism, James presents a rhetoric that is motivated by “political
affect,” equates rhetorical action with absolute equality, and challenges traditional
conceptualizations of ethos.
That is, as an astute observer of America culture and politics, James recognized the
limitations of American liberalism and Stalinist Marxism as political and rhetorical programs.
Particularly, James suggests that both American liberalism and Marxism have only pandered to
African Americans, despite their revolutionary potential. In his follow-up notes to his meeting
with Trotsky, James makes clear his estimation of the Communist Party’s reception among
African Americans. He writes, “The C.P. [Communist Party] Negroes are looked upon as touts
for Negro converts in exactly the same way as the Democratic and Republican Parties have touts
for Negro votes” (“Preliminary Notes” 8). In other words, the desire to bring African Americans
into the political process only serves the end of taking power. Both liberalism and Marxism seek
to gain power while “representing” the views of African Americans. Marxism and liberalism
seek to use African Americans as a means rather than as ends in and of themselves. For James,
the goal is not simply to be included in politics by consenting to representation by a governing
body or institution, but to create a revolutionary course that challenges the liberal and Marxist
programs that insist on representation based on metaphysical principles in order to gain the
powers of the State.
James argues against this tendency, and suggests that Roosevelt’s liberalism and Stalin’s
communism masks the condition of absolute equality qua the ability to act rhetorically. More
specifically, by appealing to immutable concepts, both liberalism and Stalin’s communism seek
to put subjects in their “rightful places” and preclude rhetorical engagement by African
Americans. What I mean by rhetoric is the ability of a rhetor to raise an argument that challenges
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the grounds or arkhê on which a political arrangement rests. In making this claim, I am using the
work Jacques Rancière, who although does not employ an explicitly rhetorical vocabulary,
provides an original and useful way to think through the connection between anarchism, rhetoric
and politics.1 To that end, it is necessary to revisit and provide a brief summary of Rancière’s
thinking before moving into a discussion of “My Friends.”
In Rancière’s terms, “dissensus” counters the processes of “consensus” implemented by
the “police” in order to recognize the logic of an arkhê. “The police,” Rancière tells us, “is a
distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) whose principle is the absence of void and of
supplement” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 36).2 Echoing Foucault, he suggests:
The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing,
ways of being, and way of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a
particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a
particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse
and the another as noise. (Disagreement 29)
Rancière finds in Plato’s Republic the first instance of such “partitioning.” Rancière calls the
result of Plato’s “partitioning of the sensible” an “etho-logy” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 41).
Because Plato seeks the “complete realization of the arkhê of community,” all individuals are to
occupy certain roles that correspond to their particular knowledge(s), which, consequently,
1

With a few exceptions, Rancière’s connection to rhetorical theory has yet to be explored
in detail. Samuel McCormick, for instance, picked up on Rancière for his reading of Bertolt
Brecht’s “Mr. Kuener” and the “political identity of the philosopher.” Also, Ethan Stoneman
recently argued that “Rancière’s political theory implies an aesthetic model of rhetorical
indecorum of which rhetoricians may avail themselves in order to rethink the relationship
between rhetorical performance and political praxis” (131). See McCormick and Stoneman.
2
Steven Corcoran tells us that Rancière plays on the “double meaning of [the French]
avoir-part,” which means to both “partake” and “partition.” That is, the “partage du sensible”
both determines actions and creates distinctions between groups/individuals. See “translator’s
note” on page 220 in Rancière’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.
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ensures the smooth functioning of the polis (Disagreement 65). Furthermore, it is Rancière’s
claim that since Plato, all “political philosophy lies in grounding political action in a specific
mode of being,” and “works essentially to mask the litigiousness constitutive of politics” (“Ten
Theses” 40). As a result of the ontological connection between knowledge and position, the
ability of a subject to dissent and present arguments that challenge the arkhê that “partitions the
sensible” is null and void.
In his own fireside chat, James critiques Roosevelt’s “etho-logy” and its exclusion of
rhetoric. In particular, James draws out his critique by pointing up that Roosevelt’s desire to
speak for all and enter the war is reliant upon individuals consenting to a metaphysical arkhê that
suggests certain individuals are to perform certain roles that correspond to the certain knowledge
they possess. As James ironically points out, “I notice that a good fireside chat always has
something in it about God and prayers. But I notice too that Hitler in all his speeches talks about
God and asks for his blessing” (“Fireside Chat” 21). In this passage, James makes the case that
by appealing to God, Roosevelt’s position as commander-in-chief is substantiated not by the US
Constitution, but the arkhê of Christianity. On James’ reading, Roosevelt effectively masks the
political by adopting the seemingly non-political form of “the fireside chat” and endowing with it
appeals to the Almighty instead of the Constitution. Yet, in suggesting that Hitler’s position is
also sanctified by God, James calls into question this arkhê, as well as the imperative to assent to
it. The appeal to such an arkhê becomes, then, simply an effort to stave off dissent and arguments
that challenge the validity of the State. It is simply a justification for the exercising of power.
James writes, “Roosevelt, Hitler and [President] Wilson not only pray to God, but see to it that
they have guns, battleships, and planes” (21-22).
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To undermine the reign of the arkhê and resulting “etho-logy,” one must exercise his/her
absolute equality by acting rhetorically. In response to impending war and the Popular Front,
James writes, “In this moment of crisis, it is proper that the voice of the working man should be
heard. The President governs for all, the priests pray for all, the solider fights for all (so, at any
rate, we are told) but it is the working man who pays for all” (18). James point out that the
President, despite his claim of embodying metaphysical figurations of the “good,” “just,” or
“right,” cannot meet his own expectation: creating an all-encompassing system, logic, or arkhê
that avoids crisis or dissension. Specifically, exercising one’s absolute equality by acting
rhetorically upsets the reign of “archi-politics.” As Rancière writes, “The problem is not the
always more but the anyone at all, the sudden revelation of the ultimate anarchy on which
hierarchy rests” (emphasis in original, Hatred of Democracy 16). Confirming Plato’s suspicion,
James’ rhetorical response seeks to question the metaphysical arkhê on which Roosevelt’s
liberalism rests. Any attempt to speak for “all” can be undercut through rhetorical action. That is,
“when the president talks about preparing America for war I demand my right to be heard”
(James, “My Friends” 18). In short, any claim to political representation based on metaphysical
concepts attempts to preclude rhetoric, the “litigiousness constitutive of politics.” The ability of
rhetoric to question politics based on a metaphysical arkhê is an-arkhê-istic. It attempts to make
the arkhê account for itself. In doing so, such a rhetoric performs the very function that Emma
Goldman assigns to political anarchism: “Anarchism urges man to think, to investigate, to
analyze every proposition” (50). James’ anarchism, then, can be thought of as a rhetorical
response to a claim of representation based on a metaphysical arkhê, which invites an
interrogation of the very premises on which the claim to representation relies. In other words,
James enacts critique, which, as Wendy Brown writes, “[P]assionately reengages the text,
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rereads and reconsiders the text’s truth claim. In so doing, critique reasserts the importance of the
text under consideration (whether a law, nation, principle, practice, or treatise), its power to
organize and contain us, its right to govern us” (16). This interrogation reveals the rhetorically
constructed nature of the metaphysical arkhê on which politics, whether liberal or Marxist,
appear to rest.
Moreover, what I call James’ anarchic rhetoric presupposes Rancière’s absolute equality;
one always has the ability to speak for oneself. James argues, “So that when the President talks
about preparing America for war I demand to be heard. I know how to make a fireside chat. You
are all sitting down listening to me and I am sitting down talking to you. You know it, I know it,
everybody knows it” (“My Friends” 18). The “it” everyone possesses is the ability to act
rhetorically in order to make a counter-fireside chat. This argument suggests that despite claims
to the contrary, there is no ontological connection between the knowledge one has and the
position he/she occupies. To act rhetorically, that is, to construct and present arguments that
undermine what one might call Roosevelt’s metaphysical politics, means one has the ability to
create and occupy new spaces and subjectivities.
Painted in such a way, a picture of the connection between anarchist politics and
rhetorical practice begins to emerge; it is anarchistic to be rhetorical. Or, in other words, rhetoric
has the ability to call into question the arkhê on which political arrangements rest, which
confirms Brian Garsten’s observation that “the reigning view of rhetorical speech is that it is a
disruptive force in politics and a threat to democratic deliberation” (3). Indeed, Rancière’s own
definition of politics relies on this calling-into-question the legitimacy of the arkhê. He argues,
“Politics occurs wherever a community with the capacity to argue and to make metaphors is
likely, at any time and through anyone’s intervention, to crop up” (Disagreement 60). This
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response to and rejection of a metaphysical arkhê, or what I call James’ anarchic rhetoric,
presents several implications still to be parsed. In what follows, I explore the relationship
between anarchic rhetoric and judgment, as well as its relationship to the classical appeal of
ethos.
Affect and Judgment
Despite his ambivalence towards the Communist Party in 1939, James recognized the
need for thinking through the “negro problem.” James suggested that the SWP “must give its
frank, sincere, and unwavering support” in “the awakening and bringing into political activity of
the large mass of Negroes” (“Preliminary Notes” 11). Yet, the support must be unconditional; “it
must be insisted upon that support of a Negro mass movement must not be conditional upon
whether it is or soon will be socialist or not” (emphasis in original, “Preliminary Notes” 11).
More pointedly, “The Negro much be won for socialism. There is no other way out for him in
America or elsewhere. But he must be won on the basis of his own experience and activity”
(James, “Preliminary Notes” 8). If there was to be an African American political movement it
would have to develop autonomously with a minimum of outside influence. Because of the
failures of both American liberalism and Soviet Communism, the only viable option was a selfdetermined political program.
To help foment political engagement among African Americans, James proposed that the
Trotskyist Fourth International form a “section entirely devoted to the Negro question.” This
section should “embark on an unremitting study of the Negro question, and immediately make
arrangements for the publications of articles.” The section should also reach out to the active
“Negro organizations in Harlem and elsewhere” (“Preliminary Notes” 12-13). The goal was to
develop and compose a rhetorical program aimed at those African Americans active in the
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NAACP, the Urban League, and other groups that were “reformist” and not seen to be radical.
The program would “fight for the party’s ideas in a manner carefully adapted to their hearers’
point of view” (“Preliminary Notes” 13). By reaching out to these groups and appealing to their
particular demands, “the transition to revolutionary socialism will not ultimately be difficult”
(“Preliminary Notes” 11). James argued that the Fourth International could correct the mistakes
made by the Stalinist Communist Party and play a role in the development of an African
American movement by aiding instead of dictating. He concludes, “What the party must avoid at
all costs is looking upon such a movement as a recruiting ground for party members, something
to be ‘captured’ or manipulated for the aims of the party, or something which it supports
spasmodically at the time it needs something in return” (“Preliminary Notes” 9). Thus, the
challenge for James was constructing a rhetoric that avoided appearing vanguardist or
prescriptive, yet assisted in fomenting a radical political movement.
A quick note of clarification is needed before proceeding. While the next few paragraphs
echo our earlier discussion of the rhetorical construction of shared “moral sentiments”
(“sympathy”), I want to offer here an example of how the sympathetic process coalesces around
the particular affect of anger, which Simon Critchley suggests is that which “moves the subject
to action” (130). In other words, I want to draw attention to the role of anger in motivating
anarchic rhetoric—an idea that will also be explored in more detail in the following chapter.
For James, the response to Roosevelt stems from a seemingly axiomatic and affective
judgment. That is, when Roosevelt claims that the moral act is joining in the fight against Hitler
in order to protect American democracy, James responds, “Our democracy! My friends, when I
heard that I laughed for ten minutes. Yes. Laughed. I’ll tell you why. It was because I was so
damned mad that if I didn’t laugh I would have broken the radio.” James further argues, “I have
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no democracy and the democracy I haven’t got Hitler didn’t take from me” (19). Describing the
enemies of democracy in the US, which include President Roosevelt and the entire Democratic
Party, as well as the American Federation of Labor and those “Negro-hating, Negro-baiting little
American Hitlers from the South,” James argues “[t]hey have been lynching me and my people,
giving us the dirtiest job, at the lowest pay, Jim Crowing us, taking the taxes we pay to teach
while children, treating us worse than they treat their dogs” (19-20). The judgment stemming
from this crisis is not an evaluation of how well a claim corresponds to a transcendent conception
of the “good” or “just” (Rorty xvii). Rather, the judgment is a self-evident and affective response
to a certain political and social situation that challenges the “correspondence” notion of
judgment. Describing this notion, James writes:
My friends, the President warns us about the fifth column. I understand that this is the
new name for the enemies of democracy. Where have the President’s eyes been all this
time? If he wants to find out who these fifth column people are, he just has to ask the
Negroes. We know them. We spend our lives fighting against them. (“My Friends” 20)
Anarchic rhetoric, then, does not seek validation in aligning a claim or course of action to a
metaphysical figuration. It instead echoes John Protevi’s concept of political affect, which he
describes as “the historically and socially embedded aspect of affective cognition” (35).
Affective cognition is described as the ability of a body to be affected and make sense of that
affection in order to develop a course of action (Protevi 51). If a claim of representation creates a
sense of anger or wrong, one is motivated to exercise his/her absolute equality by acting
rhetorically. In doing so, it “exposes the embodied and imitative nature of the political animal, its
condition of political affect—that is, precisely that which disrupts the transcendent vision of the
intellect” (Protevi 71). Against appeals to reason and/or rationality that seek to tame one’s
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affective response in order to maintain order, and against Spinoza-influenced postMarxist/Autonomist theories that center on affect’s “constitutive power,”3 anarchic rhetoric
recognizes the potential affect in general and anger in particular has in effecting radical political
change by vetoing the very distinctions between “right” and “wrong” judgment. One might say,
then, that rather than constitute an antagonism between two classes/groups within a static world,
such a figuration of affect reveals the gap between two sensory worlds by making “visible that
which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another” (Rancière, “Ten Theses on
Politics” 38).
Anarchy and Ethos
Scholars of rhetoric will find that James’ rhetoric, when read through Rancière’s notion
of “etho-logy” challenges rhetorical understandings of the ethical appeal, as well as reveals its
aesthetic dimension. Risa Applegarth provides a useful definition of ethos when she writes:
As simultaneously a spatial and social concept, ethos is a situated practice, neither fully
and freely chosen nor yet thoroughly determined, but shaped through the interaction
between individual rhetors and the social and material environments within which they
speak. (49)
For James, this definition of ethos is exactly the problem; the dialectic between a rhetor and the
social/spatial, which is seen as the space in which a rhetor exercises his/her agency, is simply the
dominant power’s acceptable process of invention. One can only “be” and “say” that which is
permitted by his/her lot. As a result, within an “etho-logy” a rhetor’s ability to challenge the very

3

The State, according to Antonio Negri, is a limit of desire, and can only be
“overcome…to the extent to which we express love rather than hatred or other negative
passions.” See Negri 170
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terms of the argument is effectively preempted. The problem is not that only this or that is
“sayable,” but that whatever is said remains ineffectual.
Against the spatial-social figuration of ethos described above, anarchic rhetoric allows for
the construction of subjectivities that, although unrecognizable under the reign of an “etho-logy,”
exist nonetheless. Rancière calls this process “subjectification” and is the “action of subjects who
by working the interval between identities, reconfigure the distributions of the public and the
private, the universal and the particular” (Hatred of Democracy 61-62). That is, subjectification
“constantly bring[s] the universal into play in a polemical way” (Hatred of Democracy 62). This
process means one is able to observe more and different means of persuasion than those admitted
under an “etho-logy.” To be specific, it allows for a wider body of ethical topoi from which a
rhetor can draw, including those means that were once thought illegitimate or invalid. Thus,
anarchic rhetoric readily opens up new rhetorical, ethical, and political possibilities, including
using those that were formerly used as a weapon in the forming of an “etho-logy.” In short,
anarchic rhetoric takes as its goal the upsetting of traditional figurations of ethos, which, in turn,
opens up the available means of persuasion to both construct new spaces and subjectivities.
By writing under the pseudonym “Native Son” and evoking the “fireside chat,” James
violates the racial and political order of early-to-mid-twentieth century America. Scott McLemee
suggests “My Friends” is a “fiction of a black sharecropper taking President Roosevelt’s place at
the microphone” (xxxi). The setting is a living room replete with presidential amenities:
newspapers, a radio, a fireplace, and literature. However, the pseudonym “Native Son,” which
evokes Richard Wright’s character Bigger Thomas, as well as Bigger’s murder of a white
woman to prevent rape allegations, creates a Burkean “perspective by incongruity:” a black
sharecropper occupying the White House.
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The figure of Bigger Thomas is an important one for James. A month before “My
Friends” was published, James published “On Native Son by Richard Wright” in Labor Action.
In this piece, James takes up the question: “Is Bigger ‘typical?’” The answer foreshadows
Rancière’s notion of “etho-logy” and James’ anarchic rhetoric. He writes, “What is a ‘typical’
Negro? ‘Typical’ of what? In capitalist society at the present time, no ‘typical’ Negro could
express the point of view that Wright wished to portray. Bigger Thomas represents the Negro in
revolt” (56). Under 1940s capitalist logic, certain actions, rhetorics, and subjectivities were
allowed and/or forbidden. However, according to James, because Bigger’s actions are not
“typical” or correspond to the logic of an arkhê, they violate the accepted understanding of
ontology, politics, epistemology, and rhetoric. Indeed, Bigger “does not quote Marx and say,
‘Workers of the world unite,’ or, ‘Black and white, unite and fight.’ He does not even know what
the ‘Reds’ stand for. But he is a revolutionary nevertheless, instinctive but none the less
powerful” (56-57). In other words, although Bigger lacks an understanding of revolutionary
Marxism, his knowledge, which lacks the requisite correspondence to an abstract and
metaphysical category, is revolutionary nonetheless. In describing Bigger Thomas in such a way,
and drawing on this image in “My Friends,” James asks the 1940’s reader to consider a new
subjectivity, that of Bigger Thomas, a black man who does not fit within the liberal American or
revolutionary Marxist schema, occupying the White House.
Cast in this way, James’ take on Bigger seems to violate the notion of “typicality” put
forth by Georg Lukács.4 Instead, James seems to argue for the sort of art that Lukács derides: “If
a work of art depicted only the overflowing abundance of new concepts, only those aspects
4

Lukács argues, “The work of art must therefore reflect correctly and in proper
proportion all important factors objectively determining the area of life it represents. It must so
reflect these that this area of life becomes comprehensible from within and from without, reexperiencable, that it appears as a totality of life” (38)
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which provide new insights…then the reader would merely be confused instead of involved”
because “the appearance of such aspects in life generally confuses people and leaves them at a
loss” (39). As already stated, James here employs what Kenneth Burke calls “perspective by
incongruity,” which Burke describes as the intermediate stage in the creation of “new meanings”
that involves the “rending and tearing” of formerly held “orientations” (69).
Through this “perspective by incongruity,” whereby James asks the audience to consider
a subjectivity that violates the logic undergirding political and rhetorical engagement, the
connection between rhetorical action and political anarchism becomes explicit. James argues that
because anyone can act rhetorically, there is no connection between the knowledge one has and
the position they occupy; anyone can occupy the White House and offer a fireside chat.
Moreover, the figure of the White House, which was once used to suppress dissent, is now the
site of dissension; the tool of the oppressor becomes the tool of the oppressed. As a result of
anyone and everyone having the ability to act rhetorically, which allows for the construction of
an-arkhê-istic subjectivities, it invalidates the ontological connection between knowledge and
position and consequently points to the irrelevance of the White House and government as a
whole. If anyone and everyone can govern, then no one need govern; government is simply
unneeded in so far as government is epitomized by the State.
The summoning of Bigger Thomas in James’ text also points to the aesthetic dimension
of politics and rhetoric. In line with Rancière’s thought, James blurs the line between rhetoric
and aesthetics. “Subjectification,” or the process of creating an an-arkhê-istic/anarchistic political
subjectivity, is an aesthetic process: “politics is aesthetic in principle” (Disagreement 58). More
specifically, Rancière writes, “Political invention operates in acts that are at once argumentative
and poetic” (Disagreement 59). By evoking the figure of “Native Son” and creating the
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“perspective by incongruity” mentioned above, James makes the implicit argument that a radical
politics demands a corresponding aesthetic and that the aesthetic is always political. That is, one
reads in James’ text an aestheticized rhetoric that collapses the division between rhetoric/poetics
or rhetoric/aesthetics. Further, the figure of “Native Son” suggests James’ discontent with both
Roosevelt’s liberalism and Marxism. While “Native Son” explicitly takes issue with Roosevelt’s
liberal policies, James’ characterization of Bigger Thomas as unaware of Marxism and
revolutionary socialism suggests that James’ own malcontent with Stalinist Marxism and CP
politics are coalesced in the figure of “Native Son.” Without an awareness of or acceptance by
the Communist Party, James’ “Native Son” suggests that the only way forward is to create one’s
own politics. Indeed, James’ anarchic rhetoric seems to resonate with Max Horkheimer’s
suggestion, which also serves as the epigraph of this chapter, “The critical mind must free itself
from a Marxism which says that all will be well if only you become a socialist” (21).
“an entirely new comprehension of the meaning of socialist politics”
Already a well-known figure and writer within radical circles and Trotsky’s Left
Opposition, James’ time in America proved to be a formative experience both for him and his
approach to radical politics. Throughout his extended stay in the U.S., which ended in
imprisonment and deportation by the U.S. Government, James began to develop his wholly
original approach to revolutionary politics. James himself suggested that his years in the U.S.
were “the most important years of my life, intellectually and personally” (qtd. in McLemee xiv).
Worcester argues, “It is indisputable that the United States offered James a set of relationships
and challenges that stimulated some of his best writing while it also opened him up to an entirely
new comprehension of the meaning of socialist politics” (“James and the American Century”
177). In short, because of his engagement with the American scene, James’ political writings can
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be seen as his effort to translate and transform European socialism and Marxism into an
American political program. In other words, when James wrote that “[t]here is no longer any
purely philosophical answer to” the problems of Marxism and liberalism, and that these
problems “can be solved only by the revolutionary action of the proletariat and the masses”
(State Capitalism and World Revolution 129); James provided an alternative in the form of
anarchic rhetoric.
What’s more, James’ rhetoric, anticipating certain strands of poststructuralist thought,
lays bare the stifling effects and consequences of metaphysical politics, be it Marxist
vanguardism informed by dialectics, or liberalism and its assumption of rationality within
dialectical exchange. In addition, James foreshadows Rancière in arguing that the arkhê borne of
metaphysical/dialectical politics masks absolute equality, as well as Rancière’s aestheticization
of politics. Finally, James points up the way in which anger can motivate—via the sympathetic
process—the disruption of the political status quo. As such, James also sets the stage for its
appropriation by twenty-first century conservatives, which we will explore in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT’S LEFT OF THE RIGHT AND RIGHT WITH THE LEFT?: FINDING THE
FUTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY IN THE END(S) OF RADICAL POLITICS
“We have corruption unlike anything we’ve ever seen. We have socialism and
communism. I read a Web site today from — I think it was the Communist Party
USA — they’re taking credit for a lot of the victories recently in the elections
here in the last week. I mean, did you even know these guys were around
anymore? They’re rearing their ugly heads, revolutionaries and anarchists” (Glenn
Beck, “The Enemies of America Are Hard at Work”).
“When in doubt, in American politics, left, right, or center, deploy the Founding
Fathers” (Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes 14).
“The historian’s ancestry goes back to Socrates.” (Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History” 91).
The last chapter demonstrated how C.L.R. James in his drift away from dogmatic
Marxism and Trotskyism enacted anarchic rhetoric from a leftist position. That is, in response to
the failures of both liberalism and Marxism, James began to question the role of both the liberal
and Marxist State and their ability to create, manage, and/or protect an equitable political
arrangement, and, as a result, enacted anarchic rhetoric to advocate for a localized, decentralized,
and autonomous (i.e. anarchist) African American politics. As we have seen throughout the last
few chapters, such a rhetoric is both anarchistic and an-arkhê-istic because it presupposes
absolute equality; aims for the aligning of rhetorically constructed “moral sentiments”
(sympathy); questions traditional conceptualizations of ethos; blurs the boundary between
rhetoric and aesthetics; and seeks the dynamic non-teleological exchange of ideas and
arguments.
While this dissertation has traced the genealogy of anarchic rhetoric as a series of
strategies running parallel to the more “traditional” varieties of American leftism, this chapter
presents a rather peculiar situation by suggesting that the best example of anarchic rhetoric today
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has taken shape under the Tea Party movement associated with America's radical conservatism.
In other words, as in the epigraph above, when Glenn Beck asks his audience if they are aware
that “anarchists” are “still around,” this essay answers: “Yes, Glenn. And you are one of them.”
In making such an accusation, my aim here is to argue that instead of placing its faith in the more
“traditional” liberal, socialist, or Marxist politics, which includes the once ubiquitous Occupy
Wall Street movement, a reevaluation of the rhetorical strategies of today’s far-right
conservatism might better serve today’s Left as it looks for a new ways to intervene in the social,
political, and economic inequities that mark the world today. Or, perhaps more pointedly,
applying our model of anarchic rhetoric to the Tea Party will demonstrate the elasticity of
anarchic rhetoric, which, I hope, will also ask us to reconsider our political categories and
practices by pointing out that the deeply engrained rejection of representative thinking
(dialectics) and politics (liberalism, Marxism, socialism) present in American radicalism is an
attitude that begins to blur the contemporary boundaries between “right” and “left.” To be clear,
those on the Left, or those who are simply concerned with today’s inequities, would do well to
recognize that there exists a body of rhetorical topoi—anarchic rhetoric—that not only has done
much to intervene in these areas of human life, but also redirects our attention back to the legacy
of critical theory, by challenging the teleology stemming from the metaphysics undergirding our
political arrangements and institutions. Instead of emphasizing reason over the affective,
empathy over sympathy, the dialectical over the rhetorical, the teleological over the open-ended,
in order to wrest away power from another group, those who desire a just, participatory, and
egalitarian should, I suggest, recognize that anarchic rhetoric gives individuals the tools needed
to determine their own ends, their own telos. In doing so, such a project evokes an all but
forgotten (and/or maligned) political tradition: anarchism.
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Taking up anarchism, then, means doing what the radical anarchist “ex-worker
collective” CrimethInc, who implicitly express both the connection of rhetoric to anarchist
politics and the importance of such a connection, suggest is necessary for creating a just,
equitable, and participatory society. In what I would argue is the most succinct summary of the
anarchic rhetoric, they write in Fighting for Our Lives: a Primer on Anarchy:
Meddle with The Truth, undermine it, create a space in which new truths can form.
Introduce questions, not answers—though remember, not all questions end in question
marks. For the revolutionary, the essence of a statement lies in its effects, not in whether
or not it is “objectively” true—this approach distinguishes her from philosophers and
other idle bastards. (10)
For today’s radicals and critical theorists, in other words, the goal should not be to create a
politics that aims to become more faithful to the “Truth” than its predecessors like today’s return
to metaphysics and Marxism. Rather, on the anarchist view, we ought to revive what Kenneth
Burke (and Derrida after him) taught us: “all effective medicines are potential poisons” (Burke
126). One might say, then, that radicalism today means rejecting both the illnesses and remedies
associated with politics and political thought by “declaring our independence” from the body
politic outright. In “declaring our independence” from the body politic, today’s critical theorists
and radicals ought to strive for creating innumerable societies founded on the free-flowing
exchange of affective/aestheticized responses to subjective and empirical perceptions that allow
for the endless congealing and dissolving of human sympathies.
False Negatives: How Politicians Diagnose and Cure Political Illness
Like the politics of Jefferson, Tucker, and James, there has been a certain awkwardness
among politicians, pundits, and critical theorists in addressing and assessing both the rhetorical
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approaches and political expediencies the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movements.
For instance, upon the clearing-out of OWS protestors in Zuccotti Park, New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg asserted, “Protestors have had two months to occupy the park with tents and
sleeping bags. Now they will have to occupy the space with the power of their arguments”
(Bloomberg). These remarks reveal Bloomberg’s inability or unwillingness to recognize the
point of OWS. Prior to clearing-out the park Bloomberg bluntly stated, “It was just an
opportunity for a bunch of unions to complain or to protest or whatever they want to do” (M.
Lee). However, whether he is unable or unwilling is of little concern; his actions reveal the wont
to put protestors back into recognizable positions. Because OWS protestors did not engage in the
deliberative process, their arguments were either unrecognizable or inadmissible within the realm
of political rhetoric. In short, Bloomberg’s desire to have protestors “occupy the space” with “the
power of their arguments” is simply the desire to have protestors reengage the acceptable spaces
and arguments.
There was also a similar reaction to the earlier Tea Party movement. In its early stages,
much like OWS, the Tea Party did not engage in deliberation and consensus building. The
resurgence of the “Town Hall Meeting” during the debate surrounding President Obama’s
“Affordable Care Act” serves as a case in point. After suspending his town hall meetings with
constituents due to “angry, sign-carrying mobs and disruptive behavior,” Democratic
congressman Tim Bishop remarked, “There is no point in meeting with my constituents and [to]
listen to them and have them listen to you if what is basically an unruly mob prevents you from
having an intelligent conversation” (qtd. in Isentadt). Indeed, the scenes of citizens openly and
polemically engaging their elected officials in response to health care reform shocked American
politicians on both sides of the aisle. Republicans made a hard right to appease an angry
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electorate, while, like Congressman Bishop, President Obama called for a roundtable discussion
in order to “procedurally” and “methodically” examine the differing health care proposals in
order to reach some sort of mutual agreement (Brown and Allen). Both of these responses—the
sudden embracing of far-right conservatism and the call for reasonableness and rationality—
were moves that sought to engage the Tea Party in the political process.
The difficulty in understanding both the Tea Party and OWS movements has also been
played out in the media coverage of these movements. In an attempt to define and explain the
Tea Party, The Christian Science Monitor, for instance, suggested that the Tea Party movement
is best characterized as the slogan “You can't fix stupid, but you can vote it out” (Jonsson).
Ambiguous as it might be, the description suggests that the Tea Party, at least in its earlier
incarnation, was not interested in making “demands.” They simply sought to vote out those who
did not agree with certain conservative principles. While the Tea Party made no qualms about
what they were against, their positive agenda was, according to some, nowhere to be found. Like
the Tea Party, the OWS movement and its lack of “demands” left pundits and commentators
befuddled. Indeed, the lack of an apparent agenda motivated a group of Huffington Post writers
to turn “to a panel of marketing experts to find out what this unlikely startup [OWS] can do,
marketing-wise, to survive and grow” (Chun). Because the OWS and Tea Party movements
adopted a tack that foregrounds their rejection of deliberation and consensus, pundits and
politicians have been left to construct caricatures and straw men in order to respond to both of
these movements.
Similarly, for left-oriented critical theorists, most notably Slavoj Žižek, OWS has
provoked a response that seems to undercut the contemporary critique of liberal politics within
critical theory. Interestingly, Žižek, whose work would appear to embrace the rhetorical program
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of OWS, suggests that the lack of demands will eventually have to change. In fact, his comments
about OWS apply just as well to the Tea Party movement, which he calls both a “sister
movement” to OWS and the “only true opposition to liberal consensus” (qtd. in A. Lee; Living in
the End Times 464). Noting the effectiveness of not engaging in dialogue, Žižek argues, “This
silence, this rejection of dialogue, of all forms of clinching, is our ‘terror’, ominous and
threatening as it should be” (“Occupy First”). In place of negotiation and dialogue, the OWS and
Tea Party movements favor an unrelenting critique of the current political and economic
institutions. However, Žižek also argues that OWS “will have to coalesce not only in some new
master-signifiers, but also in concrete answers to the old Leninist question, ‘What is to be
done?’” (“Occupy First”). In making this claim, it appears that Žižek, who, despite his vehement
and often violent condemnations of liberal politics, holds on to the notion that equitable politics
must be won either by participating in the State through representative process, or by adopting
the Marxist approach and simply taking it over.
Despite the competing partisan leanings, what is clear, judging by the responses of
politicians, commentators, and political theorists, is that both the OWS and Tea Party movements
violate liberal notions of deliberation and consensus. Liberalism, as John Rawls argues, is
concerned with “political society as a fair system of social cooperation” with “citizens as
reasonable and rational, and free and equal” (134-135). Picking up on this definition, Bryan
Garsten suggests that the rhetoric of liberalism “assumes that people can find some shared point
of agreement and asks how they can engage in deliberation within the boundaries set by that
underlying agreement” (6). Thus, participants in the liberal political process begin with a shared
set of assumptions and work towards building consensus on some issue or policy. Both OWS and
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the Tea Party stand in opposition to the rhetoric of liberalism; they refuse to engage in rational
dialogue, liberalism’s defining form of communicative interaction.
While these similarities are striking, each group rages against a different machine, which
has borne out varying successes. Indeed, the descriptions The New York Times provide are
indicative of the ways in which these two movements are viewed; OWS “stand[s] against
corporate greed, social inequality and the corrosive power of major banks and multinational
corporations over the democratic process” (“Occupy Movement”), while the Tea Party is “is an
antigovernment, grass-roots political movement,” whose “supporters tend to unite around fiscal
conservatism and a belief that the federal government has overstepped its constitutional powers”
(“Tea Party Movement”). Further, the results of these two movements are today beginning to
become clear; whereas by early 2012, the OWS movement has seemingly vanished from the
political scene and national discourse (Freidman), “Tea Party-style politics is likely to remain for
so0me time to come, a pivotal part of ongoing, fierce disputes about what the U.S. government
should do and not do” (Skocpol and Williamson 205). Given that both OWS and the Tea Party
have forwarded pointed critiques of liberal politics, which have also met with varying success,
we might wonder: In terms of coalition-building and political influence, what has led to the
success of the Tea Party? And, more importantly, what implications does this have for critical
and rhetorical theory, and the radical Left?
I argue that the Tea Party’s longevity and political successes are thanks to its enactment
of anarchic rhetoric, which, consequently, may also have something to offer to those on the Left
concerned about social, political, and economic justice. To make this case, I will paradoxically
take up a recent event that saw the Texas State Board of Education rewrite its social studies
curriculum to reflect an overt conservatism. The changes included dramatically playing up the
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role of Christianity in influencing the American Revolution while relegating Thomas Jefferson to
a minor role (Lepore 13). What is of interest in this situation is the way in which the Texas State
Board of Education was able to make such sweeping changes. In fact, part of my argument here
is that the actions of the Texas State Board of Education are representative of a larger shift
within American political and cultural life that, in addition to serving as the catalyst for this
current study, has warranted a revaluation of critical theory and its attachment to radical politics.
To be specific, as the philosopher of science Mario Pigliucci points out, the Texas State Board of
Education (ironically) retooled leftist critique for its rightist goals.
The irony of this rear-guard action by conservatives is that they have learned the
right sort of politically correct language, talking about uprooting the allegedly leftimposed “ideological bias” of public education, or about “teaching the controversy”
(concerning creation-evolution) so that students can “freely” make up their minds about
the supposed inconsistencies of evolutionary theory. (“Ideology vs. Education”)
As I hope will become clear, my analysis of this event offers a more optimistic diagnosis
of the state of critical theory than most: critique is not dead. In fact, it is alive and well, albeit in a
different form. To be specific, in my estimation, which stands against those on the Left who are
actively seeking to disregard critical theory’s legacy or have simply admitted its “defeat,” critical
thought’s political unmooring reveals its radical, egalitarian, and democratic potential. In other
words, critique—as the examination and laying bare the contingent nature of any claim of
representation or appeal to immutable “truth”—is thoroughly rhetorical and anarchistic. To be
specific, instead of critique being wed to a dialectically-informed Marxist vanguardism,1 which

1

In his seminal essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” Max Horkheimer suggests, “It
is the task of the critical theoretician to reduce the tension between his own insight and oppressed
humanity in whose service he thinks” (221).
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seemingly reifies the sort of representative thinking and politics we have been criticizing
throughout these pages, the aims of critical thought takes shape under anarchic rhetoric with its
presupposition of equality, aestheticized and affective responses to perceived wrongs, rhetorical
construction of moral sentiments (“sympathy”), and endless questioning of all claims of
representation or transcendent truths. In short, the uptake of critical thought among today’s farright conservatives, which, to many thinkers, has meant the “end of radical politics” and the
“death of critical theory, gives us good reason to connect the goals of critical thought to
anarchism: the most radical, egalitarian, democratic, and rhetorical (anti-)politics.
Before I continue, I want to offer a point of clarification: In what follows, I endorse the
form of today’s conservative politics, but, it is important to note, I am generally weary of the Tea
Party’s political goals, particularly its desire for an unfettered capitalism. My point here is that
the elasticity of anarchist politics and anarchic rhetoric—two concepts that are “without
content”—may more effectively contribute to developing communicative strategies that aide in
the creation of a just and equitable society than the Platonism that undergirds the Left’s liberal,
socialist, and/or Marxist politics.
The Tea Party?
Because the Tea Party is a relatively new phenomenon, much of the scholarship has
focused on defining and explaining the Tea Party’s politics. In their ethnographic study of Tea
Party activists, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, two political scientists at Harvard,
suggest that “the Tea Party is fundamentally the latest iteration of long-standing, hard-core
conservatism in American politics” (82), which, as a result, has “pulled the Republican Party
sharply toward the right, and shifted U.S. public debates at a critical juncture” (205). In
contradistinction, the libertarian and Constitutional scholar Elizabeth Price Foley argues that the
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Tea Party “has shown a ruthless ability to reject any candidate, of any party, who doesn’t
embrace their principles and a persistence in pursuing their agenda with any candidate who’ll
listen. To the extent that the Tea Party has been more successful in obtaining the ear of the
Republican Party may be (or is becoming) accountable to the Tea Party, and not vice versa”
(xiv). Ronald P. Formisano splits the difference between Foley and Skocpol and Williamson and
argues that the Tea Party is “[n]ot quite an independent political party and not quite a fullfledged populist social movement but [has] some characteristics of both” (15). While the above
descriptions do little to provide a stable picture of Tea Party politics, they are diagnostic in that
they highlight the political ambiguity of the Tea Party that we discussed in the opening pages.
The difficulty in assessing the status of the Tea Party as a political and social movement
can be owed to the fact that it “is an amorphous, factionalized uprising with no clear leadership
and no centralized structure” (Barstow). However, such a difficulty is not simply the result of the
Tea Party not having a clearly defined organizational structure; it also lacks a clearly articulated
political telos. For instance, political scientists Miller and Walling, calling on the work of social
movement scholars Stewart, Smith, and Denton, cannot determine whether the Tea Party seeks to
“revive” a storied past or “resist” changes to the status quo (6). Pointing out the Tea Party’s lack
of vision and goals, the historian Mark Lilla suggests, “Anarchistic like the Sixties, selfish like
the Eighties, contradicting neither, it [the Tea Party] is estranged, aimless, and as juvenile as our
new century” (“Tea Party Jacobins”). Summarizing these views, one might say that the Tea Party
seems to defy the neat ideological categories that political and social scientists are wont to
prescribe to it because it is immature and has no positively identified set of ideals to be achieved;
its partisan promiscuity is thanks to its lack of a political teleology.

124
Yet, as was outlined above, the Tea Party’s lack of a political telos gives pause to today’s
partisans on both the Left and Right. To no surprise, then, the conservative commentator David
Brooks’s negative definition proves to be the most succinct characterization of the group. He
writes:
The tea party movement is a large, fractious confederation of Americans who are defined
by what they are against. They are against the concentrated power of the educated class.
They believe big government, big business, big media and the affluent professionals are
merging to form self-serving oligarchy — with bloated government, unsustainable
deficits, high taxes and intrusive regulation. (“The Tea Party Teens”)
Such a characterization is certainly prevalent in the platform of the Tea Party Patriots, “the most
grassroots entity among tea party organizations” (Formisano 33). Citing Thomas Jefferson and
the other Founding Fathers, their “mission is to restore America’s founding principles of Fiscal
Responsibility, Constitutionally Limited Government and Free Markets” (“About Tea Party
Patriots”). Despite the appearance of clearly articulated set of goals, when one recalls the Tea
Party’s unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the Left that we addressed earlier, a defining
paradox seems to emerge: by not participating in the American political process, the Tea Party
will restore America’ founding political values. Moreover, if, as was argued in the first chapter,
those particular political values can be considered anarchist, then one might say that the Tea
Party is the inheritor of a long line of American anarchism.
Taken as a whole, the above discussion of the Tea Party suggests that one might think of
the Tea Party less in terms of a “party” or a “politics,” but what Kenneth Burke calls an
“orientation.” Burke writes, “Orientation is thus a bundle of judgments as to how things were,
how things are, and how they may be” (14). Thus, the orientation propelling today’s
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conservatism is undergirded by an overtly “anti-government” sentiment and distrust of elites and
experts.
Comparing the Tea Party’s “orientation” to that of the most visible anarchist group in the
US, the CrimethInc ex-Workers Collective, the Tea Party’s inherent anarchism comes to the fore.
According to CrimethInc:
Whenever you act without waiting for instructions or official permission, you are an
anarchist. Any time you bypass a ridiculous regulation when no one’s looking, you are an
anarchist. If you don’t trust the government, the school system, Hollywood, or the
management to know better than you when it comes to things that affect your life, that’s
anarchism, too. And you are especially an anarchist when you come up with your own
ideas and initiatives and solutions.
To reiterate, then, one can clearly begin to recognize within the Tea Party’s distrust of
governmental institutions and regulations, scientists and academics, and its non-teleological
underpinning, the distinct shape of anarchist politics. The result is that the radical Left and
radical Right begin to overlap.
The conservative commentator David Brooks also picks up on the Tea Party’s anarchistic
tendency and suggests that the blurring between left and right is the result of the Right’s
appropriation of the Left’s earlier use of non-dialectical rhetoric. He suggests, “The Tea Partiers
have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for street theater, mass rallies, marches and
extreme statements that are designed to shock polite society out of its stupor” (“The Wal-Mart
Hippies”). Ronald Formisano makes explicit the Tea Party’s non-dialectical approach when he
notes that the Tea Party “claim[s] to be above the nitty-gritty of politics and the established
parties” while “proudly declar[ing] their unwillingness to negotiate or compromise” (17). The
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result of such an approach, much like the New Left of the sixties, is that the Tea Party is
unrecognizable as a worthy politics in today’s liberal-democratic arrangement. To put it
succinctly, the Tea Party is overtly anti-political and the strategies of persuasion they employ
exemplify the anarchic rhetoric we have been discussing throughout the last chapters; it is anarkhê-istic and anarchistic. In other words, the Tea Party today provides the most visible
alternative to the Platonism present in today’s liberal, Marxist, and socialist politics. An
examination, then, of the Tea Party’s use of history reveals a rhetoric that presupposes absolute
equality qua the ability to construct arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political
arraignment rests, which, in doing so, seeks sympathy as its end, or the aligning of affective
responses through aesthetic judgment.
Bitter Tea: Angry, Old, Rich, White Men as Persecuted and Disenfranchised Victims
The Tea Party’s critique of liberalism is undergirded by a palpable anger and disaffection.
It is an affective response to the perceived failures of the State. The source of such anger is the
belief that the US has morphed into its Other: a socialist/communist State. As a matter of fact,
most journalistic and scholarly commentary locate the origin of the Tea Party in the passionate
“rant” of CNBC anchor Rick Santelli against President Barack Obama’s governmental policies
during the “Great Recession.” In response to the passing of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, which was passed less than a month after Barack Obama took the presidential
oath of office, Rick Santelli decried on live television the government’s decision to cut taxes and
engage in “stimulus” spending as way to promote economic activity and stave off a recession.
Expressing his belief that the government had violated America’s defining traits, the US
Constitution and free-market capitalism, Santelli screamed: “This is America!” (“The Power of
Rick Santelli’s Rant”). After being sardonically called a “revolutionary” by another anchor, the
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red-faced and foaming-mouthed Santelli responded by shouting, “If you read our Founding
Fathers, people like Benjamin Franklin and Jefferson — what we're doing now in this country is
making them roll over in their graves” (“The Power of Rick Santelli’s Rant”). To phrase it
another way, Santelli’s vitriol and anger was aimed at the perceived concentration of power in
the Federal government and its ability to interfere with the Constitution and capitalism, the
bastions of political and economic freedom the Founding Fathers established as a result of the
British government’s own intrusion and overreach into the lives of American colonialists. The
remedy Santelli offered completed his analogy: For the morally misguided Keynesian economic
policies of President Obama, Santelli proposed “[a] Chicago Tea Party” (“The Power of Rick
Santelli’s Rant”). Possibly more telling, however, might be the fact that as he stood on the floor
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange staring and yelling into a camera, Santelli’s rant was met
with sympathetic cheers and applause from fellow traders, or the “real Americans” (i.e.
capitalists and constitutionalists) as Santelli referred to them.
Soon thereafter, Santelli’s “shout heard ‘round the world” was being proliferated
by bloggers, conservative groups, and Fox News. Formisano notes, “In early 2009, economic,
political, and cultural shocks came together to activate ordinary persons across the country—
mostly conservative Republicans, but also independents and others—to organize and mobilize”
(27). The election of the first African American Democratic President, the recession, and
Santelli’s rant resulted in “Tax Day” protests “in some 750 towns and cities across the country”
on April 15, 2009” (Formisano 27). The fuel for these protests was, in the words of Michael
Barone, the idea that “Taking money away from those who made prudent decisions and giving it
to people who made imprudent decisions…cast[s] society's vote for imprudence and selfindulgence. It mocks thrift and makes chumps out of those who pay their own way” (“The Power
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of Rick Santelli’s Rant”). Such a visceral reaction on the part of many libertarian Americans
produced fertile ground for an easy alliance between Americans of different political stripes.
That is, suddenly, thanks to Santelli’s anarchic rhetoric, a coalition of libertarian, religious
conservatives, moderates and independents, and conservative democrats—the Tea Party—was
born.
In addition to being a rather angry population, the demographics of the Tea Party suggest
that it is “whiter, older, wealthier, and more educated than other Americans” (Formisano 106).
Thus, it goes without saying that this is a particular group that has benefitted immensely from the
State in terms of education, social security, and tax policy. However, as Formisano continues,
“Besides wholesale reaction against government, the movement also expresses a ‘heartland’
ethos of ethnocentrism among older white Americans experiencing rapid change in the kinds of
people who make up the nation” (110). What is of interest here, however, are the ways in which
this population chooses to present itself; in response to its anger at the federal government’s
Keynesianism, it is not afraid to create counter-subjectivities where they are seen as repressed,
targeted, and victimized. Indeed, present at the first “Tax Day” protests were signs equating
President Obama with Adolf Hitler, people dressed as American colonists and Revolutionaries,
and many a Gadsden Flag (“Thousands of Anti-Tax 'Tea Party' Protesters Turn Out in U.S.
Cities”). Tea Partiers, in order to express their own malcontent with government and
concentrated power, are not afraid to effectively remix history in order to aesthetically selffashion themselves as members of a victimized minority group. Whether it is equating
themselves as colonists living under the rule of a tyrant monarch or victims of the Third Reich,
Tea Party activists have sought to create new subjectivities in order to undermine the principles
guiding political action. Such a situation recalls David Brook’s rather adept observation
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discussed above: “The Tea Partiers have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for
street theater, mass rallies, marches and extreme statements that are designed to shock polite
society out of its stupor” (“The Wal-Mart Hippies”). Like C.L.R. James in the previous chapter
who sought to create a “perspective by incongruity” by portraying a black sharecropper
occupying the White House, today’s Tea Partiers, in order to drum up sympathy among the
American population, employ the same process and fashion themselves in the same sort of
position as a black sharecropper: the victim of governmental malpractice. In this way, the Tea
Party seems to echo Simon Critchley’s neo-anarchism when he suggests that the first political
emotion is anger, and that it can be used to foster and create political subjectivities that can
challenge State power (131-132). Thus, the Right, much like the Left in earlier days, produced
an aesthetic politics capable of producing new and subversive subjectivities founded on affective
responses to a perceived wrong, which, in turn, fostered sympathy between seemingly disparate
populations.
However, today’s conservatism has done more than appropriate the Left’s earlier
aesthetic and form of rhetorical invention for a different purpose, it has also claimed the Left’s
epistemology. That is, in an effort to fashion subversive subjectivities, Tea Partiers have drawn
on constructivist epistemologies in order to challenge and open up the historical record. Indeed,
as we will see below, the Tea Party’s anarchic rhetoric, which questions history as both an object
of study and methodology, resembles the effects of Nietzschean genealogy on the Christian
morality. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Tea Party is employing the genealogical method.
Rather, the Tea Party shares Nietzsche’s view of the rhetoricity of the historical record: history is
a linguistic construct and is always open to reinterpretation, repurposing, and redistribution. In
what follows, I first detail the changes made by the Texas State Board of Education to its social

130
studies curriculum in early 2010, as well as the ensuing backlash, in order to show how the Tea
Party’s use of history is an affective response to the Left’s Platonism, which has spurred its
anarchic rhetoric and might also suggest that today’s conservatives have effectively appropriated
many of the Left’s cherished forms of critique.
“Education is too important not to politicize.”
Second only to California, Texas is the second largest producer and seller of education
textbooks in America. Indeed, “The state’s $22 billion education fund is among the largest
educational endowments in the country. Texas uses some of that money to buy or distribute a
staggering 48 million textbooks annually — which rather strongly inclines educational
publishers to tailor their products to fit the standards dictated by the Lone Star State” (Shorto). In
other words, any state that buys its textbooks from Texas is also buying Texas’s curriculum. In
2010, the Texas State Board of Education, an elected board that was largely comprised of
lawyers and led by a dentist named Gary McLeroy, overhauled the Texas Social Studies
curriculum. Regarding the curriculum changes and ensuing media firestorm, McLeroy suggested:
The proposed changes have attracted national attention because they challenge the
powerful ideology of the left and highlight the great political divide of our country. The
left's principles are diametrically opposed to our founding principles. The left believes in
big, not limited, government; they empower the state, not the individual; they focus on
differences, not unity. (“Opposing View”)
McLeroy notes that the resulting curriculum “rejected changes that referred to America as
imperialistic, that deleted the role religion played in the foundations of representative
government, and that downplayed the First Amendment's protection of the ‘free exercise’ of
religion” (“Opposing View”). More specifically, The New York Times notes, “the board
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considered an amendment to require students to evaluate the contributions of significant
Americans. The names proposed included Thurgood Marshall, Billy Graham, Newt Gingrich,
William F. Buckley Jr., Hillary Rodham Clinton and Edward Kennedy. All passed muster except
Kennedy, who was voted down” (Shorto). And, what is sure to bore students to the point of
revolution, the Texas State Board of Education proposed that “[e]ach school district shall require
that, during Celebrate Freedom Week…students in Grades 3-12 study and recite” the opening
lines of the Declaration of Independence (Texas State Board of Education 12). The result of such
changes was an overtly conservative curriculum that had the potential to affect social studies
curricula across the country.
Unsurprisingly, the changes provoked an immediate outcry among academics and
concerned citizens. Over one thousand historians, for instance, signed a petition calling a delay
in the Board’s vote arguing that the curriculum should be voted upon “only after public
consultation with classroom teachers and scholars who are experts in the appropriate fields of
study” (Erekson et. al). According to the petition’s authors, “recent proposals by Board members
have undermined the study of the social sciences in our public schools by misrepresenting and
even distorting the historical record and the functioning of American society” (Erekson et al).
Moreover, John Gehring, the Director of Communications for the group Catholics in Alliance for
the Common Good, suggested in The Washington Post that the actions of the Texas State Board
of Education neglected the “common good” (Gehring). Similarly, the philosopher of science
Massimo Piggliucci argued that the curricular changes were a rewriting of history that
implemented a conservative “ideology” at the expense of reason and scholarship (“Ideology vs.
Education”).
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For the most hostile critique of Texas’s curriculum changes, one can look to a recent
study by the Harvard historian Jill Lepore about the Tea Party’s most prominent tropes: the
Founding Fathers and the American Revolution. In her study, Lepore calls the Tea Party’s
“version” of the American Revolution and the Founding Fathers “antihistory” that “has no
patience for ambiguity, self-doubt, and introspection” (15). Furthermore, Lepore characterizes
the Tea Party’s “antihistory” as “reactionary,” “outside of argument,” without “interest in
evidence,” “reductive,” unitary,” and “dangerously antipluralist” (96). Yet, recalling Jefferson’s
own ambivalence towards “history” and its stifling influence on social and political change,
which was discussed in the first chapter, one might say that the Tea Party’s “antihistory”—
including its reframing of Jefferson within social studies textbooks—is thoroughly Jeffersonian
(anarchistic). Indeed, part of my argument here is that the Left’s dependence on “argument,”
“introspection” and “evidence,” far from creating spaces for the construction of a new and
equitable society, actually undercuts its own goals of creating pluralistic, tolerant, and selfgoverning populations.
“For a free society, history is everything.”
In an USA Today opinion piece, Don McLeroy suggested that the changes to the Texas
curriculum that he championed reflected a belief outlined by Thomas Jefferson and reflected in
Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan. He argues, “The theme is freedom. These men understood
America and the principles upon which she stood: self-evident truths; liberty, with its twin
corollaries of limited government and individual responsibility; the embrace of Judeo-Christian
values; and a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence” (“Opposing View”). McLeroy
further writes, “The Texas school board is currently adopting changes to the curriculum
standards to ensure these principles are taught” (“Opposing View”). According to McLeroy, the

133
importance of history, education, and politics could not be understated: “For a free society,
history is everything” (“Opposing View”). The changes to the curriculum, then, reflected a larger
battle; it was a battle between the State and the individual. Recalling the quote above, McLeroy
suggests that the Left’s view of history “empower[s] the state, not the individual,” and, as such,
“focus[es] on differences, not unity” (“Opposing View”). The picture McLeroy paints portrays,
once again, a battle between the State and the individual. The battle over American history is a
battle between Statism and liberty/freedom. Also, noting Lepore’s negative characterization of
McLeroy and the Tea Party’s history, this is also a battle between reason, with its “focus on
differences” and “pluralism,” and self-evident truths, which are “reactionary” and “antipluarlist.”
What is of note here is the way these two orientations produce and use history. For
Lepore, the Tea Party, the Texas State Board of Education, and their biggest champions—the
media personalities Glenn Beck and Sean Hannity—“shared…a set of assumptions about the
relationship between the past and the present that was both broadly anti-intellectual and, quite
specifically, antihistorical, not least because it defies chronology, the logic of time” (15).
Legitimate history, on the other hand, “requires research, that raises questions about perspective,
that demands distinctions between fact and opinion, that bears audience in mind” (Lepore 161).
Moreover, “The study of history requires investigation, imagination, empathy, and respect.
Reverence just doesn’t enter into it” (Lepore 162). In other words, the study of history requires
the placing of one’s self in the subjective position of another in order to separate fact from
fiction, true from false (the empathetic function). According to Michel Foucault, such a
methodology presupposes the notion that “historical consciousness is neutral, devoid of passions,
and committed solely to truth” (95). As a method of inquiry, history is an expert’s uninterested
and detached search for an original Truth that must be expressed today. Foucault writes, “We
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want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and
immutable necessities” (89). One can begin to see, then, that the sort of history Lepore embraces
and Foucault dismisses is, because it relegates the passions and the rhetorical in order to present
a view of the transcendent, is overtly Platonic and dialectical.
To explain, the method employed by the Tea Party and the Texas State Board of
Education is, according to Lepore, “Antihistory,” and it has no interest in expertise, reason,
evidence, and pluralism (96). Indeed, one can detect the opposition between reason/non-reason
and expert/novice in an impassioned polemic against evolution that McLeroy gave in front of a
crowd of Texas teachers, parents, and students; McLeroy—a dentist—took issue with the
scholarship of Stephen Jay Gould by citing Darwin’s description of evolutionary stasis as “the
greatest challenge” to the theory of evolution scholarship. According to McLeroy, the critique of
evolution is self-evident: “It’s not complicated. It doesn’t take mathematics.” Indeed, such an
argument needs to be made, according to McLeroy, because “[s]omeone needs to stand up to
experts” (“Don McLeroy: 'Someone has to stand up to experts!'”). For McLeroy and his
sympathizers, then, the Left’s embrace of difference, political correctness, and reason means that
history is always, already imbued with questions of politics and ethics. Thus, McLeroy’s use of
history is purpose-driven. In being used as a way to forward a certain position, McLeroy’s
history can be used to undermine the sort of historical Platonism utilized by the Left.
Ironically, then, McLeroy and the Tea Party’s history resembles what Foucault calls
Nietzsche’s “effective history.” Foucault argues that Nietzsche’s study of “descent” and
“emergence”—genealogy—might be characterized as “effective history,” which stands in
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opposition to the historian whose “ancestry goes back to Socrates” (91).2 This historian “is given
to a contemplation of distances and heights; the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most
abstract ideas, the purest individualities. It accomplishes this by getting as near as possible,
placing itself at the foot of its mountain peaks, at the risk of adopting the famous perspective of
frogs” (89). It is these historians who “take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work
which reveal their groundings in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy—
the unavoidable obstacles of their passion” (90), and` harbor a “belief in eternal truth, the
immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself” (87).
“Effective history” challenges history’s metaphysical grounding and its attendant asceticism.
According to Foucault, “effective history” is “parodic, directed against reality, and opposes the
theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed against
identity, and opposes history given as continuity or representative of a tradition; the third is
sacrificial, directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge” (93). “Effective history,”
undoes “traditional history” and “its dependence on metaphysics” by questioning its grounding
and guiding principle (89). Indeed, “effective history” calls into question the arkhê guiding the
sort of historical inquiry exemplified by Jill Lepore and other Left-leaning academics. The result
of such a procedure might be that “genealogy can be considered the anarchist method par
excellance” (May, Political Philosophy 90).
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According to Foucault, “An examination of descent also permits the discovery, under
the unique aspect of a trait of a concept, of the myriad events through which—thanks to which,
against which—they were formed” (81). Furthermore, according to Foucault, “Emergence is
always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of Entstehung [emergence]
must delineate this interaction, the struggle these forces wage against each other or against
adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing
these forces against themselves” (83-84).
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Once again, it should be noted that I am not arguing that the either the Tea Party of the
Texas State Board of Education is performing genealogical analyses. However, they do
recognize, like Foucault and Nietzsche, that history is imbued with perspective, interest, and
power. That is, they are readily aware that the ability to persuade in the present means
constructing a past that one can use as rhetorical topoi for the present. To phrase it another way,
one can shape the past so as to become usable for persuasion today. Despite the seemingly
adolescent and awkward donning of tricorne hats, flying of the Gadsen flag, and wholesale
assuming of the Revolutionary ethos by the Tea Party, such an approach suggests that critical
theory’s emphasis on the power of language in shaping subjectivities and knowledge, far from
being dead, is alive and well (and being used rather effectively).
Thus, when those on the Left accuse the Tea Party’s use of history as being “ideological,”
“distortion” and “amateurish,” they raise history and reason above the concerns of individuals
whose feet reside firmly on the ground (which includes themselves), as well as preclude the
creation of counter-narratives. In elevating history to the metaphysical, the expert historian
denies his/her own affective and emotional preferences and responses: the historian is “divided
against himself: forced to silence his preferences and overcome his distaste, to blur his own
perspective and replace it with the fiction of a universal geometry, to mimic death in order to
enter the kingdom of the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity” (Foucault 92). Such subjectivity
results from “a necessary belief in providence, in final causes and teleology—the beliefs that put
the historian in the family of ascetics” (Foucault 92). The expert historian, like Plato’s
dialectician, venerates the metaphysical at the expense of one’s own affective responses and
processes, as well as the potential politics an affective and non-dialectical approach might
produce.
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The Elasticity of Anarchism, or T.E.A. Party (anti)Politics
The situation described above is not without irony, nor is it without precedent. Indeed,
there has been growing tendency among those on the radical Right to employ the philosophical
and rhetorical methods that were developed in and around the turbulent sixties and meant to
operate as anti-capitalist, anti-statist, and anti-hegemonic forms of resistance and
subjectification. Indeed, according to Hardt and Negri, poststructuralist and postmodern thought
has always been void of all political implications. “The ideology of the world market,” they
suggest, “has always been the anti-foundational and anti-essentialist discourse par excellance”
(141), and is the “symptom of a rupture in the tradition of modern sovereignty” (143). More to
the point, postmodernist and poststructuralist thought, according to Hardt and Negri, “indicate[s]
the passage toward the constitution of Empire” (143), “the center that supports the globalization
of productive networks and casts its all inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within
its world order—and yet at the same time it deploys a powerful police function against the new
barbarians and the rebellious slaves who threaten its order” (20). Describing the explicit use of
these same tools among those with retrograde political goals, Bruno Latour suggests, for
instance:
entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning
the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated,
unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak
from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very
same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our
lives. (227)
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While many on the Left might decry the notion that certain elements of critical theory are/have
been used for seemingly retrograde political goals, I question whether it might not serve as a site
through which to think a new path towards political emancipation. That is, while critical theory’s
appropriation by the Right may seem a like nadir in the struggle for a just and egalitarian society,
I hold that it points to a series of implications for rhetorical and critical theory, which might also
allow for a revaluation of radical politics in America. It might just point to the need to
reappropriate that which has been reappropriated, while also pointing up the points of contact
between the various appropriators whose continual use of the of the critical toolbox does not
suggest “failure” or “death,” but the potential for liberation from representative thinking and
politics—a hallmark of the critical tradition from Kant to the Frankfurt School and French
poststructuralism to Rancière today.
To clarify, my argument throughout these chapters has been that the philosophies of
Marxism and liberalism, which, despite their supposed antagonism, share a certain Platonism
that results in the State being viewed as the vehicle for creating and/or maintaining political
justice. To phrase it another way, Marxism, with its dialectical view of history and classconsciousness, and, liberalism, with its dialectical view of reason and reasonableness, both
depend on the State to embody their respective dialectics, which, consequently, also forecloses
any thinking about what a non-statist politics might look like and/or offer us today. As a result,
politics has been synonymous with the State, and any effort to think an alternative has met
immediate resistance as both liberals and Marxists share a common foe in anarchism. Yet, the
developments within critical theory and American politics have demanded a revaluation of two
traditions that stand in opposition to dialectics and the State: rhetoric and anarchism. Drawing
upon America’s often neglected and maligned history of anti-statism/anarchism, which includes
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both indigenous and imported forms, has revealed an elastic rhetoric that has been appropriated
for both left and right political goals. Such a rhetoric presupposes absolute equality qua the
ability to construct arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political arraignment rests,
which, in doing so, actively seeks sympathy as its end.
Regarding the implications of such a view, anarchic rhetoric asks rhetorical and critical
theorists to end the assumption that meaningful social change must take place via the State
and/or be dialectical, and, instead, emphasize the role of affect and aesthetics play in ushering in
social change page. Asking rhetorical and critical theorists to do away with the State, or at least
entertain alternatives to State-based politics, points not to cosmopolitanism whereby
individualism gives way to a certain universal consciousness in place of the State, but to seven
billion “declarations of independence” from the State and global capitalism. Such a move from
the global and to the local also points, then, to the importance of voluntary associations based on
sympathy.
Lastly, I hope that this genealogy of radical politics in America, with its emphasis and
valorization of anarchism’s (and rhetoric’s) lack of content and elastic nature, aids in a
reconsideration of what is meant by “anarchism” itself. Indeed, as these chapters have sought to
illustrate, anarchic rhetoric allows for what might seem like an oxymoron: a more plural
anarchism. To clarify what I mean, these chapters have aimed to show how anarchic rhetoric,
with its employment by Thomas Jefferson in the “pre-partisan” Colonial period, the anarchist
Benjamin Tucker in the nineteenth century, the Marxist CLR James in the twentieth century, and
twenty-first century far-right conservatives, might allow us to reevaluate our very political
categories so as to find points of contact and rhetorical topoi from which to draw upon in order to
move towards creating a more just and equitable society. To phrase it another way, recognizing
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that “anarchy” really means “anarchies” opens the door for critical theorists to examine events,
groups, and movements that appear politically disagreeable at first blush, which may reveal, in
contradistinction to both our historical and contemporary thinking, that politics is not a series of
problem to be solved; politics is the problem. However, before I elaborate further on these
claims, I want to provide a gloss of the ways in which the most prominent contemporary
theorists and philosophers have addressed politics and (the death of) critical theory.
Because anarchic rhetoric is both an-arkhê-istic in the sense that it is anti-Platonic, and
anarchistic in the sense that it resists the codification of Platonism in the State form, anarchic
rhetoric stands in direct opposition to the current trends in critical and social theory. That is, in
response to many of critical theory’s most reliable tools—ideology critique, social
constructivism, and an anti-essentialist theory of the subject—being appropriated by the Right,
one can isolate four dominant trends with critical and continental thought. Some thinkers,
exemplified by Alain Badiou, have advocated for a renewed emphasis on “philosophy.” Badiou
has argued, “The world needs philosophy to be re-founded on the ruins of metaphysics as
combined and blended with the modern criticism of metaphysics” (Infinite Thought 42). For
Badiou, the connection between a reconstituted metaphysics and politics is concerned with
thinking about “justice,” which is the “name by which a philosophy designates the possible truth
of a political orientation” (Infinite Thought 53). In other words, for Badiou, philosophy is to
determine politics and political subjects; philosophy’s role is to show that “justice designates the
contemporary figure of the political subject,” and “it is by means of such a figure that philosophy
assures, via its own names, the inscription of what our time is capable of in eternity” (Infinite
Thought 56). What is more, when it comes to anarchism, Badiou’s thought presents a paradox.
He writes:
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We know today that all emancipatory politics must put an end to the model of the party,
or of multiple parties, in order to affirm a politics ‘without party’, and yet at the same
time without lapsing into the figure of anarchism, which has never been anything else
than the vain critique, or the double, or the shadow, of the communist parties, just as the
black flag is only the double or the shadow of a red flag. (The Communist Hypothesis
155)
Thus, Badiou gives anarchism both a laudation and denunciation. His goal is anarchy, yet his
method is not anarchistic; philosophy is instead to give rise to anarchy. And while many have
identified a certain anarchist bent in Badiou’s work,3 his veneration of philosophy as that which
gives rise to politics seemingly reifies the sort of Platonism that anarchic rhetoric is wont to
question and resist.
Similar to Badiou’s project, Slavoj Žižek advocates a return to philosophy in the wake of
poststructuralist and postmodern thought. However, for Žižek the return to philosophy means a
return to and/or a repeat of a Leninist-Marxism. He writes:
to repeat Lenin does not mean a return to Lenin — to repeat Lenin is to accept that
“Lenin is dead,” that his particular solution failed, even failed monstrously, but that there
was a utopian spark in it worth saving. To repeat Lenin means that one has to distinguish
between what Lenin effectively did and the field of possibilities that he opened up, the
tension in Lenin between what he effectively did and another dimension, what was “in
Lenin more than Lenin himself.” To repeat Lenin is to repeat not what Lenin did, but
what he failed to do, his missed opportunities. (“Lenin’s Choice” 310)

3

For example, See Benjamin Noys’s “Through a Glass Darkly: Alain Badiou’s Critique
of Anarchism” and Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding.
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In essence, Žižek wants philosophy to perform the same act as Badiou proposes: philosophy
should illuminate the path forward to political emancipation. One can clearly see the affinity
between Badiou and Žižek in the text Philosophy in the Present. In fact, Žižek makes it apparent
as he continually showers Badiou with praise that there is little difference in the way they view
the relationship between philosophy and politics. Citing Badiou approvingly, Žižek posits that
philosophy “literally exists only through the excessive connections to external politics, which are
of either an amorous, political, scientific, or artistic nature” (69). Despite the similarities between
the two, it is evident that their political allegiances differ. Whereas Badiou appears at least
willing to entertain non-Statist, non-liberal and non-Marxist approaches, Žižek is thoroughly
embedded in the Marxist tradition. However, noting Žižek’s discussion of Lenin, his Lenin is not
the historical Lenin and advocate of the vanguard party. In fact, Žižek’s Lenin cannot be the
historical Lenin. Thus, we are left with a vague picture of what Marxism today might look like.
Or, as Peter McLaren writes in JAC, “Consequently, it is unclear how he would suggest that we
proceed—politically and organizationally—in our mission to slay the beast of capital” (644).
Indeed, one might agree with Todd May when he suggest that “given the contortions made in
order to bring Marx into alignment with current thinking, one might wonder whether it would be
better simply to seek a new tradition in which to embed their thought” (“Anarchism from
Foucault to Rancière” 11). In other words, Žižek’s project points to a Marxism that is no longer a
Marxism, which, as such, leaves us with nothing but a politics hidden in clouds of dialectics and
parallax.
The work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri seems to suffer the same fate as Žižek’s.
While Hardt and Negri might provide us with the most succinct diagnosis of the today’s political
climate, their solutions leave us wanting. As a corrective to the postmodern emphasis on the
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negative (anti-essentialism, difference, etc), Hardt and Negri seek to transform the fight against
capitalism and the State into a “positive, constructive, and innovative activity” (413). Drawing
on the ideas of Marx, Machiavelli, Deleuze, and Spinoza, they argue, “Their thought is always
grounded within the real processes of the constitution of modern sovereignty, attempting to make
the contradictions explode and open the space for an alternative society. The outside is
constructed from within” (184). Yet, as many have pointed out,4 while Hardt and Negri are in no
short supply of content, their politics lacks form; they provide no model for how their model of
political subjectivity—the “multitude”—might come into existence and replace the existing
order. Indeed, the vagueness of the last two sentences of the book might serve as a piece of
seemingly axiomatic evidence of Hardt and Negri’s lack of form, as well as recall Marx and
Engel’s own vague definition of communism in The German Ideology. They summarize, “This is
a revolution that no power will control—because biopower and communism, cooperation and
revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible
lightness and joy of being communist” (431). In short, despite the acclaim Hardt and Negri’s
works have received, we are still left without a concrete statement on how such a theoretical
amalgamation is to come to fruition and aide in the struggle for a just world. The result,
according to Timothy Brennan is that Hardt and Negri “[will] their readers to accept their
assertions—‘This is so, is it not?’” (“The Magician’s Wand” 374).
Žižek’s philosophical Leninism, however, has its opposite in what today has become
known as “postanarchism” or “poststructuralist anarchism.” Drawing on the constellation of
postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers of Deleuze, Guttari, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard,
many have argued that poststructuralist thought leads to the anarchist politics of Max Stirner,

4

See Timothy Brennan 337-340.
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Mikhail Bakunin, and others (Kuhn 20-21). Todd May inaugurated such thinking is his 1994
book The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism. In this book, May forwards the
thesis that joining the philosophies of Deleuze, Lyotard, and Foucault to that of “classical
anarchism” might “sketch the framework of an alternative political philosophy, on that differs
from its dominant predecessors, especially free-market liberalism and Marxism, not only in the
vision is provides but also in the level and style of intervention it advocates” (3). Many others,
including Saul Newman and Lewis Call have furthered May’s ideas in order more fully elaborate
the “possibilities of anarchist moments entrenched in the postmodern condition” (Kuhn 19).
While I am sympathetic to the general aims of this work, much of it seems to neglect many
contemporary anarchists’ own distrust of poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking (i.e.
philosophy). In The Coming Insurrection, for instance, the authors—a group of imprisoned
anarchists—explicitly reject poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking:
Today Western imperialism is the imperialism of relativism, of the “It all depends on
your point of view”; it’s the eye-rolling or the wounded indignation at anyone who’s
stupid, primitive, or presumptuous enough to still believe in something, to affirm
anything at all. You can see the dogmatism of constant questioning give its complicit
wink of the eye everywhere in the universities and among the literary intelligentsias. No
critique is too radical among postmodernist thinkers, as long as it maintains this total
absence of certitude. (92)
In other words, anarchism as a political project cannot be substantiated by a groundless
philosophy. Indeed, for The Invisible Committee, once revolution begins, everyone will “be
forced to take sides” (13); one will have “to choose between anarchy and the fear of anarchy”
(130). The point here is that political, economic, and social justice will not stem from using
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anarchist political philosophy to develop alternative epistemologies, ontologies, and ethics that
secure the tenure-track. Indeed, I agree with Jesse Cohn when he writes, “anarchism has more to
offer poststructuralism than Newman and May seem to recognize, and that poststructuralism
affords other and better resources for the development of anarchist theory” (“What is
Postanarchism ‘Post’?”). In addition to using anarchist political philosophy as a framework to
develop and expand philosophical and/or critical thought, the goal is to investigate the ways in
which the various “post-isms” might be used to create, cause, and confirm anarchy.
The ideas of Jacques Rancière, which we have addressed at some length in this study,
have begun to take us in that direction. Rancière, unlike many of his comrades on the Continent,
evokes anarchism as a politics, while also arguing for a reconceptualization of “philosophy” and
its relationship to politics. By supplanting the notion of the people “as lacking” equality,
Rancière argues that equality is the sine qua non of politics. On Rancière’s view, politics is
grounded on an egalitarian presupposition, and that the opposite of politics—the Foucault-esque
“police”—designates categories that determine political subjects and their acceptable roles.
Indeed, political philosophy from Plato to Marx functions as “the police.” The “police”
participate in a process called the “partitioning of the sensible” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 36). In
such an arrangement, all members of a society have a part to play, which results in “consensus”
on the part of the populous. However, such an arrangement is undone by a process he calls
“dissensus;” this process entails subjects putting into actions those very ideas that were under the
logic of the “police” once unavailable to them. “Dissensus” creates a “supplement,” an
unaccounted part of the whole that creates a “rupture with the logic of the arkhê” (“Ten Theses
on Politics” 33). This rupture occurs as a result of rhetorical action; Rancièrian politics “occurs
where a community with the capacity to argue and to make metaphors is likely, at any time and
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through anyone’s intervention, to crop up” (Disagreement 60). To explain, making aesthetic
arguments operates anarchistically; such arguments question the guiding principles on which a
State (the “police”) rests. Framed in such a way, “dissensus” is thoroughly concerned with
rhetoric and, like the Tea Partiers who have and continue to don tricorne hats, the construction of
subversive political subjectivities. While Rancière is mum on the rhetorical tradition, in his
rejection of political philosophy and development of the “egalitarian presupposition,” he
provides a sort of rhetorical formalism that seems to take the shape of a neo-anarchism, which
has revived an interest in the anarchist tradition as an object of study.
Bearing in mind the four positions above, this current study has sought to direct our
attention away from the “return to philosophy” in the works of Badiou and Žižek; the incessant
desire to change philosophical and/or critical thought in order to fit Marxist politics found in the
works of Hardt and Negri and Žižek; and, the fusion of poststructuralist/postmodern thought to
anarchist political philosophy. Instead, this study has aimed to develop and give a full-throated
enunciation of the rhetorical formalism that Rancière’s work suggests by performing a rhetorical
and genealogical analysis of American anarchism.
As we’ve seen throughout the last few chapters, we have developed a model called
anarchic rhetoric that presupposes, like Rancière, absolute equality qua the ability to construct
arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political arraignment rests. Moreover, anarchic
rhetoric puts forward an ethic of shared moral sentiments that can be said to resemble Adam
Smith’s figuration of sympathy. To be specific, the rhetorical interaction of self-interested
individuals who, not through rational persuasion but the expression and judgment of affective
and aestheticized responses, join together in “sympathy” to perform common actions can take
place of the State. Because anarchic rhetoric provides a process that can take the place of the
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State, politics, then, becomes a dynamic and ever-changing state of affairs. It becomes what we
might call a “rhetorical State” that has no political telos other than the staving-off of
infringements on individual liberty (which each individual is free to define for him/herself).
Anarchic rhetoric is, in its essence, without content. It is readily available to partisans of all
stripes, which is, in my estimation, an idea that should be developed so as to resist the “us”
versus “them” worldview that seems to mark contemporary radical politics while also reifying
the critique of representative thinking and politics we have been arguing against. In what
follows, I conclude this study with a short discussion of what such a rhetoric might have for
today’s radical politics and rhetorical theory.
While I hope it has become readily apparent, our model of anarchic rhetoric asks
rhetorical studies to move beyond its emphasis on reason, dialogue, and mediated forms of
communicative interaction. In other words, it asks rhetorical studies to overcome its own
veneration of the Platonic, liberal, and Marxist dialectics that seems to ground the field. Indeed,
as I hope I have showed, these approaches leave little room for thinking about the power of nondialectical, affective, and aesthetic communication can have in creating a more just world. Such
a veneration of these communication models echoes Deleuze’s observation that “[t]o ground is to
determine” (272). Indeed, I hope that the model of anarchic rhetoric that I have put forward
throughout these pages suggests a new starting point for scholars interested in questions of
social, political and economic justice. That is, whereas the Platonic, liberal, and Marxist rhetorics
presuppose a scarcity of dialectical knowledge and that it is the job of dialecticians to give them
the give of such knowledge, anarchic rhetoric presupposes everyone has the ability to make
arguments and that one always, already has the necessary content to effect change: one’s own
affects. Lastly, because anarchic rhetoric is without content, yet can easily be supplied with
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affective content, the resulting messages resemble the aesthetic rather than the ritualized and
mechanistic forms of communication that dialectical models engender. While my view may open
me up to accusations of moral and political relativism, I would respond by pointing to the
anarchist Paul Goodman who once wrote, “Men have a right to be crazy, stupid, and arrogant.
It’s our special thing. Our mistake is to arm any with collective power. Anarchy is the only safe
polity” (57). Thus, whether it be the enlightening the masses to the ideal forms of justice, beauty,
etc, cultivating universal procedures for the use of reason, or fomenting class-consciousness,
anarchic rhetoric resists the concentration of knowledge and power. Anarchic rhetoric, on the
contrary, is overtly democratic in the sense that it trusts in the skills, actions, and judgments of
humanity, which is simply another way of saying that “[a]narchism is the revolutionary idea that
no one is more qualified than you are to decide what your life will be” (CrimethInc 7). Anarchic
rhetoric provides the form that allows one to exercise his/her equality and freedom and determine
the life he/she deems fit for living.
Before pointing up the implications of anarchic rhetoric, I want to provide another quote
from Paul Goodman who, I think, provides a concise view of anarchic rhetoric while also
returning us to Thomas Jefferson. He writes:
And, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, only such an organization of society is selfimproving; we learn by doing, and the only way to education co-operative citizens is to
give power to people as they are. Except in unusual circumstances, there is not much
need for dictators, deans, police, pre-arranged curricula, imposed schedules, conscription,
coercive laws. Free people easily agree among themselves on plausible working rules;
they listen to expert direction when necessary; they wisely choose pre tem leaders.
Remove authority, and there will be self-regulation, not chaos. (94)
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To put it more directly, instead of subscribing to the Platonic dream of finding and fostering the
best leaders to create and usher in a just society, which, as we discussed in an earlier chapter, is
simply one individual’s implementing of a single moral vision, we find, create, and/or foster
better societies where everyone and anyone can participate in determining and debating what is
just. This is what the Tea Party’s inheriting and employment of anarchic rhetoric, a rhetoric
deeply embedded in American radicalism, reminds us of today.
In conclusion, anarchic rhetoric presents two implications, which deserve a brief
explanation. As Don McLeroy and his comrades on the Texas State Board of Education prove,
critique is no longer wed to a particular politics. As such, we might say that critique is dead, at
least in the sense that it no longer serves an outdated Marxist and dialectical vanguardism such as
Horkheimer suggests (221). Its partisan promiscuity suggests, in fact, that the aims of critique
reveal an anti-political bent; the examining and exposing of the contingent nature of any claim of
representation or appeal to immutable “truth,” as well as the power(s) they serve is anarchistic.
And, like the rhetoric Plato warned against, the aims of critique challenge all claims of
representation and/or transcendent truths. Critical thought today takes the shape of anarchic
rhetoric—an astheticized and affective response to a perceived wrong that seeks the dynamic
congealing and dissolving of sympathies in place of the State and absolute ethical relativism.
With that said, anarchic rhetoric draws our attention to a facet of rhetoric that has been
neglected or overlooked by today’s rhetoricians: rhetoric’s an-arkhê-istic function. In fact, when
compared to most rhetoricians, one might say that philosophers have more readily acknowledged
rhetoric’s ability to challenge and undo political institutions and ethical arrangement founded on
“immutable” knowledge. In this sense, the preceding pages have sought to valorize what
rhetoricians have not seen and philosophers since Plato have belied: rhetoric is democratic,
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egalitarian, and a threat to any philosophically-informed politics. To phrase it another way, in
place of the concentrated power and knowledge that both liberalism and Marxism assume, as
well as the notion of absolute moral chaos that is often assigned to rhetoric, anarchic rhetoric
puts the power to determine one’s own life in the hands of anyone and everyone. Painted as such,
this rhetoric—a rhetoric “without content”—provides the framework for seven billion
Declarations of Independence: the beginning of anarchy.
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